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 As a group, anxiety disorders represent the most prevalent mental health 
condition. A hallmark feature of anxiety disorders is avoidant behavior. Along with this, 
anxious individuals have been shown to exhibit a risk aversion in decision making. 
However, anxiety disorders are simultaneously highly co-morbid with substance use 
disorders (e.g., Grant, Stinson, Dawson, & Chou, 2004), suggesting that certain 
individuals with anxiety disorders engage in particular forms of risk taking. However, 
much of the current literature on anxiety and risk taking has focused on risk aversion in 
anxiety, presupposing an inhibited model of anxious responding. In addition, there is 
little literature which explicitly differentiates between adaptive and maladaptive risk 
taking or the relevance of context in risk taking, variables which were predicted to be 
highly important when attempting to interpret risk taking behavior in anxious individuals.  
 There were three overarching aims of the current study: 1) Investigate etiological 
and maintenance factors, particularly motivation and emotion regulation, hypothesized to 
play a role in risk taking behavior in individuals with heightened anxiety; 2) Differentiate 
between maladaptive (negative) and adaptive (positive) risk taking to examine if type of 
 
 
  
risk taking behavior is differentially influenced by anxiety; and 3) Investigate the relation 
between risk taking in the laboratory and naturalistic settings to identify the role of 
context.  
Participants included undergraduate college students enrolled in psychology 
courses (N = 143). Participants completed a laboratory portion of the study where they 
completed three computerized tasks to assess risk taking behavior and self-report 
inventories. The Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3) was utilized due to its clinical 
relevance in anxiety disorders. Following the laboratory session, participants completed a 
naturalistic portion of the study where they completed a week-long diary of their 
engagement in and perception of different risk taking behaviors.  
  Contrary to much of the literature on anxiety and risk taking, anxiety sensitivity 
was not found to be associated with reduced or heightened risk taking for either adaptive 
or maladaptive risk taking domains. Anxiety sensitivity also did not influence risk taking 
in laboratory or naturalistic settings. With regards to original aims, it was found that: 1) 
Anxiety did not interact with predicted moderating variables to influence risk taking 
behavior; 2) On laboratory tasks, positive risk taking was differentiated from negative 
risk taking; however, this distinction was not made in naturalistic settings; and 3) Risk 
taking in the laboratory was not associated with risk taking in real world settings, 
suggesting that it should not be assumed that findings from laboratory tasks will readily  
generalize to real world behavior.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Anxiety disorders are a prevalent mental health concern. Collectively, anxiety 
disorders make up the most prevalent mental health conditions in the US with a life-time 
prevalence rate of 28.8% according to the National Comorbidity Survey-Replication 
(Kessler et al., 2005). Thus, anxiety disorders represent a significant mental health burden 
in the US. Investigation of decision making processes in anxiety can aid in further 
understanding the tendency to avoid, a major cross-diagnostic symptom of anxiety 
disorders. In this regard, decisions which involve risk are particularly important in 
examining the impact of anxiety on decision making. Although risk is inherently 
involved to some degree in all decision making (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008), 
risky decision making typically involves the potential for losses or punishment offset by 
uncertain gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In general, individuals prefer certain gains 
over gambles even when gambles have probabilistically higher payoffs (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). Thus, there is a natural tendency towards risk aversion. However, 
affective state influences the propensity to take risks (Blanchette & Richards, 2010), and 
anxious individuals tend to be comparatively more risk averse than non-anxious 
individuals (Maner et al., 2007; Mueller, Nguyen, Ray, & Borkovec, 2010; Raghunathan 
& Pham, 1999). Under conditions where risk taking is associated with greater payoffs, 
anxious individuals’ greater risk aversion leads to selection of suboptimal choices (Maner 
et al., 2007). This could be an important mechanism that sustains negative affect.  
The perception of risk itself is altered by affect. Specifically, individuals 
experiencing high state anxiety exhibit pessimistic predictions regarding risk (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001). That is, individuals with high levels of state anxiety tend to rate the 
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probability of a negative outcome occurring as higher than individuals with lower levels 
of state anxiety (Mitte, 2007; Stöber, 1997). Anxious individuals also exhibit a 
heightened loss or punishment aversion, which also likely contributes to their risk 
aversion (Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008; Mueller et al., 2010). Anxious individuals’ 
tendency to attend to threatening or dangerous material (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007) likely plays a role in this skewed 
perception. Paradoxically, sensitivity to losses may also render anxious individuals more 
risk seeking in situations where losses are inherent (Hartley & Phelps, 2012). Thus, 
anxious individuals may be more likely to choose uncertain options in conditions where 
certain options are associated with losses or punishment. Anxiety symptoms themselves 
may be viewed as aversive, and attempts to avoid or modulate these symptoms may 
influence risky decision making. Along this line, negative emotions that are high in 
arousal lead to more maladaptive risk taking (Taking, Leith, & Baumeister, 1996). Thus, 
anxious individuals may be more risk seeking under certain circumstances.  
Although anxious individuals are both more risk and loss averse in general, 
studies have not clearly delineated circumstances under which anxious individuals are 
more or less prone to take risks both in laboratory-based and naturalistic decision making. 
Furthermore, studies have not clearly differentiated risk taking that is positive or 
beneficial, which will be referred to as positive risk taking, and risk taking that is 
negative or disadvantageous, which will be referred to as negative risk taking. 
Understanding the impact of anxiety on the propensity to take positive and negative risk 
may provide significant insight into mechanisms underlying impairment in anxiety 
disorders. Thus, this study aims to differentiate positive and negative risk taking and 
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examine associations between anxiety and propensity to avoid or take positive and 
negative risks. Because decision making is largely understudied in naturalistic settings 
where uncertainties and unclear outcome contingencies are generally involved, 
associations between laboratory-based and naturalistic decision making are largely 
unknown. The current study aims to examine the impact of anxiety on decision making in 
both laboratory and naturalistic settings, which allows for the examination of the relations 
between risk taking in these different settings.     
 Trait-like measures of anxiety, such as the anxiety sensitivity index (ASI) which 
assesses levels of anxiety sensitivity (AS), can help to identify individuals who may be at 
risk of developing clinically significant anxiety-related difficulties. AS is a known risk 
factor for the development of panic disorder (Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1999), and AS 
elevations are found across several anxiety disorders including PTSD, social phobia, and 
GAD (Cox, Borger, & Enns, 1999). AS will be discussed in depth as the current study 
will utilize ASI scores as an index of anxiety. In addition, several factors that are 
associated with anxiety and impact decision making will be discussed. Motivation 
theoretically underlies all or most of behavior. In anxiety where there is a pervasive loss 
aversion (Hartley & Phelps, 2012), the underlying motivational focus is expected to be on 
minimizing losses, which can be accomplished in both a more active or passive manner. 
Motivational theories which predict opposing activation and avoidance-based systems 
may not fully capture underlying motivation in anxiety (Higgins, 2005). Regulatory focus 
theory (RFT) predicts that there are two motivation systems- the prevention system, 
which aims to minimize losses and ensure safety and the promotion system, which aims 
to maximize gains and is concerned with advancement (Higgins, 2005). Differences in 
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the functioning of these two systems may underlie anxiety and its effects on decision 
making by motivating behavior in a manner that is consistent with active and/or passive 
avoidance.  
Another factor involved in both anxiety and decision making is emotion 
regulation (ER). ER is defined as attempts to modulate the internal experience or external 
expression of emotions (Gross, 1998). ER can occur in two ways: 1) Antecedent focused 
regulation in which an individual attempts to control emotions prior to experiencing 
them; and 2) response modulation, which involves modifying the expression of the 
emotion (Gross, 1998). Several ER strategies and functions will be considered in depth 
due to their relationship with both anxiety and decision making. One antecedent-focused 
ER strategy, behavioral avoidance (Gross, 1998), will be discussed in depth. Behavioral 
avoidance is a common symptom across anxiety disorders and high levels of trait anxiety. 
In addition, this symptom is often targeted in treatments for anxiety disorders. As an ER 
strategy, behavioral avoidance temporarily reduces anxiety due to evasion of fear-
provoking stimuli. Generally, anxious individuals are expected to engage in more 
behavioral avoidance of risk taking in decision making.  
In sum, this study will examine associations between anxiety and positive and 
negative risk taking in laboratory-based and naturalistic settings, with a focus on factors 
associated with both anxiety and decision making. Examining associations between 
personality traits and connection with real-world risk taking have been identified as areas 
that need further research (Buelow & Suhr, 2009). In addition, there are no studies 
examining the relations between behavior in the laboratory and naturalistic settings which 
account for the effects of anxiety. The overarching goal is to illuminate the factors 
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associated with different types of risk taking in anxiety to reveal sources of impairment 
and protections in clinical anxiety.   
Anxiety 
Anxiety broadly involves the fear and apprehension of specific or broad 
situations, people, or places. Anxious behavior typically involves some level of 
avoidance of feared situations. Autonomic activation which in turn produces somatic 
symptoms is also characteristic of anxiety (Spielberger, 2010). Anxiety can be acquired 
through classical fear learning as demonstrated by Palov’s induction of neurotic dogs 
brought about by an unpredictable, uncontrollable environment, and are maintained by 
persistent feelings of lacking control (Lazarus, 1991). Anxiety, like all emotions, at times 
offers important information needed for survival and to prepare individuals for action 
(Frijda, 1988) and thus can be an adaptive and vital emotional response to one’s 
environment. However, when anxiety becomes predominant, it can negatively impact 
relationships and/or general functioning, causing distress and impairment.  
Anxiety Sensitivity. In attempting to understand anxiety disorders, it may be 
advantageous to examine transdiagnostic constructs as opposed to specific disorders. In 
each subsequent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), anxiety disorders have been further dissected into increasingly numerous 
subtypes and specifiers (Norton & Philipp, 2008). However, high rates of comorbidity 
among anxiety disorders challenge the increasing amount of distinction among anxiety 
disorders imposed by the DSM (Watson, 2005). Upwards of 60% of individuals seeking 
treatment for an anxiety disorder have another anxiety and/or mood disorder (Norton & 
Philipp, 2008). In addition, there is evidence supporting the efficacy of transdiagnostic 
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treatment protocols which are aimed at treating a variety of anxiety disorders rather than 
a specific disorder (Norton & Philipp, 2008). Consequently, the National Institute of 
Mental Health (NIMH) is moving away from research involving classically defined DSM 
diagnoses (Insel, 2013). Thus, the use of transdiagnostic constructs is increasingly 
important in clinical research.  
One such widely studied transdiganostic trait is AS. The AS construct represents 
an individual’s level of responsiveness to their own anxious feelings. Defined as the “fear 
of fear,” or fear and sensitivity to anxiety-related symptoms (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & 
McNally, 1986), AS is elevated across all anxiety disorders (with the exception of 
specific phobia) and plays a particularly important role in the development of panic 
disorder (Taylor, Koch, & McNally, 1992). Whereas trait anxiety has to do with the 
propensity to experience anxiety-like symptoms, AS refers to one’s interpretation of his 
or her own anxious feelings (McNally, Hornig, Hoffman, & Han, 1999). AS has been 
typically measured by the ASI (Reiss et al., 1986). Originally, AS was conceptualized to 
be a single, unitary factor; however, numerous studies revealed that this was not the case 
(R E Zinbarg & Mohlman, 1998). Factor analysis has uncovered a 3-factor structure 
underlying the ASI which involves: (1) Physical Concerns, or the fear of physical anxious 
sensations, (2) Cognitive Concerns, which entails the fear of cognitive dyscontrol, and (3) 
Social Concerns, or the fear of publically observable anxiety symptoms (Taylor & Cox, 
1998). The original ASI has been revised several times in order to improve particularly 
on the 3-factor structure. The psychometric properties of these factors in the original 16-
item ASI lacked strength due to a limited number of items. Specifically, both the Social 
Concerns and Cognitive concerns subscales contain 4 items each in the original measure 
7 
 
  
(Taylor et al., 2007). Several revisions of the ASI were conducted including the ASI-
Revised (ASI-R; Taylor & Cox, 1998a) and the ASI Profile (Taylor & Cox, 1998b), both 
of which involved adding a substantial number of items in an effort to improve the factor 
structure. Neither of these measures successfully accomplished this goal. However, one 
relatively recent revision of the ASI, the ASI-3 (Taylor et al., 2007), has demonstrated 
significant improvement on this 3-factor structure (Olthuis, Watt, & Stewart, 2014; 
Taylor et al., 2007; Wheaton, Deacon, McGrath, Berman, & Abramowitz, 2012). Thus, 
the ASI-3 is the measure which best captures the true multidimensional nature of AS 
(Wheaton et al., 2012).   
Although high levels of AS are associated with various psychopathology (e.g., 
depression, substance abuse), they have specific predictive value in anxiety disorders        
(McNally, 2002). AS levels at baseline predict the frequency and intensity of panic 
attacks in prospective studies (Plehn & Peterson, 2002; Schmidt et al., 1999). AS also 
predicted the number of feared situations in individuals diagnosed with agoraphobia         
(McNally & Lorenz, 1987). A 3-year prospective study in which AS and anxiety 
symptoms were initially assessed in 1984 and then in 1987 demonstrated that AS level 
was significantly predictive of the risk for development of future anxiety disorders 
(Maller & Reiss, 1992). Specifically, results demonstrated that individuals who had 
scored most highly on the ASI were five times more likely than low scorers to be 
diagnosed with any anxiety disorder (Maller & Reiss, 1992). Recent investigations using 
the ASI-3 have found that scores on the Social Concerns subscale are positively 
correlated with social phobia while high scores on the Physical Concerns subscale are 
associated with panic disorder (Olthuis et al., 2014; Wheaton et al., 2012). The Cognitive 
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Concerns subscale is associated with GAD symptoms (Wheaton et al., 2012) and 
depressive symptoms (Olthuis et al., 2014). AS is viewed as an “anxiety amplifier” in 
that high AS individuals are more attuned to and fearful of anxiety symptoms when they 
occur, which further increases the intensity of these symptoms (Taylor et al., 2007). AS 
may also be a useful clinical tool in revealing idiosyncratic beliefs about anxiety 
symptoms, which can be targeted by therapeutic interventions. Along this line, reducing 
elevated AS in itself may be useful in treating panic disorder (Smits et al., 2008). 
 Reductions in AS following treatment for anxiety disorders further demonstrate 
the relevance of AS as a clinically significant construct. Following cognitive behavioral 
therapy (CBT), patients with anxiety disorders exhibit significant reductions in their ASI 
scores to normative levels (McNally & Lorenz, 1987; Smits et al., 2008; Telch et al., 
1993). Medication-based treatments also decrease ASI scores, some more effectively and 
long-term than others. While benzodiazepines decrease anxiety symptoms in the short 
term, they do not decrease ASI scores (McNally, 2002). In contrast, use of imipramine, a 
tricyclic anti-depressant, results in significant reductions in ASI scores (Mavissakalian, 
Perel, Talbott-Green, & Sloan, 1998). The relative lack of efficacy of benzodiazepines in 
reducing ASI scores may be due to a blockade of anxiety symptoms that limits 
opportunities for individuals to learn that anxiety symptoms are not harmful (Fava et al., 
1994).Therefore, exposure to anxiety symptoms is a key component in eliciting AS 
reductions. Physical exercise may reduce AS levels as physical activity naturally exposes 
individuals to arousing physical sensations. This may allow anxious individuals to 
habituate to these arousing sensations and learn that these feelings are not dangerous or 
harmful (Smits et al., 2008). Smits and colleagues (2008) investigated the impact of a 
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short-term exercise regime on AS levels and found significant decreases in AS levels 
following the exercise program. In addition, these reductions were associated with 
reductions in depressed mood and anxiety symptoms (Smits et al., 2008). In summary, 
AS is a multi-dimensional construct which has significant clinical relevance. AS, as 
assessed by the ASI-3, will be used in the current study as an indicator of level of 
anxiety. 
Etiological and Maintenance Factors. Although there are numerous psychological, 
biological, and social factors influencing anxiety, a full review of all of these factors is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Several psychological and social etiological factors will 
be discussed in depth in the following sections due to their dual relationships with anxiety 
and decision making. 
Motivation. Abnormalities in motivation are frequently found in various forms of 
mental health conditions (e.g., schizophrenia, depression). In particular, anxiety is 
associated with avoidance motivation (Lazarus, 1993). While there are many theories of 
motivation (e.g. drive theory), regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 2005) will be 
discussed in depth given its relevance to the understanding of anxiety and decision 
making. RFT explains how individuals pursue goals and may provide insight regarding 
the way anxious individuals make decisions. According to RFT, there are two 
motivational systems: A prevention system, marked by vigilance and an overall goal to 
prevent losses, and a promotion system, marked by eagerness and an overall focus on 
achievements (Higgins, 2005). These two systems are mutually inhibitory. That is, when 
one regulatory system is activated in pursuit of a goal, the other system is naturally 
inhibited (Klenk, Strauman, & Higgins, 2011). Psychologically healthy individuals are 
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able to switch back and forth between these two regulatory systems flexibly depending 
on the context of the situation and goals being pursued. In individuals with heightened 
levels of anxiety, however, it is predicted that a chronic prevention focus is predominant, 
which may be related to the etiology of certain anxiety disorders (Klenk et al., 2011). 
Indeed, there is a body of empirical evidence demonstrating a risk aversion, which is 
associated with a prevention focus, in anxiety (e.g., Maner et al., 2007; Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999). Individuals high in anxiety also exhibit a tendency to focus on preventing 
losses rather than gaining achievements. The active vigilant system associated with loss 
prevention is also predicted to be involved in many avoidance-related behaviors observed 
in clinical presentations of anxiety. In addition, a prevention focus is hypothesized to 
underlie reduced risk seeking behavior in individuals with high levels of anxiety.  
RFT also underscores the importance of regulatory fit, which relates to what 
individuals value (Higgins, 2005). Each goal that is pursued is associated with a specific 
regulatory focus, and a goal can be pursued in two manners- either eagerly or vigilantly. 
RFT highlights the fact that a goal may be pursued in an eager fashion, which is 
associated a promotion focus, or in a vigilant fashion, which is associated with a 
prevention focus. The fit between an individual’s motivational orientation (i.e., 
promotion- or prevention-focused) and the manner in which they pursue the goal (i.e., 
eagerly or vigilantly) enhances engagement in goal pursuit (Higgins, 2005). In other 
words, when an individual experiences regulatory fit, there is a feeling or “correctness 
and importance” about the goal they are pursuing. For instance, an anxious individual 
would experience regulatory fit when they pursue a prevention goal in a vigilant manner. 
The anxious individual may pursue the goal of preventing a grade lower than an A on a 
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test (i.e., the prevention goal), and this may be accomplished through examining what is 
going to be on the test and reviewing material many times to prevent the loss of studied 
information (i.e., the vigilant method). The individual will experience regulatory fit 
through their avoidance of a grade lower than an A. Experiencing regulatory fit when 
pursuing goals enhances negative or positive responses to objects or situations, including 
the value of consumer goods (Avnet & Tory Higgins, 2003)and job satisfaction 
(Kruglanski, Pierro, Higgins, & Capozza, 2007). 
It is important to consider the experience of successes and failures through the use of 
promotion and prevention systems. Paradoxically, the overuse of the prevention system 
in anxious individuals is predicted to result in greater prevention failures based on the 
curvilinear relationship between anxiety and performance known as the Yerkes-Dodson 
law (Klenk et al., 2011). Hyperarousal or hypervigilance associated with prevention goals 
may reduce success in reaching prevention goals. Prevention successes reduce 
hyperactivity of the prevention system (Higgins, 2005), while prevention failures are 
expected to further increase prevention system’s hyperactivity and vigilance (Klenk et al., 
2011). Thus, repeated prevention failures resulting from the overuse of the prevention 
system in anxious individuals will further increase the activation of this system. Over 
time, anxious individuals become overly reliant on the prevention system. However, 
repeated prevention failures put anxious individuals at higher risk to experience increased 
negative affect (Klenk et al., 2011). Prevention failures are related to both anxiety and 
depressive symptoms (Strauman, 1992), and chronic regulatory failure increases 
susceptibility to psychopathology in general (Papadakis, Prince, Jones, & Strauman, 
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2006; Strauman, 1992).This represents a pathway by which motivation may be involved 
in the etiology and maintenance of negative affect. 
Emotion Regulation. Emotion regulation (ER) is a multifaceted processes involving 
how, when, and what type of emotions individuals experience (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, 
& Fresco, 2002). The ability to effectively and adaptively manage emotions is highly 
important to psychological heath (Gross & John, 2003). As reviewed earlier, Gross’s 
(1998) seminal theory of ER proposes different temporal points in affective processing 
which motivate the use of particular ER strategies. That is, individuals may enact 
strategies to manage emotion before they emerge (antecedent-focused ER) or while the 
emotion is occurring (response modulation ER). Gross’s theory serves as the framework 
for understanding ER; however, researchers differ on definitions of ER and what 
constitutes an ER strategy. Due to the wide breadth of ER strategies identified, only a 
selected number of strategies will be reviewed which fit within the framework of Gross’s 
overarching ER theory. Antecedent-focused and response modulation ER techniques will 
be reviewed, followed by a discussion of interactions between motivation and ER.  
Antecedent-focused ER. Antecedent-focused ER strategies are used prior to an 
emotional response and involve strategies employed both prior to or after an emotion-
eliciting situation. Situation selection and situation modification represent two initial 
ways emotions may be regulated at the situational level. Situation selection and 
modification may involve approach or avoidance of particular situations to regulate 
emotions. Due to its relevance to anxiety, avoidance as a situation selection and 
modification strategy will be elaborated on further.  
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Attention deployment is another form of antecedent-focused ER. Attentional 
deployment refers to the relative attention placed on or away from emotions (Gross, 
1998) and includes distraction, rumination, worry, and thought suppression (Campbell-
Sills & Barlow, 2007). In generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), individuals experience 
more intense emotional experiences resulting in an increased necessity to regulate 
emotions (Mennin et al., 2002). Worry, a characteristic symptom of GAD, is 
conceptualized as an attempt to control intense emotional experiences (Mennin et al., 
2002). Rumination is another ER strategy that anxious individuals use to deal with their 
internal experiences. Rumination involves focused attention on internal symptoms of 
distress and may perpetuate or exacerbate cognitive biases seen in anxiety. One study 
found that socially anxious individuals engaged in more rumination following a social 
interaction experience than non-anxious individuals (Mellings & Alden, 2000). 
Rumination in turn predicted the amount of negative self-relevant information recalled on 
a memory task and prolonged negative judgment biases regarding social events (Mellings 
& Alden, 2000). These results support the involvement of rumination in creating and/or 
maintaining cognitive biases in individuals with high levels of anxiety.  
A final form of antecedent-focused ER strategy is cognitive change. This involves 
changing the manner in which an individual appraises a situation in order to modify the 
emotional significance or connotation (Gross, 1998). Cognitive change strategies include 
denial, isolation, intellectualization, downward social comparison, reappraisal (Gross, 
1998), and distancing (Ochsner & Gross, 2008). In general, cognitive reappraisal has 
been found to be an adaptive strategy. Using cognitive reappraisal strategies reduces the 
subjective experience of negative emotions and induces simultaneous neural changes 
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(Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). Cognitive reappraisal is heavily utilized in 
cognitive-behavioral treatments for a range of mental health problems (Beck & Clark, 
1997) and has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in effecting positive 
changes in the context of mental health problems. For instance, following individual 
CBT, self-reported efficacy in cognitive reappraisal mediated the effectiveness of the 
treatment in reducing social anxiety symptoms (Goldin et al., 2012).  
Avoidance. Avoidance is a multifaceted concept which may be used as a specific 
situation selection and modification ER strategy. Avoidance can be active such as the 
active regulation of current behavior (e.g., escaping a dangerous or threatening situation) 
or passive which generally involves the inhibition of a certain behavior/behaviors (e.g., 
inhibition of responses; Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008). Active avoidance entails 
escaping or attempting to modify an experience in some form (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, 
Follette, & Strosahl, 1996). Active avoidance of certain situations, objects, or individuals 
may be adaptive. However, in individuals with anxiety disorders in which avoidance is a 
key feature, avoidant behavior has usually surpassed an adaptive threshold. Passive 
avoidance involves the inhibition of a response to avoid an aversive or punishing 
stimulus (Cornwell, Overstreet, Krimsky, & Grillon, 2013). Animal and human studies 
have demonstrated examples of both passive and active avoidance that are preceded by 
different conditioning experiences. In both instances, responses (e.g., pressing a level to 
stop a loud ringing noise) are acquired through operant conditioning (e.g., negative 
reinforcement by the cessation of the noise when the lever is pushed). Individuals with 
high levels of anxiety engage in both active and passive avoidance as situation selection 
and modification ER strategies.  
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  Avoidance maintains anxiety symptoms because it prevents opportunities to learn 
non-fearful associations with feared stimuli (Craske et al., 2008; Foa & Kozak, 1986). 
Long-term consequences of avoidance include increased fear to the avoided situation or 
stimulus, impairment associated with avoidant behavior, and/or distress resulting from 
increases in fear (Cisler, Olatunji, Feldner, & Forsyth, 2010). Avoidance restricts natural 
experimentation with the real world. Due to this lack of experimentation, fear is 
maintained or even heightened as beliefs about threatening stimuli or situations cannot be 
disconfirmed and are therefore maintained (Craske, 1999). Fear extinction is interrupted 
by active avoidance as manifested by safety behaviors exhibited during extinction phases 
(Lovibond, Mitchell, Minard, Brady, & Menzies, 2009).  
Passive forms of avoidance, which involve inhibition of a response to prevent 
aversive consequences (e.g., withholding a keyboard response to a stimulus that is 
potentially punishing), is also related to anxiety. The behavioral inhibition system or 
temperament style is associated with both passive avoidance and anxiety (Hirvonen, 
Aunola, Alatupa, Viljaranta, & Nurmi, 2013). Behavioral inhibition is characterized by 
fearfulness or wariness of unfamiliar situations or individuals, withdrawal from 
unfamiliar peers, and harm avoidance in children (Chronis-Tuscano et al., 2009). In 
adults, behavioral inhibition represents sensitivity to stimuli that are aversive and non-
rewarding as well as higher levels of threat anticipation (Carver & White, 1994). 
Behavioral inhibition is linked to the development of anxiety disorders. For instance, 
behavioral inhibition in early childhood predicts a four-fold increased risk of developing 
social anxiety disorder in adolescence and increases the risk of development of anxiety 
disorders in general (Chronis-Tuscano et al., 2009). In addition, behavioral inhibition has 
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been directly linked to passive avoidant behavior in humans (i.e., distance from a 
potentially threatening object in a virtual reality task; Bach et al., 2014). Similar to active 
avoidance, passive avoidance interrupts fear extinction resulting in more persistent fear 
expressions (Cornwell et al., 2013).  
Avoidance is highly significant to anxiety disorders. If left untreated, avoidance 
tends to generalize to progressively more situations, as observed clinically in GAD and 
social phobia  (Kessler et al., 2005; Turner, Beidel, & Townsley, 1992). Anxiety and 
avoidance of a greater number of situations and/or stimuli may be more severe than 
anxiety disorders where only specific stimuli are avoided. For instance, in social phobia, 
individuals with generalized subtypes have greater symptom severity, more distress, and 
more problematic social functioning compared to individuals with specific social phobia 
(e.g., public speaking; Turner et al., 1992). These differences were found even in the 
absence of differences in objective social skills (Turner et al., 1992). Similar results were 
obtained in an epidemiology study that examined the relative disorder severity, ranging 
from mild to severe, in individuals meeting criteria for a range of mood and anxiety 
disorders (Kessler et al., 2005). Serious severity was defined as the presence of a suicide 
attempt, work disability, general functioning impairment, and other serious mental health 
problems (e.g., bipolar disorder, substance dependence). Specific phobia, which by nature 
of the disorder is associated with fear of a specific object or situation, was the least likely 
of all anxiety disorders to be of serious severity and the most likely to be experienced as 
mild in severity (Kessler et al., 2005). Overall, there is support for the notion that greater 
avoidance is associated with more symptoms of anxiety, which in turn is related to 
greater impairment. 
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Response-focused ER. Response modulation involves attempts at modifying the 
actual experience of the emotion (Gross, 1998). Expressive suppression, drug use, 
exercise, progressive relaxation techniques, and biofeedback are all forms of response 
modulation (Gross, 1998). Although what is considered an adaptive ER strategy differs 
depending on the context of the situation (Gross & Thompson, 2007), some response 
modulation strategies (e.g., exercise) are effective and adaptive ways of coping with 
emotional experiences (Smits et al., 2008). Persistent use of particular response 
modulation strategies may be advantageous in the short-term but may confer maladaptive 
long-term consequences if engaged in for prolonged periods of time. For instance, 
expressive suppression confers short-term benefits in graduate students, but persistent use 
of expressive suppression is associated with worse well-being (Myers, McCrea, & Tyser, 
2013).  
Expressive suppression is considered an attempt to avoid experiencing internal 
symptoms or a way of conforming to social norms or facilitating social interactions by 
not displaying negative emotions. While expressive suppression may inhibit many 
external aspects of the emotion, it does not decrease subjective or physiological makers 
of negative mood (Gross & Levenson, 1997). In fact, individuals who utilize expressive 
suppression often report greater negative emotions and less positive emotions compared 
to individuals who do not use this ER strategy under similar circumstances (Gross & 
Levenson, 1997; Gross & John, 2003; Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2010). 
Anxious individuals are more likely to utilize expressive suppression to regulate 
emotions (Amstadter, 2008; Cisler et al., 2010).  Specifically, individuals with a number 
of anxiety disorders (e.g., PTSD, panic disorder) report using expressive suppression 
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more often in emotionally challenging situations (e.g., carbon dioxide challenge) than 
individuals without anxiety disorders (Amstadter, 2008). In addition, the use of 
expressive suppression is associated with more anxiety symptoms than the use of 
cognitive reappraisal strategies (Hofmann et al., 2010). Thus, expressive suppression is 
considered to play an important role in the development and maintenance of anxiety 
symptoms (Amstadter, 2008). In particular, the frequent or default use of expressive 
suppression may increase the negative emotions anxious individuals are attempting to 
regulate in the first place (Gross & Levenson, 1997). The effects of response modulation 
strategies on behavior, particularly decision making, in anxious individuals will be 
discussed in a subsequent section.  
Emotion Regulation and Motivation. ER strategies often represent an attempt by 
individuals to avoid or decrease negative emotions and increase positive emotions (Gross, 
1998). However, this hedonic account does not fully explain the function of ER in all 
situations.  Understanding the relation between ER and goal motivation may help to 
better contextualize ER. The relation between ER and RF is largely understudied; 
however, a recent examination found links among ER, RF, and anxiety. Llewellyn and 
colleagues (2012) found that a promotion focus was associated with less anxiety, greater 
use of adaptive ER strategies (i.e., cognitive reappraisal), and less use of maladaptive ER 
strategies (i.e., expressive suppression). Importantly, the relation between anxiety and a 
promotion focus was partially mediated by the tendency to use cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression. That is, individuals who reported greater engagement in the 
promotion system also reported greater use of cognitive reappraisal as an ER strategy, 
which in turn was associated with less anxiety symptoms.  Researchers predicted that a 
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prevention focus would be associated with greater anxiety symptoms based on RFT (see 
Klenk et al., 2011). Specifically, the prevention system is expected to be overactive in 
individuals with heightened levels of anxiety due to a heightened focus on losses in 
anxiety. A relation between anxiety and prevention focus has not been empirically 
established yet; however, a prevention focus is associated with the greater use of 
expressive suppression and not associated with cognitive reappraisal (Llewellyn, Dolcos, 
Iordan, Rudolph, & Dolcos, 2013). Given that expressive suppression may increase 
anxiety symptoms (Gross & Levenson, 1997; Hofmann et al., 2010), the association 
between a prevention focus and expressive suppression may suggest that individuals who 
have a higher prevention focus are at greater risk for the development of anxiety 
disorders. Overall, results suggest relations among RF, ER, and anxiety which warrant 
further examination. 
Decision Making 
Individuals express their underlying desires through choices or decisions they 
make (Scott, 2000). Decision making generally represents higher order cognitive 
processes which draw on executive functions; however, intuitive processes are also 
involved in some aspects of decision making. According to Kable and Glimcher (2009), 
decision making consists of two separable processes: The valuation process and the 
choice process. The valuation process involves evaluation of options on a continuum 
(from low value to high value). The choice process occurs after the valuation process and 
involves the actual selection of an option. Variables associated with decision making can 
vary widely. The degree of uncertainty is one of the major variables involved in the 
decision. In certain decision making situations, a vast amount of knowledge is known or 
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available regarding expected outcomes. Thus, degree of (un)certainty regarding outcomes 
may be high or low (Weber & Johnson, 2009). Another important variable in decision 
making is the amount of gains and losses associated with particular options. These 
variables, which influence the types of decision individuals make, will be discussed in 
greater depth in a subsequent section.   
Theories. Decision making theories from economics and public administration 
can offer some insight into how decisions are made at an individual level. Some early 
theories of decision making posit the decision-maker as completely rational and do not 
account for the influence of emotion (Turner & Homans, 1961). Early theories were 
based on the notion that actual and ideal decision making could be determined through 
modeling based on Bayesian probabilities (Resnick, 2012). According to rational choice 
theory (Turner & Homans, 1961), individuals make decisions based on the expected 
utility with the goal of maximizing gains while also minimizing losses (Lindenberg & 
Frey, 1993). Rational choice theory utilizes mathematical modeling to explain how 
individuals evaluate options. As information in the system grows, individuals use short-
cuts such as heuristics in order to simplify large volumes of information (Lindenberg & 
Frey, 1993). However, this theory does not account for uncertainty in decision making as 
there is an implicit assumption that the decision maker is omniscient regarding outcomes 
(Etzioni, 1967).     
Incremental decision making theory (Lindblom, 1959) was developed to explain 
how policy makers evaluate and choose options, while improving upon limitations of 
rational choice theory. This theory considers the cognitive limitations inherent in humans 
when making decisions. Choices are evaluated against existing policies with the focal 
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point being on the incremental difference between the two, and choices that are most 
similar to existing policies are considered (Lindblom, 1959). Unlike rational choice 
theory (Turner & Homans, 1961), incremental theory postulates that decision-makers 
consider only a select number of alternatives based on the initial evaluation stage in order 
to reduce the cognitive load of considering a multiplicity of decisions.  
 Mixed-scanning (Etzioni, 1967) integrates key components of rational choice 
theory (Turner & Homans, 1961) and incremental decision making theory (Lindblom, 
1959). A plethora of choices are first evaluated by the decision-maker. Similar to 
incremental theory, an initial decision based on the utility of spending time and resources 
considering certain options is made, and particular choices are considered in greater 
depth from this initial scan. The initial scan may be revisited periodically, and there may 
be more than two scan levels to be considered. Thus, this model allows for greater 
adaptability and flexibility compared to rational choice theory and incremental decision 
making theory (Etzioni, 1967).     
All three theories account for conscious, analytical aspects of decision making. 
Later decision making theories have moved away from normative models to less 
analytical theories of decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Dual processing 
theory of decision making hypothesizes that there are two decisional modes: The 
intuitive/implicit mode, which tends to rely on heuristics and the analytical/explicit mode 
that relies more on conscious, controlled cognitive processes (Glöckner & Witteman, 
2010). The intuitive mode has been linked to affectively charged, emotional decision 
making, while the analytical mode is associated with integration of mainly cognitive 
information and is more deliberate and strategic (Starcke & Brand, 2012).  
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Research has demonstrated evidence of distinguishable intuitive and analytical 
modes operating in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a frequently utilized decision making 
paradigm (Stocco, Fum, & Napoli, 2009). In the original version of the IGT, participants 
are instructed to make selections from four decks of card. Two of the four decks are 
associated with smaller rewards but also lower penalties, and persistent selections from 
these decks result in an overall gain. These are considered “good” decks. The other two 
decks are associated with larger rewards but also larger penalties, and persistent 
selections from these decks result in an overall loss. These are considered “bad” decks. 
Individuals receive feedback after each selection signifying the amount they have gained 
and lost on each trail. In addition, a tally of overall points the individual currently has is 
displayed at the bottom of the screen. Stocco and colleagues (2009) used a modified 
version of the IGT in which there were two phases: A learning phase, which is identical 
to the original version described, and a purely decision making phase in which neither 
trial-by-trial feedback nor total points are displayed. Thus, during the second phase, 
participants make selections based on previously learned associations. In addition, a 
distractor was added during both phases to examine the involvement of executive 
cognitive resources in both learning and decision making phases of the task. In the 
learning phase, performance was dependent on learning the pay-off structure of the task, 
a higher level of process, and distractors interrupted performance. The second phase, the 
decision phase of the task, was sensitive to loss frequency and magnitude, and choices 
were made based on immediate emotional reactions. However, performance during the 
second phase was not sensitive to distractors. These results suggest that the 
intuitive/implicit mode (i.e., the decision phase) is distinguishable from the 
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analytical/explicit mode (i.e., the learning phase) supporting dual processes theory 
(Stocco et al., 2009).      
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) is yet another theory of decision 
making which explains how individuals manage risk and uncertainty. Prospect theory 
predicts that individuals make decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains 
as opposed to outcomes. That is, individuals choose options based on their subjective 
probabilities which may differ from objective probabilities. Unlike normative decision 
making theory, this theory is descriptive because it explains real-life decisions in contrast 
to optimal outcomes. According to prospect theory, decision making occurs in two 
stages: The editing stage and the evaluation stage (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the 
editing stage, individuals consider and weigh outcomes based on their predicted 
probability of occurring. Components of a decision are separated into riskless and risky 
components during the editing phase. In the evaluation stage, individuals determine a 
value associated with options based on both subjective probabilities and subjective value 
of potential outcomes and ultimately choose the option with the higher utility (i.e., lesser 
or infrequent losses and/or higher, more frequent gains; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In 
general, individuals tend to be risk averse. Risk aversion refers to the unwillingness to 
choose options with uncertain payoffs over options with more certain outcomes (but 
potentially lower payoffs) with the goal of avoiding ambiguity (Lipshitz & Strauss, 
1997). Thus, individuals tend to be averse to uncertainty, choosing certain options even 
when uncertain options have a higher mathematical probability of greater payoffs 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Furthermore, most individuals tend to be loss-averse, 
giving higher value to losses as opposed to gains. The value function (Figure 1) predicted 
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by prospect theory depicts the relative value given to gains and losses. According to 
prospect theory, the function is concave for gains and convex for the domain of losses, 
and the curve is steeper for losses compared to gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). This 
function demonstrates the relatively higher value given to losses compared to gains.  
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical Value Function Based on Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979)   
 
 
Emotions and Decision Making. Contrary to normative theories of decision 
making, decision-makers are not always (and in fact are often not) rational. In fact, 
emotion is an essential part of decision making. For example, the accurate processing of 
emotion prior to decision making has been found to be key to rational and adaptive 
decision making in studies using the IGT (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Emotions may be 
involved in decision making in two ways: Integrally or incidentally (Blanchette & 
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Richards, 2010). Integral emotion is intrinsically involved or evoked by the material 
being processed (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). For instance, decision options may 
include emotional content (e.g., life or death emergency medical situations). Incidental 
emotion includes transient or stable affective states which are not directly related to the 
target material, including trait characteristics (e.g., trait anxiety) and mood inductions 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Given that this project will examine the impact of anxiety 
sensitivity on decision making, this review will focus on the impact of incidental emotion 
on decision making and in particular the impact of anxiety on decision making.  
Most research examining the effects of incidental emotion on decision making 
have focused on the propensity to avoid or approach risk (and relatedly, sensitivity to 
gains and losses). In terms of significance to anxiety, the propensity to be risk averse may 
be particularly important in understanding which individuals will demonstrate avoidance 
above and beyond other factors. Due to the importance of risk in decision making and 
anxiety, the following review will focus exclusively on decision making which involves 
risk.   
To understand potential mechanisms underlying propensity to avoid or approach 
risks in anxiety, it is important to examine models explaining the processes by which 
individuals make decisions under uncertain conditions. The lack of certainty of the 
decision, the key component defining risky decision making, stimulates three different 
basic methods for coming to decisions (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). First, decision makers 
attempt to reduce uncertainty by using methods such as collecting more information, 
filling in gaps in knowledge with assumptions, and using statistical methods to predict the 
likelihood of events occurring (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). A second strategy involves 
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acknowledging the associated uncertainty which can be done in two broad ways: Taking 
uncertainty into account in selecting the course of action or by preparing to avoid or 
confront the risk involved. Lastly, individuals may make decisions without knowledge of 
the probabilities and consequences of outcomes, thereby suppressing uncertainty 
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Suppressing uncertainty can occur through denial of the 
uncertainty, which may be accomplished by distorting information related to the 
uncertainty. Alternatively, individuals might rationalize the uncertainty, which involves 
coping with uncertainty symbolically by going through the process of reducing or 
acknowledging it but never actually completing these processes. Anxious and non-
anxious individuals alike may use these different strategies to manage uncertainty 
through the decisions they make. 
Anxiety. The role of anxiety in decision making has been studied both in the 
laboratory and in naturalistic settings. Laboratory-based studies on decision making allow 
for the examination of decision making in a controlled environment and manner. For 
example, laboratory decision making paradigms can examine particular aspects of 
decision making, such as risk and reward, levels of which can also be controlled. 
Laboratory paradigms are important for isolation and control of these characteristics to 
maximize group differences in decision making. However, a major limitation of research 
using laboratory paradigms is the relative lack of knowledge of how behavior in the 
laboratory may directly translate to real-world behavior. Laboratory research only 
indirectly suggests how behavior may function in the real-world.   
In contrast to the constrained and controlled nature of laboratory decision making, 
naturalistic decision making can involve vague and competing goals, a higher degree of 
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complexity of integration of information that is often ambiguous (Resnick, 2012). 
Naturalistic decision making does not tend to follow normative decision making rules. 
That is, Bayesian modeling does not always aid in explaining actual decisions (Resnick, 
2012). The examination of decision making in naturalistic settings has largely focused on 
the influence of acute stress on decision making as opposed to the influence of decision 
makers’ trait characteristics. The decision making situation under acute stress generally 
involves the characteristics of high uncertainty, time pressure, and extreme consequences 
of decisions (Baumann, Sniezek, & Buerkle, 2001). Studies conducted both in the 
laboratory and in naturalistic settings will be reviewed below. Currently, no published 
studies examined the influence of anxiety on decision making in both laboratory and 
naturalistic settings.   
Risk Aversion. Trait anxiety and anxiety inductions are associated with a 
persistent risk aversion both in self-reported behavior and performance on laboratory 
gambling tasks (Blanchette & Richards, 2010). In one study examining the effects of 
mood inductions on risk taking, individuals were presented with hypothetical gambling 
and career options along with the relative probability of outcomes (Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999). Individuals who were induced to experience anxiety selected the least risky 
options compared to controls and individuals who were induced to experience other 
forms of negative affect (i.e., sadness). Another study using the Balloon Analogue Risk 
Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) examined the impact of anxiety on decision making in 
the laboratory (Maner et al., 2007). The BART, which rewards risk taking, involves 
inflating a virtual balloon on a computer screen by pumping it up. Individuals earn 
money for each pump which is placed in a temporary bank not visible to the participant. 
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All balloons have a bursting point that varies by balloon, and if a balloon bursts all 
money in the temporary bank is lost. At any point, individuals may transfer the money 
they have earned in their temporary bank to their total permanent bank (which is visible 
to the participant). The more the balloon is inflated, the greater potential reward; 
however, the potential risk of losing money earned in the temporary bank also increases. 
Maner and colleagues (2006) examined decision making in different populations using 
the BART. Individuals high in trait social anxiety, those who were high in trait anxiety, 
and those with anxiety disorders made more risk avoidant choices compared to controls, 
individuals with mood disorders, and individuals with learning disabilities (Maner et al., 
2007). Overall, findings suggest a pronounced risk aversion in anxious individuals which 
is distinct from participants experiencing other forms of chronic or transient negative 
affect. 
Affective states, such as anxiety, may result in the misattribution of the affective 
state to the decision situation, known as the affect as information phenomenon (Pham, 
2007; Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006). Emotion-understanding represents the 
ability to accurately identify the source of internal emotions and influences the extent to 
which affect is used as information. Low levels of emotion-understanding, or a lack of 
awareness of the source of emotion, play a large role in the misattribution of negative 
affect to the decision situation (Yip & Côté, 2012). Following an anxiety induction, 
individuals low (vs. high) in emotion-understanding took fewer risks (Yip & Côté, 2012). 
An interesting finding was that when participants were informed of the source of their 
anxiety, the differences between individuals with low and high emotion-understanding in 
risk taking disappeared. These findings suggest that the source of affect was misattributed 
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in low emotion-understanding individuals resulting in behavior congruent with the affect 
(Yip & Côté, 2012). Thus, when individuals are uncertain regarding the source of their 
affect, their current affect is more likely to influence decision making (Raghunathan et 
al., 2006). Acute stress can have a negative impact on decision making by interrupting 
cognitive processes involved in decision making (Starcke & Brand, 2012). However, the 
interpretation of acute stress as a challenge as opposed to a threat reduces the negative 
effects of stress on decision making (Starcke & Brand, 2012), which further supports the 
importance of the interpretation of affective information on decision making processes. 
Choices may be evaluated and made based on the attribution of the incidental affect to 
these options instead of the objective underlying probability of outcomes. This is in line 
with prospect theory’s prediction that individuals select options based on subjective 
perceptions of underlying probabilities.  
ER also influences risk taking behavior in anxious individuals. Risk aversion may 
be a situation selection or modification ER strategy in anxious individuals, especially 
when risk averse decision making involves avoidant behavior. In a study directly 
examining the influence of ER on risk taking, participants were instructed to utilize a 
particular emotion regulation strategy (i.e., reappraise, suppress, or no instructions) 
during a fear or disgust mood induction, and then participants completed the BART 
(Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea, & Miu, 2010). Individuals who were instructed to 
reappraise took more risks on the BART than participants instructed to suppress or given 
no particular instructions. The use of cognitive reappraisal under naturalistic conditions 
also increased risk-taking in individuals who were experiencing a transient negative 
mood (Heilman et al., 2010). In contrast, the use of expressive suppression did not alter 
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risk aversion in individuals who were experiencing negative mood states (Heilman et al., 
2010). Importantly, risk taking is advantageous on the BART up to a certain point. These 
results suggest that task performance is improved both in laboratory and naturalistic 
settings through the use of cognitive reappraisal but not by expressive suppression. 
Anxious individuals are more likely to use expressive suppression to regulate emotions 
and less likely to use reappraisal strategies (Amstadter, 2008), which likely contribute to 
risk aversion in anxious individuals.  
Motivational factors may also influence risk averse behavior in anxious 
individuals. As reviewed earlier, individuals experience greater regulatory fit when there 
is a match between the goal being pursued and the manner in which the goal is pursued. 
Regulatory fit enhances the feeling of “rightness” and increases engagement in the goal 
pursuit (Higgins, 2005). For instance, an individual with a prevention focus will 
experience greater regulatory fit when they pursue goals in a vigilant or risk averse 
manner. Direct assessments of RFT on decision making behavior have found that 
individuals with a promotion focus engaged in more risk taking, whereas individuals with 
a prevention focus were conservative in their decisions (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). 
Following experience of a failure on an unsolvable anagram, individuals with a 
promotion focus were able to count backwards more quickly and found more correct 
solutions for anagrams presented after the initial failure, compared to individuals with a 
prevention focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). In addition, participants with a prevention 
focus made choices that guarded errors in performing a task, while individuals with a 
promotion focus were better at accruing more correct responses on a subsequent 
recognition memory task (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). More specifically, individuals with a 
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prevention focus exhibited a more conservative, vigilant response bias by responding 
“no” (i.e., they have not previously seen the item) to more items in a recognition memory 
task. In contrast, participants with a promotion focus exhibited a less conservative 
response bias as they tended to respond “yes” (i.e., they have previously seen the item) to 
items (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). In summary, a variety of factors such as using incidental 
affect as information in decision making, reliance on certain ER strategies, and 
motivational factors underlying anxiety contribute to risk averse behavior in anxious 
individuals. 
Loss Aversion. Anxious individuals also have an increased sensitivity to losses 
(Mitte, 2007; Mueller et al., 2010) and are more physiologically reactive to losses (Miu et 
al., 2008). Findings from studies demonstrating decreased loss aversion in patients with 
amygdala lesions provide indirect evidence for a heightened loss aversion in anxious 
individuals. That is, if there is a linear relationship between loss-aversion and amygdala 
activity, one would expect a heightened loss aversion in anxious individuals given the 
amygdala hyperactivity typically seen in individuals with anxiety disorders and high 
levels of trait anxiety (Hartley & Phelps, 2012). Increased sensitivity to losses may play a 
role in increased risk aversion in anxious individuals. For instance, when performing the 
IGT, individuals with GAD learned more quickly than controls to avoid choices 
associated with long-term losses and made less selections from high loss decks (Mueller 
et al., 2010). Thus, individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) are particularly 
sensitive to long-term losses (Mueller et al., 2010). 
Heightened loss aversion may be due to the increased value anxious individuals 
give to losses. One study examined decision making in socially anxious individuals in 
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real-world settings through the use of the cognitive appraisal of risky events (CARE) 
questionnaire (Kashdan, Collins, & Elhai, 2006). When socially anxious individuals did 
not expect benefits from risk taking (i.e., risky sexual behavior, aggression), they 
exhibited significantly less risk taking compared to both socially anxious participants 
expecting benefits and controls (Kashdan et al., 2006). The exceptionally low risk taking 
in socially anxious individuals suggests that they are in a “prevention mode” which 
results in greater significance given to social losses, such as rejection, than social gains, 
such as positive relationships with others (Kashdan et al., 2006). In summary, studies 
demonstrate a heightened loss aversion in anxious individuals in both naturalistic and 
laboratory settings, which suggests that they assign greater significance to losses.  
In anxious individuals the curve in the loss domain depicted in Figure 1 may be 
even steeper. Supporting this prediction, anxiety alters processing of risk and associated 
reward or costs, which results in skewed evaluations of the actual underlying cost-benefit 
probabilities in decision making (Paulus & Yu, 2012). Numerous studies demonstrate a 
tendency to overestimate risk and draw more pessimistic conclusions regarding outcomes 
in anxious individuals (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Mitte, 2007). Individuals with 
higher levels of fear, as measured by the state domain of the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, made more pessimistic predictions regarding outcomes regardless of whether 
underlying probabilities of outcomes were known or not (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). 
Authors suggested that fearful people tend to choose more risk free options in contrast to 
options that are potentially more rewarding but uncertain, signifying the decreased 
importance placed on gains as opposed to losses in fearful individuals (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001). One study assessed subjective cost ratings individuals made to outcomes of 
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hypothetical scenarios by instructing participants to rate the probability of negative and 
positive outcomes happening to themselves or other individuals (Mitte, 2007). 
Individuals with high trait anxiety estimated the costs of negative events to be higher and 
expected that they are at greater risk for experiencing negative consequences in 
comparison to ratings made by participants with low trait anxiety (Mitte, 2007). The 
tendency to draw pessimistic conclusions regarding outcomes may also be driven by 
underlying attentional biases. The presence of attentional biases towards threatening 
information, as well as the tendency to interpret ambiguous and uncertain stimuli and 
situations as threatening (Hartley & Phelps, 2012), has been established in anxiety (see 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007 and Cisler & Koster, 2010 for reviews). These negative attentional 
and interpretation biases are likely involved in the pessimistic perception of outcomes in 
anxiety (Hartley & Phelps, 2012).  
Motivational factors may also play a role in loss aversion in anxious individuals. 
According to RFT, success in reaching goals is defined by the regulatory focus system. 
Within the promotion system, a success is defined by achieving gains, and a non-success 
is defined as not achieving any gains. In contrast, a success within the prevention system 
is defined as a non-loss, and a failure is defined as a loss (Higgins, 2005). Due to this 
inherent focus on losses by the prevention system, anxious individuals may be more apt 
to use the prevention system in pursuing goals. Overall, anxious individuals display a 
persistent loss aversion and likely give more importance to losses due to biased attention 
and interpretation biases as well as motivational factors underlying anxiety.  
Risk Seeking. In contrast to much of the literature demonstrating a risk aversion in 
anxiety, some studies have found increased risk taking in anxious individuals. One 
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laboratory study examined the effect of trait anxiety on performance on the IGT while 
simultaneously measuring physiological reactions such as heart rate and skin conductance 
(Miu et al., 2008). The IGT generally rewards risk averse decision making, and the 
original version is reliant on central cognitive resources. Anxious individuals performed 
worse on the IGT due to their frequent selection of decks with higher rewards and greater 
penalties (bad decks). This is in contrast to studies demonstrating decreased risk taking 
on the IGT in anxious individuals (e.g., Mueller et al., 2010). Reasons for the discrepancy 
in findings are discussed below. Along with worse performance, anxious individuals 
exhibited increased physiological responses to advantageous trials associated with 
punishment (Miu et al., 2008). Thus, there was a disconnection between somatic cues and 
behavior according to the somatic marker hypothesis (Miu et al., 2008).  The somatic 
marker hypothesis, which suggests that individuals utilize afferent feedback to inform 
decisions, can aid in understanding physiological contributions to decision making. 
According to the somatic marker hypothesis, physiological cues are important in 
conveying information about stimuli to the individual. Individuals who do not attend to or 
misinterpret these cues due to emotional difficulties (e.g., high trait anxiety; Miu et al., 
2008) or lesions to certain brain regions (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex; Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999), make disadvantageous choices.  
High anxiety individuals experienced greater somatic signals to punishment when 
performing the IGT (Miu et al., 2008). However, this sensitivity did not lead to better 
decision making. The authors speculated that heightened anxiety itself may serve as an 
irrelevant task distractor (Miu et al., 2008). That is, decision making which is reliant on 
central cognitive functions may be disrupted in anxious individuals because anxiety 
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detracts them from the task (Miu et al., 2008). Along this line, it is suggested that anxiety 
takes up analytical/computational processes resulting in difficulties in executive 
attentional control (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Findings suggesting 
that acute anxiety may take up processing resources and result in alterations in decisional 
processes are also in line with this hypothesis (Starcke & Brand, 2012). Specifically, 
cortisol may interfere with the functional relationship between the amygdala and the 
ventromedial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex that are involved in reaching 
advantageous decisions and emotional processing (Starcke & Brand, 2012). ER strategies 
used by anxious individuals may also interfere with adaptive decision making. Miu and 
colleagues (2008) posit that propensity to ruminate may result in poor performance due to 
interference of distracting verbal information resulting from rumination. This verbal 
interference resulting from rumination may interrupt the ability of anxious individuals to 
properly learn the reward and punishment contingencies associated with the four decks 
on the IGT. Thus, although anxious individuals tend to have a bias away from risky 
decision making, they may also exhibit impaired decision making when they are 
distracted by task irrelevant information (e.g., their own anxiety symptoms, rumination). 
Studies have not explicitly examined the moderating influence of the use of rumination or 
other ER strategies on IGT performance. Accounting for the influence of rumination and 
other ER strategies may help to understand the discrepancies seen in studies examining 
the influence of anxiety on IGT performance (Miu et al., 2008; Mueller et al., 2010).   
Higher risk taking in anxious individuals has been observed in naturalistic 
settings. In a study examining risk taking in socially anxious individuals in naturalistic 
settings, anxious individuals engaged in more risky behavior, such as risky sexual 
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behavior and aggression, when they expected positive benefits from these behaviors 
(Kashdan et al., 2006). That is, socially anxious individuals exhibit heightened risk taking 
when they expect these behaviors will have beneficial effects such as an increase in their 
social status. Additionally, engagement in risky behaviors may provide anxious 
individuals with a heightened sense of control. If symptoms of anxiety (e.g., shyness or 
avoidance) result in distress, the engagement in risk taking may serve as an ER strategy 
as it represents a stark contrast to usual inhibited behavior. Thus, risk taking may be used 
as a situation selection or modification ER strategy. 
 Negative risk taking behavior may also be engaged in as a response modulation 
ER strategy in anxious individuals. For example, women with panic disorder are at a 
greater risk for developing alcohol dependence (Merikangas et al., 1998). According to 
the self-medication hypothesis (Khantzian, 1985), alcohol abuse represents attempts to 
down-regulate panic symptoms. Similarly, social anxiety disorder is associated with 
higher prevalence rates of cannabis use disorders (Buckner et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
individuals with social anxiety disorder transit from using cannabis recreationally to 
developing problematic cannabis use faster than individuals without social anxiety 
disorder. Interestingly, individuals with co-occurring social anxiety disorder and cannabis 
use disorder were more likely to be employed than individuals with social anxiety 
disorder alone (Buckner et al., 2012). Thus, cannabis use may render symptoms of social 
anxiety disorder more manageable, in which case socially anxious individuals may utilize 
substances such as cannabis as a response modulation ER strategy. There is also a higher 
rate of nicotine abuse in panic disorder. Individuals with panic disorder may use nicotine 
as an affect regulation strategy, with the expectation that smoking will alleviate aversive 
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anxiety symptoms (Zvolensky & Bernstein, 2005). However, nicotine abuse may render 
individuals more likely to experience panic attacks as cessation and withdrawal result in 
aversive physiological symptoms, and nicotine abuse itself will lead to increased aversive 
bodily sensations and health problems over the long-term (Zvolensky & Bernstein, 2005). 
Generally, evidence suggests that maladaptive substance use, which is a form of 
maladaptive or negative risk taking, is utilized as an ER and experiential avoidance 
strategy in individuals with anxiety disorders. Negative risk taking results from the 
expectation that use of certain substances will allow individuals to cope better (Zvolensky 
& Bernstein, 2005) and the reinforcement provided by greater functionality some 
individuals are afforded over the short-term through the use of particular substances 
(Buckner et al., 2012).   
Maladaptive and Adaptive Risk Taking.  
Negative Risk Taking. Risk taking is often presented in the literature in a 
negative tone. Negative risk taking is defined by both characteristics of the decision 
situation (i.e., outcome of the decision) as well as the manner in which the decision is 
executed (Gullone, Moore, Moss, & Boyd, 2000). For example, drug abuse, risky sexual 
activities, dangerous driving, and exposing oneself to generally dangerous experiences 
have clear negative consequences that surpass any potential reward. Although anxious 
individuals are expected to be risk aversive (Hartley & Phelps, 2012), paradoxical 
findings demonstrate that some individuals do not actually avoid negative risks in their 
daily lives as demonstrated by increased aggression and risky sexual activities in some 
studies by anxious individuals (Kashdan et al., 2006). As discussed previously, engaging 
in negative risk taking may be an attempt to regulate negative emotions. For instance, 
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anxious individuals may choose to engage in risky activities as a situation selection or 
modification ER strategy. Negative risk taking may also be engaged in as a response 
modification ER strategy, such as greater substance use in individuals with anxiety 
disorders (Buckner et al., 2012; Merikangas et al., 1998; Zvolensky & Bernstein, 2005). 
Alternatively, decision making may be impaired by factors associated with heightened 
anxiety, such as the use of certain ER strategies (e.g., rumination) or hyperarousal. These 
factors could interrupt cognitive processes leading to impairments in decision making 
processes such as evaluation of options, learning probabilities, and contingencies of 
particular outcomes. This interruption in decision making processes may result in 
increased negative risk taking.   
The propensity to engage in negative risk taking, whether as an ER strategy itself 
or due to impairment in decision making, is likely to be influenced by impulsivity. 
Impulsivity is associated with greater negative risk taking, as seen in individuals who 
experience significant difficulties with impulse control (e.g., ADHD, substance use 
disorders; Fernie, Cole, Goudie, & Field, 2010; Mäntylä, Still, Gullberg, & Del Missier, 
2012).  When an anxious individual is also highly impulsive, he or she may not exhibit 
typical risk aversion associated with anxiety but may rather take more risks. For instance, 
the increased risk taking observed in socially anxious individuals with strong positive 
expectancies could be due to a higher level of impulsivity in these individuals (Kashdan 
et al., 2006). Additionally, interference in cognitive decision making processes in anxious 
individuals who are impulsive may result in higher negative risk taking. This may be 
especially significant in comparison to non-impulsive anxious individuals, who are more 
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likely to engage in a very low degree of both positive and negative risk taking (Kashdan 
et al., 2006).   
Positive Risk Taking. Risk taking can be advantageous (i.e., positive risk taking) 
when behavior is socially acceptable and the possibility of negative outcomes is relatively 
low (e.g., loss of a small amount of money) with potentially high payoffs. Positive risk 
taking has been defined in mental health care service as making decisions that sometimes 
entail heightened short term risks but lead to long-term positive outcomes (Morgan, 
2004). While avoidance of positive risks may underlie maintenance of anxiety disorders 
(Muris, Mayer, & Schubert, 2010), positive risk taking has not yet been differentiated 
from negative risk taking empirically.  
Positive risk taking is an important and often central component of treatment for 
anxiety disorders (e.g., exposure to situations on a fear hierarchy). Similarly, a person 
deciding to receive exposure therapy for anxiety disorders, such as prolonged exposure 
(PE) for PTSD (Foa & Kozak, 1986), in and of itself represents positive risk taking. PE 
entails exposure to a trauma narrative, which is associated with the short-term risk of 
increased distressing emotions and cognitions and heightened physiological arousal. PE’s 
short-term risk is offset by the longer-term benefits of increasing habituation to the 
traumatic event, which decreases the potency of distressing emotional, cognitive, and 
physiological symptoms and results in an overall reduction of PTSD symptoms (e.g., 
Rauch et al., 2009).   
 Behavior that is generally regarded as socially acceptable, such as high risk sports 
and activities that involve competition, and is not associated with the severity or 
increased likelihood of adverse outcomes present in negative risk-taking is considered to 
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be positive risk taking (Gullone et al., 2000). As is true of thrill-seeking, positive risk 
taking must involve some aspect of threat to the individual. Courage or bravery captures 
both the inherent risk in a given situation and the tendency to approach that situation 
despite the risk and, thus, can be considered as positive risk taking. Courage has been 
defined as approach behavior while simultaneously experiencing fear (Rachman, 1984). 
Importantly, courage may interfere with the development of anxiety disorders (Muris et 
al., 2010). Although courage and bravery are relatively understudied, they have been 
assessed empirically in relation to decision making and anxiety. One study examined 
association between courage, self-reported actions taken in the real-world, and anxiety in 
children (Muris et al., 2010). Courage, assessed with the Courage Measure for Children 
(CM-C), was positively correlated with reports of courageous behavior and parent reports 
of the child’s level of courage. Courage as measured by the CM-C was also negatively 
correlated with anxiety. Although not often directly recognized, courage is an essential 
component in the treatment of anxiety disorders, as therapists routinely ask their clients to 
engage in activities (e.g., exposure to a feared stimulus) which require courage as part of 
treatment (Rachman, 1984). Therefore, courage and bravery have significant relations to 
anxiety and could guide the assessment of positive risk taking. 
 Given that individuals with anxiety may not always avoid certain negative risks, 
delineation of positive risk taking and its relation with anxiety is a critical gap in the 
current literature. Understanding contributions of ER and RF on propensity to avoid or 
approach both negative and positive risks in anxiety will also increase understanding of 
the nature of risk taking behavior in anxiety.   
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Hypotheses 
1. Based on previous findings demonstrating greater risk aversion in anxious 
populations (Maner et al., 2007; Mitte, 2007; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), it is 
expected that AS levels will be associated with avoidance behaviors on laboratory 
decision making tasks. The BART, IGT, and a passive avoidance task will be 
utilized to assess decision making in the laboratory.  
a. On the BART, where some risk taking is advantageous, AS levels are 
predicted to be positively associated with more avoidant behavior in this 
task. (i.e., worse performance on the BART). It is also expected that there 
will be an interaction between AS and regulatory focus for overall success 
on the task (i.e., the sum collected). Specifically, individuals with low AS 
scores will perform particularly well on the BART when they exhibit a 
promotion focus. This prediction was supported by a pilot study using the 
BART and likely signifies a match between motivational goals and 
personality traits.  
b. In general, it is expected that AS will be positively associated with 
performance on the IGT. However, given prior studies demonstrating 
impaired decision making on the IGT in anxious individuals, performance 
is expected to be dependent on an interaction between levels of AS and 
rumination, which may serve as a  distractor. Specifically, the relation 
between AS and performance on the IGT is predicted to be moderated by 
the tendency to ruminate. Higher AS levels are expected to be associated 
with worse performance in individuals with high levels of rumination.   
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c. In a passive avoidance task, AS is expected to be positively associated 
with a higher amount of errors associated with withholding a response to a 
rewarding stimuli (i.e., omission errors). AS level is also expected to be 
negatively associated with responding to punishing stimuli (i.e. 
commission errors). Additionally, it is predicted that the relation between 
the overall points earned on the task and AS levels will be moderated by 
RF. Specifically, higher AS levels are expected to be associated with 
relatively less earnings on the task especially in individuals who have 
higher prevention levels due to a focus on losses as opposed to gains.   
2. A naturalistic decision making diary, which will take place over the course of 
seven days, will be utilized to examine negative and positive risk taking behaviors 
in the real-world in the same individuals who completed the laboratory tasks. The 
following predictions are made: 
a. Higher AS levels are predicted to be associated with decreased positive 
risk taking. In addition, high levels of AS will be associated with greater 
expected negative consequences from engaging in positive risk taking.  
b. It is hypothesized that high AS individuals will engage in increased 
negative risk taking when they endorse strong positive expectancies from 
engaging in the behavior. In addition, the tendency to use maladaptive ER 
strategies (i.e., expressive suppression) and trait impulsivity is expected to 
moderate the relationship between AS and propensity to take negative 
risks. In particular, AS will be positively associated with negative risk 
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taking in individuals who endorse greater use of expressive suppressive 
and have higher levels of trait impulsivity.  
3. Associations between decision making in the laboratory and in naturalistic 
settings will be examined.  
a. Individuals who demonstrate less risk taking behavior on the BART and 
passive avoidance laboratory tasks will also be less likely to engage in 
positive risk taking in naturalistic settings. Further, it is predicted that AS 
will moderate the relationship between positive risk taking in laboratory 
and in naturalistic settings. Specifically, the relationship between positive 
risk taking behavior in the laboratory and naturalistic settings is expected 
to be particularly strong in individuals with higher levels of AS, with these 
individuals engaging in exceptionally low levels of risk taking.    
b. Individuals who display more risk taking behavior on the IGT will also 
display more negative risk taking behavior in naturalistic settings. It is 
expected that the relations between naturalistic and laboratory behavior 
settings will be moderated by either AS or impulsivity. There are no 
studies examining these relationships; therefore, no formal predictions will 
be made regarding the nature of these relationships.   
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CHAPTER 2 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Participants were 120 men and women ages 18 and over. Based on pilot testing, 
there was a 12% attrition rate from the diary portion of the study. Therefore, to obtain a 
sample size of 120 participants with complete data for both laboratory and diary portions 
of the study, a total of 135 participants were recruited. All participants were recruited 
from undergraduate psychology courses at the University of Maine. Individuals who were 
enrolled in courses that required completion of some form of research participation were 
sent the following email: 
 Dear Students, 
I am inviting you to participate in my research study, Decision Making, 
which will investigate decision making processes both in and outside of the 
laboratory. For the initial session, you will complete computer tasks and 
questionnaires in a laboratory in Little Hall. This session will take approximately 
1 hour. Following this session, you will be asked to complete questionnaires 
assessing daily decision making over the course of a week, starting on the nearest 
Monday. Daily questionnaires will take approximately 10-15 minutes each day to 
complete. You will receive 2 credits of research participation for completion of all 
study procedures. You will also receive $5 if you complete all 7 days of the daily 
decision making questionnaires. You must be 18 years of age or older to 
participate in this study without parental consent. If you are interested in 
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participating, please log on to Sona (umaine.sona-systems.com) and sign up for a 
timeslot for the Decision Making study.  
Thank you, 
Amanda Kutz  
 The study was posted to Sona, an online experiment management system. 
Participants signed up for the study online. Those who are 18 years and older were 
eligible to participate. Individuals who were under 18 years of age were required to 
provide parental consent if they wished to participate.   
Measures 
 Anxiety Sensitivity Index-3 (ASI-3). The ASI-3 (Taylor et al., 2007; Appendix 
B) is an 18-item self-report measure, which assesses an individual’s level of fear or 
anxiety to his or her own anxious sensations. Participants rate items on a 5-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 0 (very little) to 4 (very much).  The ASI-3 assesses sensitivity to 
anxiety symptoms across three domains: Physical Concerns (e.g., “It scares me when my 
heart beats rapidly”), Social Concerns (e.g., “I worry that other people will notice my 
anxiety”), and Cognitive Concerns (e.g., “When I feel ‘spacey’ or spaced out, I worry 
that I may be mentally ill”).  
The ASI-3 represents a revision of the original 16-item ASI (Reiss et al., 1986) , 
which reportedly consists of the same three factors (i.e., physical, social, and cognitive 
concerns). However, this 3-factor structure has not been consistently found across studies 
(Richard E Zinbarg, Mohlman, & Hong, 1999), which raised a need for a revised measure 
that can adequately assess AS as a multifactor construct (Taylor et al., 2007).  The Social 
and Cognitive Concerns subscales in the original measure contained only four items each, 
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and it was unclear whether these items had a high degree of content validity (Taylor et 
al., 2007). Measures with low number of items could negatively impact reliability 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Additionally, a large amount of measurement error in 
trait-like constructs has been attributed to low content validity (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994). To address these issues, the 36-item ASI-R (Taylor & Cox, 1998a) and 60-item 
Anxiety Sensitivity Profile (Taylor & Cox, 1998b) were developed. However, both 
measures have unstable factor structures, similar to the original ASI (Deacon, 
Abramowitz, Woods, & Tolin, 2003; Zvolensky et al., 2003). The ASI-3 was constructed 
by taking items from the ASI-R which assessed each of the three domains of the ASI 
(i.e., physical, cognitive, and social), with the overall goal of establishing an efficient 
measure of AS across all three domains (Taylor et al., 2007). 
Items from the original version of the ASI with a high level of content validity 
were included in the ASI-3. Content validity was defined as items that “unambiguously 
corresponded to only one of the domains of physical, cognitive or social concerns” 
(Taylor et al., 2007, p. 178).  All three domains are assessed by six items each in the ASI-
3. Factor analyses of the ASI-3 revealed that three-factor model fit the data better than a 
one- or two-factor model. Furthermore, the 3 factor structure of Physical, Social, and 
Cognitive Concerns is more stable in the ASI-3 than the original ASI. Cronbach alpha 
coefficients for the Cognitive and Social Concerns subscales were larger compared to the 
original ASI (Taylor et al., 2007). Although three factors were highly correlated to each 
other, inter-item correlations within each subscale were much higher (range: α = .75-.93) 
than correlations between scales (range: α = .45- .78) suggesting related, but distinct, 
subscales (Taylor et al., 2007).   
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The construct of AS has been extensively implicated in greater risk for the 
development of anxiety symptomology, and individuals with a wide range of clinical 
anxiety disorders, panic disorder in particular (Schmidt & Cook, 1999), exhibit elevations 
in AS. AS is prospectively associated with the occurrence of panic attacks (McNally, 
2002; Schmidt et al., 1999), which may be due to the preponderance of items assessing 
Physical Concerns on the original ASI where 8 of the 16 items assess this domain (Taylor 
et al., 2007). However, Cronbach alpha coefficients for the Physical Concerns domain 
were not significantly lower in the ASI-3 (nonclinical: α = .79, clinical: α = .86) 
compared to the original ASI (nonclinical: α = .83, clinical: α =.89). Due to its relatively 
new inception, the ASI-3 has not been used as extensively as the original ASI. However, 
recent studies demonstrated the utility of the subscales in predicting unique variance in 
anxiety and depressive symptoms. Physical Concerns have consistently predicted unique 
variance in panic attacks, while Social Concerns predicted levels of social anxiety 
(Olthuis et al., 2014; Taylor et al., 2007). Cognitive Concerns have been associated with 
depression (Olthuis et al., 2014), panic disorder, and GAD (Taylor et al., 2007), 
suggesting that this domain may be associated with more generalized negative affect than 
anxiety specifically. The ASI-3 was utilized in the current study as a continuous measure 
of AS across 3 domains (i.e., physical, social and cognitive). The ASI-3 had high internal 
consistency (α = .91). 
 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait Version (STAI-T). The STAI-T 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Appendix B) is a 20-item scale that assesses 
levels of trait anxiety in an individual. Ratings are made on a 4-point Likert-type scale 
(1= almost never to 4= almost always). Only the Trait inventory was used in the current 
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study. Research has shown good reliability and validity for the STAI-T (van 
Knippenberg, Duivenvoorden, Bonke, & Passchier, 1990). Trait anxiety was assessed to 
examine if AS had any predictive value for decision making concurrently or over trait 
anxiety as measured by the STAI-T. Internal consistency for the STAI-T was adequate (α 
= .83).  
 Social Phobia Scale (SPS). The SPS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998; Appendix B) is a 
20-item questionnaire assessing current symptoms of social phobia. Responses are made 
on a 5-point Likert scale (0= not at all typical of me to 4= extremely typical of me). The 
SPS has high internal consistency (α = .94) and high test-retest reliability (r = .93). The 
SPS has been shown to have high convergent validity with other anxiety measures and 
high predicative validity of problems associated with social phobia. Additionally, 
concurrent validity with other scales of social anxiety has been established (Brown, 
Turovsky, Heimberg, Juster, & et al, 1997). The SPS was used to examine relations 
between social phobia and laboratory-based and naturalistic decision making. Reliability 
for the SPS was strong (α = .93).  
Behavioral Inhibition/Activation Scale (BIS/BAS). The BIS/BAS (Carver & 
White, 1994; Appendix B) is a 24-item scale measuring behavioral inhibition (i.e., system 
which regulates aversive motives) and activation (i.e., system which regulates appetitive 
motives). Ratings are made on a 5-point Likert scale (0= quite untrue of you to 4= quite 
true of you). The BIS/BAS has high reliability, and each subscale has high convergent 
validity (Yu, Branje, Keijsers, & Meeus, 2011). BIS scores are highly correlated with 
internalizing problems such as anxiety and depression, whereas BAS scores are highly 
correlated with externalizing problems and extraversion (Yu et al., 2011).  This 
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questionnaire was included in the study to test for predicted associations between risk-
aversion and behavioral inhibition and risk-taking and behavioral activation. The 
BIS/BAS measure, which includes approach and avoidance scales, was used as the 
measure of motivation in analyses, replacing the RFQ, due to reliability issues with the 
RFQ (see below). Subscales of the BAS and the BAS total score were used as a proxy of 
promotion focus as both BAS and promotion focus assess approach motivation. The BIS 
scale was used as a proxy of prevention focus as both BIS and prevention focus assess 
avoidance motivation. The BAS consists of three subscales: BAS drive, reward 
responsiveness, and fun seeking. Reliability for BAS drive (α = .80), reward 
responsiveness (α = .80), and fun seeking (α = .71) were adequate. Internal consistency 
for the BAS composite score was high (α = .85). Internal consistency for the unitary BIS 
scale was also high (α = .81).   
 Center of Epidemiology Survey- Depression (CES-D). The CES-D (Radloff, 
1977; Appendix B) is a 20-item questionnaire aimed at assessing depressive symptoms in 
the past two months on a 4-point Likert scale (0= rarely to 3= most of the time). The 
CES-D was developed to assess for depression in the general population (Radloff, 1977). 
High internal consistency (α = .85- .90; Radloff, 1977) and adequate test-retest reliability 
(r = .51 - .67; Radloff, 1977) have been found. The CES-D has good criterion validity as 
scores on the CES-D have been correlated with other measures of depression (Beekman, 
Deeg, Limbeek, & Braam, 1997). Depressive and anxious symptoms often co-occur; 
thus, the CES-D was used to ensure that differences in decision making were not 
confounded by depressive symptoms. In the current sample, Cronbach’s alpha was 
acceptable (α = .72). 
50 
 
  
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS). The RRS (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003; Appendix B) is a 22-item questionnaire which assesses an individual’s 
self-reported tendency to engage in rumination. This version of the RRS represents a 
shortened version of the original 32-item Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ). A two-
factor structure was found for the measure: Brooding, which is described as “passive 
comparison of one’s current situation with some unachieved standard” and reflection, 
which is described as “purposeful turning inward to engage in cognitive problem solving” 
(Treynor et al., 2003, pp.256). Brooding is associated with more concurrent and long-
term depressive symptoms, whereas reflection is associated with more depressive 
symptoms concurrently but less depressive symptoms over time (Treynor et al., 2003). 
The RRS has high internal consistency (α = .85) and adequate test-retest reliability for the 
Brooding (r = .62) and Reflection (r = .60) subscales (Treynor et al., 2003). The 22-item 
RRS was used in the current study because the tendency to ruminate is associated with 
anxiety symptomology and was hypothesized to impact decision making in and outside of 
the laboratory. Internal consistency of the RRS was high (α = .94). 
 Emotional Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). The ERQ (Gross & John, 2003; 
Appendix B) is a 10-item measure assessing individual differences in the use of two well-
defined emotion regulation strategies: Cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. 
Participants rate items on a 7-point Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Both the cognitive reappraisal factor and the suppression factor have 
good internal consistency (α = .79 and .73 respectively) and adequate test-retest 
reliability (r = .69). The reappraisal factor has convergent validity with reinterpretation 
coping strategies, while the suppression factor is negatively associated with the use of 
51 
 
  
venting as a coping strategy (Gross & John, 2003). Furthermore, negative mood is 
negatively related to reappraisal and positively related to suppression. The ERQ was 
included in the present study to assess the moderating role of suppression and reappraisal 
in anxiety and decision making. Internal consistency for the cognitive reappraisal 
subscale was good (α = .81) and acceptable for the suppression subscale (α = .76).      
 Regulatory Focus Pride (RFQ). The RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001; Appendix B) is 
an 11-item measure assessing strength of self-reported promotion or prevention 
regulatory pride and contains two subscales: Promotion and Prevention. The promotion 
subscale assesses history of success with promotion goals (i.e., goals involving 
achievement or advancement) while the prevention subscale assesses subjective success 
with prevention goals (i.e., goals involving safety or protection). Both the promotion and 
prevention scales have good internal consistency (α = .73 and .80) and adequate test-
retest reliability (r = .79 and .81 respectively). The promotion and prevention scales are 
independent of one another (Higgins et al., 2001). In terms of construct validity, the 
promotion scale is positively related to ‘Reward Responsiveness’ and ‘Fun Seeking’ 
factors of the behavioral activation system while the prevention scale has a negative 
association with ‘Fun Seeking’ (Higgins et al., 2001). In addition, individuals using a 
promotion focus are more inclined to use approach eagerness in achieving task goals, 
whereas individuals using a prevention focus are more apt to use avoidant vigilance in 
achieving the same goals (Higgins et al., 2001). The RFQ was used to assess the 
predicted interaction effect between regulatory focus, anxiety, and decision making.  The 
promotion scale of the RFQ had poor internal consistency (α = .51) and the prevention 
scale of the RFQ had good internal consistency (α = .73). Both the promotion and the 
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prevention scales of the RFQ have a low number of items (n = 6 and n = 5, respectively), 
likely contributing to the low reliability. Due to this low reliability, an alternate measure 
of motivation was used in all subsequent analyses involving motivation (specifically, the 
BIS/BAS scale).  
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale- Short Form (IUS-12). The IUS-12 (Carleton, 
Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; Appendix B) is a short-form of the original Intolerance of 
Uncertainty Scale. The 12-item measure assesses responses to ambiguous and uncertain 
situations on a 5-point scale (1= not at all characteristic of me to 5= entirely 
characteristic of me). The IUS-12 has strong convergent and divergent validity as well as 
high internal consistency (Carleton et al., 2007). Factor analyses have revealed three 
distinct subscales: Intolerance of Uncertainty, Prospective Anxiety and Inhibitory 
Anxiety. This measure was utilized in the present study to assess relations between 
intolerance of uncertainty and risk-taking. Internal consistency for the Intolerance (α = 
.91), Prospective Anxiety (α = .84), and Inhibitory Anxiety (α = .87) subscales, as well as 
the overall composite score (α = .96) were all strong.  
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS-11). The BIS-11 (Patton, Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995; Appendix B) is a 30 item measure assessing the personality and behavioral 
construct of impulsivity. This is an entirely distinct measure from the BIS scale of the 
BIS/BAS scales described above. Items are scored on a 4-point Likert scale (1= 
rarely/never to 4 = almost always/always). The original BIS measure has been revised 
many times, and the BIS-11 represents the most updated and psychometrically sound 
version of the measure (Stanford et al., 2009). Three overarching factors have been 
determined through the various revisions: Motor Impulsiveness, Non-planning 
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Impulsiveness, and Attention Impulsiveness. The total score has good internal 
consistency (α = .83). Additionally, the scale has good convergent validity with measures 
assessing similar constructs (e.g., reward responsiveness, thrill-adventure seeking) and 
discriminant validity with expected measures (e.g., inhibition) (Stanford et al., 2009). The 
BIS-11 was used in this study as risk-taking is associated with impulsivity. Internal 
consistency of the BIS-11 total scale was high (α =.83). The BIS-11 consists of three 
subscales: attentional impulsivity, non-planning impulsivity, and motor impulsivity. 
Internal consistency for attentional impulsivity (α = .66), non-planning impulsivity (α = 
.63) and motor impulsivity (α = .69) were all questionable. Therefore, only the BIS-11 
total score was used as a measure of impulsivity. 
Galassi College Self-Expression Scale (College Self-Expression Scale). The 
College Self-Expression (Galassi, Delo, Galassi, & Bastien, 1974; Appendix B) scale is a 
50 item self-report questionnaire designed to measure assertiveness in college students. 
Items are rated according to how an individual behaves in situations on a 4-point scale 
(0= almost always to 4= never or rarely). High scores indicate more assertive behavior. 
Studies have demonstrated convergent validity with other assertiveness measures and 
have also shown that the College Self-Expression Scale uniquely includes a factor 
measuring positive assertion, or open expression of positive emotions and attitudes 
(Henderson & Furnham, 1983). Many of the questions that I added to the Cognitive 
Appraisal of Risky Event Questionnaire (CARE; Fromme, Katz, & Rivet, 1997, 
discussed in depth below) assess positive risk-taking, which may tap into the construct of 
assertiveness. Therefore, this questionnaire was utilized to assess convergent validity 
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between assertiveness and positive risk-taking. For the present sample, Cronbach’s alpha 
was .85, indicating good internal consistency.  
Diary Measures 
 Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Questionnaire (CARE). The CARE 
(Fromme et al., 1997; Appendix D) questionnaire was utilized to assess risk taking 
behavior across six domains in young adult populations. These domains include, Illicit 
Drug Use, Aggressive and Illegal Behaviors, Risky Sexual Activities, Heavy Drinking, 
High Risk Sports, and Academic or Work Behaviors which have been identified through 
factor analyses (Fromme et al., 1997). Individuals rate their involvement in these 
activities, expected benefits of involvement, and expected risks of involvement in 30 
activities falling into one of these six domains (Fromme et al., 1997). Expected benefits 
are rated on a 7-point Likert scale (i.e., 1 = not at all likely to 7 = extremely likely) that 
they would experience some positive consequence as a result of engaging in each 
activity. Expected risks are also rated on a 7 point Likert-type scale (i.e., 1 = not at all 
likely to 7 = extremely likely) that they would experience some negative consequence as a 
result of their involvement in each activity.  
The questionnaire was adapted in the following two ways. First, participants rated 
activities in the past 24 hours, instead of past six months. Participants simply rated 
whether they engaged in each activity (i.e., a “yes” or “no” response) as opposed to rating 
the number of times they engaged in the activity as in the original questionnaire. Second, 
13 items assessing positive risk taking were added to assess positive dimensions of risk 
taking. These 13 items were adapted from a measure assessing courage in children, the 
Courage Measure for Children (CM-C; Muris et al., 2010). 
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Reliability was assessed for all subscales. Overall negative risk behavior (α = .78) 
and academic/work behaviors (α = .81) showed high internal consistency. Illicit drugs use 
(α = .69), illegal and aggressive behaviors (α = .65), risky sexual behaviors (α = .52), 
heavy drinking (α = .41) and high risk sports (α = .69) showed acceptable to poor internal 
reliability. Several factors might have contributed to low reliability of these subscales. In 
particular, a low number of items (e.g., for heavy drinking, n = 3) and low base rates of 
certain negative risk taking behavior (e.g., risky sexual behaviors) may have negatively 
affected reliability. In accordance with previously established guidelines (Kline, 2005), 
only subscales with reliability rates of greater than or equal to .70 (i.e., overall negative 
risk behaviors and academic/work behaviors) were used independently in analyses. 
However, all subscales were included to compute a composite score.        
 Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). The PANAS (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988; Appendix D) is a 20-item questionnaire developed to assess current 
affect. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (i.e., 1= very slightly or not at all to 
5 = extremely) based on the extent to which the participant is experiencing different 
emotions at the current time. Reported Cronbach’s alpha coefficients have been high for 
both the Positive Affect scale (α = .86 - .90) and the Negative Affect Scale (α = .84 - .87). 
Test re-test correlations for an 8-week period range from .47-.68 for Positive Affect and 
.39-.71 for Negative Affect, reflecting the variability of mood across time (Watson et al., 
1988).  The PANAS was administered prior to each computerized decision making tasks 
as well as daily along with the adapted CARE questionnaire to assess for the influence of 
positive and negative affect states on daily decision making. 
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Computer Tasks 
 Each task involves earning points or virtual money. Participants were informed 
prior to beginning the first task that any points or money earned in the task would be 
virtual and that there would be no actual cash prize based on their earnings in these tasks. 
However, to increase incentive and motivation to do well, they were informed that 
individuals who perform better than average on these tasks would be entered into a raffle 
to win one of two $20 Amazon gift cards. In actuality, all participants were entered into 
this raffle and they were informed of this deception at the end of the study (see 
Debriefing Script, Appendix E).   
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART).  
BART: Psychometrics. The BART (Lejuez et al., 2002) is a computerized task 
that is a reliable and valid measure of risk taking (e.g., Fernie et al., 2010; Lejuez et al., 
2002). Performance on the BART is associated with real-world risk taking behaviors. 
Specifically, risk taking as measured by BART performance is significantly associated 
with alcohol use, including level of use and problems related to alcohol use (Fernie et al., 
2010). Delinquency and engaging in behaviors which are dangerous to one’s health (e.g., 
substance use) is also related to BART performance in adolescents, specifically taking 
more risks on earlier trials in the task when contingencies are more unknown (Crowley, 
Raymond, Mikulich-Gilbertson, Thompson, & Lejuez, 2006). Risk taking on the BART 
is also dissociable from similar constructs, such as personality traits of impulsivity and 
sensation seeking. For example, BART performance was associated with substance use 
above and beyond trait impulsivity and sensation seeking (Aklin, Lejuez, Zvolensky, 
Kahler, & Gwadz, 2005). Of importance to the current investigation, anxious individuals 
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show avoidance of risk taking on the BART compared to individuals experiencing other 
forms of negative affect (e.g., depression; Maner et al., 2007). Relations between risk 
taking on the BART, anxiety, motivation, and emotion regulation were examined. 
Additionally, to test whether this task may be a proxy of positive risk taking in the real 
world, relations between performance on the BART and positive risk taking in 
naturalistic settings (as assessed by the decision making diary) were explored. 
BART: Procedure. In this task, participants are instructed to inflate a virtual 
balloon presented on the computer screen. The display contains this balloon, a reset 
button labeled Collect $$$, a box showing permanent money-earned, labeled Total 
Earned, and money earned on the last balloon, in a box labeled Last Balloon (see Figure 
2). Participants were informed that they would earn virtual money by inflating the 
balloon. On each trial, individuals earned an increasing amount of money in a temporary 
bank as they pumped up the virtual balloon. Each balloon pump is worth 5 virtual cents. 
Participants were informed of this; however, the money in their temporary bank was not 
visible to them. Participants were informed that they may transfer money earned in their 
temporary bank over to their permanent bank (displayed as Total Earned) at any point 
during each trial by clicking on the Collect $$$ button. They were also informed that 
each balloon would explode at a certain threshold. The explosion threshold changed on a 
trial-by-trial basis, which participants were not explicitly informed of. On trials where the 
balloon exploded, no virtual money was earned. Thus, with each click to inflate the 
balloon, there was an increased chance of gaining more virtual money as well as an 
increased risk of the balloon exploding. Each trial ended when the participant clicked on 
the Collect $$$ button eliciting a slot machine sound effect, or when the balloon 
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exploded eliciting a “pop” sound effect, depending on whichever of these events came 
first. Participants were re-informed at the beginning of this task that the “money” that 
they were earning in this task is virtual and that there was no cash prize for any of the 
money earned.   
 
Figure 2. BART Task. 
  
 
Several factors can vary in the BART. First, the number of trials may vary. 
Research has shown that 10 trials produce sufficient reliability and 11 and above trials 
produce good reliability. Versions of the BART containing 30 and 90 trials were tested to 
assess how well BART performance models risk taking behavior (Wallsten, Pleskac, & 
Lejuez, 2005). This study found no differences in reliability measures between a version 
of the task involving 30 trials compared to one using 90 trials (Wallsten et al., 2005). The 
current study utilized the 90 trial version in order to obtain more data per subject. 
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Although the 30 trial version is often used in favor of the 90 trial version for the sake of 
time constraints, a pilot study using the 90 trial version of the task found that the task 
took 15 minutes to complete (Kutz & Yoon, in preparation). Another variable often 
manipulated in the BART is the level of reward in the task. Pumps may be programed to 
be worth either 1 cent, 5 cents or 25 cents. Studies have demonstrated that the reward 
structure does not affect behavior of highly impulsive individuals, but does affect 
behavior of individuals low in trait impulsivity in that these individuals are increasingly 
less likely to take risks as the reward level increases (White, Lejuez, & de Wit, 2008).  
Several outcome measures of interest were be used for analytical purposes on the 
BART. These included the sum collected, adjusted average pumps, and sum of balloon 
bursts. The sum collected is the total amount of virtual money earned on the BART and is 
a measure of task success. The adjusted average pumps is the average amount of balloon 
pumps on unexploded balloons and is a measure of risk taking behavior with more pumps 
indicating more positive risk taking. The sum of balloon bursts is the amount of balloon 
bursts throughout the task and is also a measure of risk taking with more balloon bursts 
being indicative of more negative risk taking.   
The BART was run through the program PEBL (Psychology Experiment Building 
Language; Mueller & Piper, 2014). Participants were given the following instructions 
prior to completing the BART: 
Throughout the task, you will be presented with 90 balloons, one at a time. 
For each balloon you can click on the button labelled ‘Press This Button to Pump 
Up the Balloon’ to increase the size of the balloon. You will accumulate 5 cents in 
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a temporary bank for each pump. However, you will not be shown the amount you 
have accumulated in your temporary bank.  
At any point, you can stop pumping up the balloon and click on the button 
labelled ‘Collect $$$’. Clicking this button will start you on the next balloon and 
will transfer the accumulated money from your temporary bank to your 
permanent bank labelled ‘Total Earned’. The amount you earned on the previous 
balloon is shown in the box labelled ‘Last Balloon’.  
It is your choice to determine how much to pump up the balloon, but be 
aware that at some point the balloon will explode. The explosion point varies 
across balloons ranging from the first pump to enough pumps to make the balloon 
fill the entire computer screen. If the balloon explodes before you click on 
‘Collect $$$’, then you move on to the next balloon and all money in your 
temporary bank is lost. Exploded balloons do not affect the money accumulated in 
your permanent bank.  
There is NO cash prize for virtual money earned in the task.  However, 
individuals who perform better than average across the computer tasks will be 
entered in a lottery to win one of two $20 amazon gift cards. Do you have any 
questions? Press any key to begin. 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). 
IGT: Psychometrics. The IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) 
is a commonly used paradigm to assess decision making under uncertain conditions in a 
manner that simulates real-life decision making. Performance on the IGT was originally 
assessed in individuals with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) lesions and 
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individuals with amygdala damage, while somatic signals (i.e., skin conductance) were 
measured. The amygdala and VMPFC are both involved in mediating the activation of 
somatic states (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara & Damasio, 2005). These investigations 
showed that disruption of either of these areas was detrimental to adaptive decision 
making but did not impact overall intellectual functioning (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara 
& Damasio, 2005), That is, these individuals tended to consistently choose options which 
yielded long-term losses as opposed to options which yielded long-term gains. Normal 
controls exhibited somatic signals when receiving rewards and punishments and, as they 
gained experience with the task, exhibited anticipatory signals prior to the selection of a 
deck. Individuals with VMPFC damage exhibited somatic signals to receiving rewards 
and punishments similar to controls. However, they did not exhibit anticipatory somatic 
signals. Individuals with amygdala damage did not show any somatic signals throughout 
the task (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Taken together, these findings support the somatic 
marker hypothesis, which proposes a mechanism by which emotions influence decision 
making behavior. The somatic maker hypothesis predicts that decision making deficits 
are due to problems integrating somatic makers (e.g., skin conductance) and cognitive 
reasoning abilities as seen by the decision making difficulties and integration of somatic 
signals in individuals with VMPFC or amygdala damage (Bechara et al., 1994).  
No studies have directly examined reliability of the IGT. However, learning 
effects are observed in general upon repeated use of the IGT (e.g., Ernst et al., 2003a; 
Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003), with the exception of adolescents with 
behavior disorders who fail to show learning effects with repeated administration (Ernst, 
et al., 2003b). Based on evidence from the extensive studies using the IGT in clinical and 
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non-clinical populations, the IGT is considered to assess emotion-based decision making, 
given the importance of integration of somatic signals in adaptive decision making on the 
task (Buelow & Suhr, 2009). Importantly, in clinical populations, worse performance on 
the IGT is associated with personality traits such as sensation seeking and impulsivity 
(Buelow & Suhr, 2009). Additionally, some studies have found that negative affect, high 
trait anxiety, and depression are all associated with poor performance on the IGT (Miu et 
al., 2008; Must et al., 2006; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007).  
Examining associations between personality traits and connection with real-world 
risk taking have been identified as areas that need further research (Buelow & Suhr, 
2009), both of which were addressed in the current project. Relations between anxiety, 
motivation, and emotion regulation were examined in the context of performance on this 
task. In addition, to explore if poor performance on this task is a proxy of negative risk 
taking in real-world settings, relations between performance on the IGT and negative risk 
taking in naturalistic settings (as assessed by the decision making diary) were explored as 
well.    
IGT: Procedure. In the IGT, participants were presented with four decks of cards 
on the computer screen and were instructed to choose cards from these decks. 
Participants were informed that each time they chose a card, they would gain virtual 
money. However, on certain draws they would simultaneously lose a small or large 
amount of points. The frequency of loss and the amount of the loss depends on the deck 
selected. Some decks are “bad decks” and would lead to overall losses, whereas other 
decks are “good decks” and led to overall gains. In this version of the task, decks were 
numbered 1-4, and the deck itself was represented by a blank box. On each turn, for 
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example, choosing from decks 1 and 2 resulted in a reward of $100 whereas choosing 
from decks 3 and 4 resulted in a reward of $50. Selecting decks 1 and 2 resulted in higher 
penalties (e.g., $1000) such that choosing from these decks consistently resulted in a net 
loss. Therefore, decks 1 and 2 were considered “bad decks” (Figure 3). Conversely, decks 
3 and 4 resulted in lower penalties (e.g., $50) such that choosing from these decks 
consistently resulted in a net gain. Decks 3 and 4 were thus considered “good decks” 
(Figure 4). Good and bad decks were counterbalanced to control for any confounding 
influence of deck order on decision making. Participants were re-informed at the 
beginning of the task that the “money” which they were earning in the task is virtual. 
Importantly, no differences in performance have been found when participants are 
playing for real versus virtual rewards (Bowman & Turnbull, 2003). The outcome 
measure of interest was the sum collected which was total virtual money collected at the 
end of the task. Greater sum collected amounts indicated better task performance and less 
risk taking.    
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Figure 3. IGT: Four Trials Selecting from a Bad Deck.  
 
 
Figure 4. IGT: Four Trials Selecting from Good Decks. 
 
   
 
 
65 
 
  
The IGT was run using PEBL programming language. Participants were given the 
following instructions for completing the IGT: 
You are about to take part in a task that involves gambling with play 
money. You will start with a $2000 loan. On each trial, you will select a card 
from one of four decks. After you select each card, you will be given a reward and 
possibly be required to pay a penalty. Your goal is to maximize the profit on your 
loan, and you may choose from any deck at any time to do so. Click the mouse to 
continue.  
For each card you draw, you will get a reward. This reward depends on 
the deck you choose, and each deck has a fixed reward. You will also get a 
penalty, which will cost you money. Sometimes the penalty will be zero, and 
sometimes it will be larger, at times even larger than the reward you get for 
choosing that deck. You should try to get as much money as possible by the end of 
the task. Press the mouse to continue.  
At the bottom of the screen, there is a graph that shows you your current 
earnings. The more money you have, the larger the bar will be. There is NO cash 
prize for virtual money earned in this task. However, individuals who perform 
better than average will be entered in a lottery to win one of two $20 amazon gift 
cards. Do you have any questions? Press the mouse to begin. 
 Passive Avoidance. 
Passive Avoidance: Psychometrics. The passive avoidance (PA) task used in the 
current study is based off of paradigms used in animal go/no-go paradigms (Finger, 
Mitchell, Jones, & Blair, 2008). In these paradigms, a singular stimulus is presented with 
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a reward or punishment. Responding to a stimulus therefore may result in either a reward 
or punishment. Withholding a response, or passively avoiding a response, resulted in 
neither reward nor punishment. The overall objective of the task was to earn points. 
Therefore, this task assesses instrumental decision making and the formation of stimulus-
reward and stimulus-punishment contingencies (Finger et al., 2008; Kosson et al., 2006). 
The PA task differs from the human go/no-go paradigm as individuals are not verbally 
instructed to respond or withhold a response to specific stimuli (Kosson et al., 2006). 
This task has not been used extensively in human populations; therefore, reliability and 
validity metrics are not readily available.  
Passive Avoidance: Procedure. Several versions of the PA task have been 
utilized in human participants. The current version of the PA task was consistent with the 
design utilized by Kosson and colleagues (2006). Specifically, there were 10 blocks of 
trials containing 12 different two-digit numbers. Each number was associated with a 
reward (e.g., gain 100 points) or punishment (e.g., lose 100 points). Half of the stimuli 
were associated with a reward while the other half were associated with a punishment. 
Rewards and punishments ranged from 1 to 2000. Not responding to a stimulus resulted 
in no reward or punishment (i.e., no loss or gain of points). Each stimulus was presented 
on the screen for 1000 milliseconds. If a response was made while the stimulus was on 
the screen, a message appeared above the number indicating whether the individual was 
rewarded (e.g., “You have won 100 points.”) or punished (e.g., “You have lost 100 
points.”). If no response is made, the next stimulus appeared on the screen after 3000 
milliseconds. Participants began the task with 10000 points, and a running total of points 
was presented on a separate screen following each stimulus, regardless of the participants 
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response or lack thereof to the stimulus. Participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to 
one of two versions of the tasks where the numbers associated with reward and 
punishment was switched for each version of the task. The outcome measures of interest 
on the passive avoidance task included the sum collected, commission errors and 
omission errors. The sum collected was the overall amount earned on the passive 
avoidance task across the 10 blocks. Commission errors were the number of responses to 
punishing stimuli (i.e., those associated with losses). Omission errors were responses 
withheld to rewarding stimuli (i.e., those associated with gains).  
 
Figure 5. Passive Avoidance Task: Correct Response, Correct Avoidance, and 
Commission and Omission Errors.
 
 
 
The passive avoidance task was run using E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools). Participants were given the following instructions for completing the 
PA task: 
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You will be presented with a series of numbers. You will use the space bar 
to make responses in this task. Some of the numbers are good and you will gain 
points by pressing the space bar while they are on the screen. Other numbers are 
bad and you will lose points if you press the space bar while they are on the 
screen. If you do not respond you will neither lose nor gain any points. You 
should try to gain as many points as possible by the end of the task. There is NO 
cash prize for virtual money earned in this task. However, individuals who 
perform better than average will be entered in a lottery to win one of two $20 
amazon gift cards. Do you have any questions? Press the space bar to begin. 
Diary 
 Following the in-lab session, participants were asked to complete a week-long 
diary portion for course credit. The diary involved filling out an adapted version of the 
CARE and the PANAS to assess real-world decision making and current mood each day 
for seven days. Qualtrics allows for the creation of “panels,” which can contain subject 
numbers and email addresses. For ease of distributing the surveys, panels were created 
weekly and used only for survey distribution purpose. Participants began the diary 
portion on the first Monday following their lab session and ended the following Sunday. 
Participants received prompts daily at 4 pm to complete each survey by 11:59 pm that 
night via emails distributed through Qualtrics. For participants who have not yet taken the 
survey, reminders were automatically triggered by the system at 10 pm that evening.   
General Procedure 
 Participants who opted to participate signed up for the study via the online 
experiment scheduling website Sona (umaine.sona-systems.com). Various timeslots 
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throughout the day were made available, and eligible participants signed up on a first-
come first-serve basis.  
Study sessions took place in a designated laboratory in the Psychology 
Department. All sessions were conducted by trained undergraduate research assistants. 
Upon arrival to the study session, participants were asked to read and sign an informed 
consent form (see Appendix A) for the first portion of the study (i.e., the lab session) 
before participating. The experimenter for the study session reviewed the content of the 
consent form with the participant to ensure that study procedures are clarified. In 
addition, before beginning the session, the experimenter answered any questions the 
participant has about study procedures and participating.  
 Once participants were clarified about study procedures and agreed to participate, 
the study session began with all participants completing the battery of computer tasks 
(i.e., BART, IGT, and Passive Avoidance) on a designated computer. Prior to each task, 
participants completed a PANAS questionnaire, to control for mood induced performance 
on these tasks if relevant. Presentation of these tasks was counterbalanced for all 
participants to control for potential order effects. Each computer tasks took 
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. The instructions (listed above) were presented 
on the screen and read aloud by the experimenter to all participants. Following the 
computer tasks, participants completed a battery of questionnaires containing the 
following: a demographics questionnaire, ASI-3, TANX, SPS, BIS/BAS, CES-D, RRS, 
ERQ, RFQ, IUS-12, BIS-II, and the College Self Expression Scale. These questionnaires 
took approximately 30 minutes to complete. The demographics questionnaire included 
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the date, age, race, education, and questions regarding their history of mental health 
treatment (both medication-based and therapy/counseling-based).  
Following completion of the surveys, participants were given verbal and written 
instructions (see Appendix C) regarding the diary portion of the study. Participants were 
informed that they would be sent links each day prompting them to complete the survey. 
A rationale for examining relationships between laboratory-based and naturalistic 
behavior was provided to increase compliance. In addition, participants were informed 
that they would receive 2 credits for completion of both the laboratory portion and diary-
based portions of the study. They were informed that they would earn an extra $5 for 
completion of all 7 days of the diary portion. Further, they were notified that if they opt 
out of completing the diary portion, they should inform the experimenter of their 
decision, and they would receive 1 credit for their participation.     
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 A correlational design was employed in the current study to examine associations 
between anxiety and risk taking in laboratory and naturalistic settings. There were three 
overarching goals: 1) Better understand the role of AS in risk taking behavior; 2) Define 
and characterize the construct of positive risk taking in relation to negative risk taking; 
and 3) Examine the relations between risk taking behavior in laboratory and naturalistic 
settings.  
Participant Characteristics  
 Demographics. The total sample consisted of 148 college students (see Tables 1 
and 2). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 45. The majority of the sample was female 
(76.22 %) and white (87.8%). This is consistent with the overall demographics of 
psychology students at the University of Maine. In addition, the State of Maine is 
predominately white, resulting in the relative lack of ethnic and racial diversity of the 
sample.  
Table 1. Age by Gender 
 Male 
(n = 33) 
Female  
(n= 109) 
Total 
(N= 143) 
Mean (SD) 20.39 (5.20) 19.60 (3.90) 19.78 (4.21) 
Range 18-43 18-45 18-45 
Note: One subject did not indicate a gender. There was an option for “other gender” 
which was not endorsed by any subjects. 
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Table 2. Ethnicity by Gender 
 Male  
(n = 33) 
Female  
(n =109) 
Total  
(N = 143) 
Ethnicity     
   White  30 (88.2%) 99 (88.4%) 130 (87.8%) 
   Hispanic or Latino 0 (0%) 6 (5.4%) 6 (4.2%) 
   Black 1 (2.9%) 2 (1.8%) 3 (2.0%) 
   Asian  1 (2.9%) 3 (2.7%) 4 (2.7%)  
   American Indian/Alaska Native  0(0%) 4 (3.6%) 4 (2.7%) 
   Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
   Mixed Race 0 (0%) 2 (1.8%) 2 (1.4%) 
   Other Background 2 (5.9%) 5 (4.5%) 7 (4.7%) 
Note: One subject did not indicate a gender. There was an option for “other gender” 
which was not endorsed by any subjects. 
 
Preliminary Data Preparation and Analyses  
Self-Report Measures. Means (SDs) of the study variables are presented in Table 
3 (self-report data). Univariate outliers were defined as data points with z-scores 
exceeding ± 3.29 (Cousineau & Chartier, 2010). Outliers were transformed rather than 
excluded to maintain power. To this end, a transformation technique involving moving 
extreme values to the next most extreme value that is not an outlier (i.e., winsorizing) was 
used. Winsorization allows for the relative preservation of data while reducing the skew 
caused by outliers on the overall distribution (Field, 2009). Outliers were identified and 
winsorized for the ASI-3 (n = 1), BAS total scale (n = 1), and reward responsiveness 
subscale of the BAS scale (n = 3). There were no outliers for the RFQ or the RRS.  
Missing data varied across the measures. For measures in which a sum score was 
calculated, sum scores were not calculated for individuals who skipped individual items 
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on a given measures.  On average, there were 5.48 (SD = 5.33) items missing per 
measure. Number of missing items per measure ranged from one to 25 items. 
When testing the hypotheses, variables which have been theoretically associated 
with AS, moderator variables, and outcome measures were controlled for to assess 
whether AS and moderators are associated with the outcome variable above and beyond 
other related variables. This theoretically driven method of choosing covariates has been 
shown to be superior to purely data-driven methods of choosing covariates (Raab, Day, & 
Sales, 2000).  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Self-Report Measures  
 N Range Mean SD 
ASI-3 141 0-56 16.13 11.79 
TANX 143 27-60 41.86 8.26 
SPS 141 0-55 17.95 13.87 
CES-D 141 8-41 21.97 6.88 
RFQ- Promotion 145 12.00-30.00 22.30 3.49 
RFQ- Prevention 142 9.00-25.00 17.85 4.02 
ERQ- Reappraise 144 6-42 27.01 6.79 
ERQ-Suppression 146 4-27 13.72 5.37 
RRS- Total 139 22-75 39.45 12.70 
RRS- Ponder 146 5-19 8.67 3.46 
RRS-Brood 143 5-19 9.50 3.50 
BAS- Fun Seek 146 5-16 12.02 2.46 
BAS- Drive 146 4-16 11.03 2.55 
BAS- Reward Resp 146 12-20 17.65 2.13 
BAS- Total 144 16-52 40.63 5.94 
BIS 147 9-28 20.63 4.27 
IUS-12- Total 144 12-59 31.65 10.07 
IUS-12- PA 146 7-34 20.64 6.00 
IUS-12- IA 145 5-25 10.98 4.73 
BIS-11- Total 135 33-86 61.00 10.77 
CSES 123 116-225 168.81 19.71 
Note. ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory- 3; TANX = Trait Anxiety Inventory; SPS = Social Phobia 
Scale; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; RFQ- Promotion = Regulatory Focus 
Questionnaire, Promotion; RFQ- Prevention = Regulatory Focus Questionnaire, Prevention; ERQ- 
Reappraise = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, Cognitive Reappraisal; ERQ- Suppress = Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire, Suppression Scale; RRS- Total = Rumination Response Scale- Total Score; 
RRS- Ponder = Rumination Response Scale, Pondering Scale; RRS- Brood =  Rumination Response Scale, 
Brooding Scale; BAS- Fun Seek = Behavioral Activation Scale, Fun Seeking; BAS- Drive = Behavioral 
Activation Scale, Drive; BAS- Reward Resp = Behavioral Activation, Reward Responsiveness; BIS = 
Behavioral Inhibition Scale; IUS-12- Total = Intolerance of Uncertainty-12, Total Score; IUS-12- PA = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty-12, Prospective Anxiety, IUS-12-IA = Intolerance of Uncertainty-12, Inhibitory 
Anxiety; BIS-11- Total = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale -11- Total Score; CSES = College Self-Expression 
Scale.  
75 
 
  
Computerized Decision Making Tasks.  Means (SDs) of performance on 
computerized risk taking tasks are presented in Table 4. Univariate outliers were also 
identified in dependent variables. Outliers for BART sum (n =1), BART adjusted pumps 
(n =1), BART balloon bursts (n = 1), IGT deck choices (n = 1) and IGT sum (n = 2) were 
winsorized. There were no outliers for any of the outcome measures of the PA task. 
There was minimal missing data due to experimenter error and equipment failure (n = 4). 
BART adjusted pump score and BART sum score were found to be correlated perfectly 
with one another (r = 1.00, p < .01; see Table 9). Therefore, only BART adjusted pumps 
was chosen as the dependent variable because this is the typical outcome measure used in 
prior studies (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002).  
 
Table 4. Performance on the Computerized Risk Taking Tasks 
 N Range Mean SD 
BART- Sum 142 4.80-73.40 27.80 11.04 
BART- Bursts 142 11-86 37.20 11.34 
BART- Pump 142 118-2060 819.47 372.87 
BART- Adj 142 1.2-34.0 11.28 5.96 
IGT- Choice 143 -78-108 11.22 27.75 
IGT- Sum 143 -2000-3100 -90.77 805.38 
PA- Com. Err. 146 .12-1.00 .48 .22 
PA- Om. Err. 146 .00-.62 .25 .14 
PA- Sum 146 -755021- 2330251 817701.29 727278.36 
Note. BART- Sum = Total sum collected on the BART; BART- Burst = Total sum of balloon bursts 
on the BART; BART- Pump = Sum of balloon pumps on the BART; BART- Adj = Average balloon 
pumps on the BART adjusted for balloon bursts; IGT- Choice = Number of choices from bad decks 
subtracted from number of choices on good decks on the IGT task; IGT- Sum = Total sum collected 
on the IGT task; PA- Com. Err. = Errors of commission on the Passive Avoidance Task; PA- Om. Err. 
= Errors of omission on the Passive Avoidance Task; PA- Sum = Total sum collected on the Passive 
Avoidance Task.  
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Correlations among computerized decision making outcome measures are 
presented in Table 5. BART adjusted pumps was significantly associated with BART 
balloon bursts, signifying that as risk taking increased (i.e., BART adjusted pumps), 
balloon bursts also increased. BART adjusted pumps and balloon bursts were also 
associated with PA sum score. In addition, BART adjusted pumps, but not BART balloon 
bursts, was associated with more advantageous IGT deck selections, a higher IGT sum 
score and less commission errors on the PA task. Advantageous IGT deck selections was 
associated with a higher IGT sum score, less commission errors on the PA task and a 
higher PA sum score.  
 
Table 5. Correlations between Decision Making Task Outcome Measures 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. BART- Adj ---       
2. BART- Bursts .79*** ---      
3. IGT- Choice .14 .15 ---     
4. IGT- Sum .17* .16 .78*** ---    
5. PA- Com. Err. -.20* -.16 -.23** -.11 ---   
6. PA- Om. Err. -.17* -.11 .01 -.07 -.43*** ---  
7. PA- Sum .30*** .24** .18* .13 -.75*** -.08 --- 
Note. BART- Adj = Average balloon pumps on the BART adjusted for balloon bursts; BART- 
Bursts = Total sum of balloon bursts on the BART; IGT- Choice = Number of choices from bad 
decks subtracted from number of choices on good decks on the IGT task; IGT- Sum = Total sum 
collected on the IGT task; PA- Com. Err. = Errors of commission on the Passive Avoidance Task; 
PA- Om. Err. = Errors of omission on the Passive Avoidance Task; PA- Sum = Total sum 
collected on the Passive Avoidance Task.  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Daily Decision Making Diary. Negative and positive risk taking dimensions 
were calculated from the CARE questionnaire. Means (SDs) are presented in Table 6. 
The original questionnaire contains six subscales which included the following: illicit 
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drug use, aggressive and illegal behavior, risky sexual activities, heavy drinking, high 
risk sports, and academic/work behaviors. Outliers for negative risk taking (n = 2), 
positive risk taking (n = 1), academic/work behaviors (n =3), social risk taking (n = 2) 
and non-avoidance of negative emotions (n = 1) were identified and variables were 
winsorized. 
A composite positive risk taking score was calculated from items added to the 
CARE questionnaire to assess positive risk taking (i.e., social risk taking, non-avoidance 
of negative emotions and openness to new activities) and the high risk sports items. 
Reliability was assessed for all positive risk taking subscales. Similar to the negative 
composite score, all subscales were used to create the positive composite score regardless 
of individual scale reliability rates. The positive risk taking composite score (α = .86), 
social risk taking (α = .75) and non-avoidance of negative emotions (α = .75) showed 
high internal reliability. Openness to new activities had poor internal reliability (α = .58). 
Once again, reliability may have been affected by a low number of items as the openness 
subscale had a total of two items. 
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Table 6. Decision Making Diary Descriptives 
 N Range Mean SD 
Negative Risk 137 12.50-15.56 13.20 .69 
  Aggression 137 4-5.50 4.11 .22 
  Substance Use 137 3.50-5.50 3.62 .26 
  Sex Risk 137 2.50-3.50 2.56 .14 
  Work Risk 137 2.50-4.27 2.92 .44 
Positive Risk 137 9.00-15.04 10.46 1.11 
  Nat. Assert. 137 2.50-4.50 3.13 .44 
  Non-Avoid 137 3.50-5.50 4.03 .44 
  Openness 137 1.00-2.00 1.21 .23 
  Sport Risk 137 2.00-3.50 2.09 .20 
  Social Risk 137 4.00-6.83 4.90 .60 
Note. Negative Risk = Negative Risk Taking Composite; Aggression = Aggression 
Subscale of the Negative Risk Taking Scale; Substance Use = Risky Substance Use 
Subscale of the Negative Risk Taking Scale; Sex Risk = Risk Sexual Behavior Subscale 
of the Negative Risk Taking Scale; Work Risk = Work/School-Related Risk Taking 
Subscale of the Negative Risk Taking Scale; Positive Risk = Positive Risk Taking 
Composite; Nat. Assert. = Naturalistic Assertiveness Subscale of the Positive Risk 
Taking Scale; Non-Avoid = Non-Avoidance of Negative Emotions Subscale of the 
Positive Risk Taking Scale; Openness = Openness to New Activities Subscale of the 
Positive Risk Taking Scale; Sport Risk = High Risk Sport Subscale of the Positive Risk 
Taking Scale; Social Risk = Social Risk Taking Subscale of Positive Risk Taking Scale. 
 
Moderated Regression Analyses. Multicollinearity was assessed by examining 
tolerance values with a cut-off of equal to or less than .10. Points of undue influence were 
assessed in regression analyses. Specifically, multivariate outliers, leverage, and 
influential cases were examined. For multivariate outliers, studentized deleted residuals 
were examined with a cut-off value of ± 3. Influential points were assessed by examining 
leverage points and Cook’s distance values. For leverage points, a cut-off of .06 was used 
and a cut-off of greater than 1.00 was used for Cook’s distance. Assumptions of 
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homoscedasticity and normality were assessed by examining studentized residuals plotted 
against unstandardized predicted values for all regression analyses. Regression is robust 
to violations of normality and homogeneity (Box, 2005). Thus, violations are noted, but 
data was not transformed.  For moderated regression analyses, all variables were centered 
prior to conducting analyses in order to prevent multicollinearity between main effects 
and interaction terms.   
Hypothesis One 
 Hypothesis one concerned participants’ performance on the laboratory tasks 
assessing decision making.  
 Hypothesis One- A. Participants with higher AS were predicted to show lower 
risk taking on the BART. Specifically, AS would be negatively correlated with adjusted 
balloon pumps and balloon bursts on the task.  In addition, it was predicted that success 
on the BART task, as measured by the adjusted pump score, would be dependent on 
interactions between motivation and AS. In particular, participants with higher AS and 
higher approach motivation would exhibit lower risk taking compared to lower AS, 
higher approach motivation individuals and higher AS, lower approach motivation 
individuals due to a mismatch between their motivation focus and level of anxiety. 
Similarly, higher AS individuals who have lower avoidance motivation levels were 
predicted to also show significantly lower earnings on the BART (i.e., BART sum) than 
lower AS, low avoidance motivation individuals and higher AS, high avoidance 
motivation individuals.  
Bivariate correlation analyses were conducted to examine the relations between 
ASI scores, BIS/BAS scores, average adjusted pumps, and balloon bursts on the BART 
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task (Table 7). Correlation values between 0.1 and 0.3 were considered weak 
correlations; values between 0.3 and 0.5 were considered moderate correlations; and 
values above 0.5 were considered strong correlations (Cohen, 1988). There were a 
significant weak, negative correlation between AS and BAS Fun Seeking and a 
significant moderate, positive correlation with AS and BIS. These findings were in line 
with the predictions that AS would be negatively correlated with approach motivation 
and positively correlated with avoidance motivation. Contrary to the predictions, risk 
taking on the BART was not correlated with AS.  
 
Table 7. Correlations between ASI and BART Outcome Measures 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. ASI-3 --        
2. BAS Drive -.03 ---       
3. BAS- Reward 
Resp 
.05 .39*** ---      
4. BAS- Fun 
Seek 
-.18* .47*** .36*** ---     
5. BAS Total -.08 .79*** .74*** .79*** ---    
6. BIS .40*** -.08 .22*** .23*** -.23 ---   
7. BART- Adj .01 -.03 -.03 -.05 -.01 .03 ---  
8. BART- Bursts  -.01 -.12 -.09 -.13 -.15 .04 .79*** --- 
Note: ASI-3 = Anxiety Sensitivity Index- 3; BAS- Fun Seek = Behavioral Activation Scale, Fun 
Seeking; BAS- Drive = Behavioral Activation Scale, Drive; BAS- Reward Resp = Behavioral 
Activation, Reward Responsiveness; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale; BART adjusted = 
Average balloon pumps on the BART adjusted for balloon bursts; BART bursts = Total sum of 
balloon bursts on the BART. 
*p < .05; *** p < .001 
 
 
Interaction between AS and Approach Motivation. A series of hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses were conducted to assess the interaction between AS and 
motivation (i.e., BAS scales, BAS total score and BIS, regressions run separately) on 
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BART outcome measures, including the average balloon pumps adjusted for balloon 
bursts (i.e., BART adjusted) and sum of balloon bursts (i.e., BART bursts).  
BAS Drive by AS. There was no indication of multicollinearity (all tolerance 
values > .91). A multivariate outlier was identified for the interaction between BAS drive 
and AS for BART adjusted pump scores. Analyses were conducted with and without this 
outlier, and results remained unchanged; therefore, the outlier was included in the 
analyses. Although there were several points exceeding leverage cut-offs, no points 
exceeded the Cook’s distance cut-off. To assess for homogeneity of variance, studentized 
residuals were plotted against unstandardized predicted values. Upon visual inspection of 
these plots, the plot for BART bursts was somewhat heteroscedastic, showing a slight 
increasing funnel shape. The plot for BART adjusted pumps appeared homoscedastic. 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated that the studentized residuals were normally distributed for 
BART adjusted pumps and balloon bursts.  
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the 
interaction between AS and BAS drive for BART adjusted pumps. AS and BAS drive 
were added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for .1% of the 
total variance in BART adjusted pumps, R2 = .001, F(2, 132) = .08, p = .92.  The 
interaction between AS and BAS drive was entered into step two of the model. The 
model was not significant, and the interaction between AS and BAS drive did not 
significantly account for additional variance in BART adjusted pumps, ΔR2 = .000, ΔF(1, 
131) = .000, p = .99. 
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was also conducted to examine the 
interaction between AS and BAS drive for BART balloon bursts. AS and BAS drive were 
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added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 1.2% of the total 
variance in BART balloon bursts, R2 = .012, F(2, 132) = .81, p = .45.  The interaction 
between AS and BAS drive was entered into step two of the model. The interaction 
between AS and BAS drive did not account for additional variance in BART balloon 
bursts, ΔR2 = .001, ΔF(1, 131) = .16, p = .69.  
Reward Responsiveness by AS. There was no indication of multicollinearity (all 
tolerance values > .94). No multivariate outliers were identified, and no data exceeded 
leverage and Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized residuals against 
unstandardized predicted values showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated 
that the studentized residuals were normally distributed.  
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the 
interaction between AS and reward responsiveness for BART adjusted pumps. AS and 
reward responsiveness were added simultaneously into step one of the model which 
accounted for .2% of the total variance in BART adjusted pumps, R2 = .002, F(2, 132) = 
.12, p = .89.  The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness was entered into 
step two of the model. The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness did not 
account for additional variance in BART adjusted pumps, ΔR2 = .001, ΔF(1, 131) = .12, p 
= .73. 
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the 
interaction between AS and reward responsiveness for BART balloon bursts. AS and 
reward responsiveness were added simultaneously into step one of the model which 
accounted for 1.0% of the total variance in BART balloon bursts, R2 = .010, F(2, 132) = 
.69, p = .50.  The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness was entered into 
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step two of the model. The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness did not 
account for the additional variance in BART balloon bursts, ΔR2 = .008, ΔF(1, 131) = 
1.09, p = .30. 
BAS Total by AS. There was no indication of multicollinearity (all tolerance 
values > .95). No multivariate outliers were identified. There were no points exceeding 
leverage and Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized residuals against 
unstandardized predicted values showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated 
that the studentized residuals were normally distributed.  
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the 
interaction between AS and BAS total score for BART adjusted pumps. AS and BAS 
total score were added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 0% 
of the total variance in BART adjusted pumps, R2 = .000, F(2, 130) = .02, p = .98.  The 
interaction between AS and BAS total score was entered into step two of the model. The 
interaction between AS and BAS total score did not account for additional variance in 
BART adjusted pumps, ΔR2 = .001, ∆F(1, 129) = .17, p = .68. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was also conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BAS total score for BART balloon bursts. AS and BAS total score were 
added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 2.1% of the total 
variance in BART balloon bursts, R2 = .021, F(2, 130) = 1.37, p = .26.  The interaction 
between AS and BAS total score was entered into step two of the model. The interaction 
between AS and BAS total score did not account for additional variance in BART 
balloon bursts, ΔR2 = .009, ∆F(1, 129) = 1.16, p = .28. 
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Interaction between AS and Avoidance Motivation. There was no indication of 
multicollinearity (all tolerance values > .80). Multivariate outliers were identified for the 
interaction between BIS and AS for BART adjusted pumps (n = 2). Analyses were 
conducted with and without outliers, and the outcome was not changed; therefore, 
outliers were included in final analyses. There were no points exceeding leverage and 
Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized residuals against unstandardized predicted 
values showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated that the studentized 
residuals were normally distributed.  
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BIS score for BART adjusted pumps. AS and BIS score were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 0% of the total variance in 
BART adjusted pumps, R2 = .000, F(2, 133) = .03, p = .97.  The interaction between AS 
and BIS score was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and 
BIS score did not account for additional variance in BART adjusted pumps, ΔR2 = .000, 
∆F(1, 132) = 0, p = .99. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BIS score for BART balloon bursts. AS and BIS score were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for .2% of the total variance 
in BART balloon bursts, R2 = .002, F(2, 133) = .12, p = .89.  The interaction between AS 
and BIS score was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and 
BIS score did not account for additional variance in BART balloon bursts, ΔR2 = .002, 
∆F(1, 132) = .08, p = .78. 
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Contrary to the predictions, the interaction between motivation and AS did not 
explain risk taking on the BART. Specifically, the interaction between AS and approach 
motivation (BAS subscales and total BAS scores) did not predict BART adjusted balloon 
pumps or BART balloon bursts. The interaction between AS and BIS score also did not 
predict BART adjusted balloon pumps or BART balloon bursts. Overall, positive risk 
taking, as assessed by BART risk taking, was not related to anxiety, approach-avoidance 
motivation or anxiety at different levels of approach-avoidance motivation, 
Hypothesis One- B. The relations between AS and outcome measures on the IGT 
were predicted to be moderated by the tendency to ruminate. In particular, participants 
with higher levels of AS and higher levels of rumination were predicted to take more 
maladaptive risks on the IGT as shown by more “bad deck” selections (i.e., a higher IGT 
choice score) and lower earnings on the IGT (i.e., a lower IGT sum score).  
Bivariate correlations were conducted to assess the relations between ASI scores, 
rumination and IGT choice and sum scores. As presented in Table 8, there was a 
significant, moderate correlation between AS and rumination which was in line with the 
predictions. However, correlations between AS, rumination and IGT outcome measures 
were not significant.  
 
Table 8. Correlations between AS, Rumination, and IGT Outcome Measures 
 1 2 3 4 
1. ASI-3 ---    
2. RRS- Total .56*** ---   
3. IGT- Choice .01 .07 ---  
4. IGT- Sum -.07 -.02 .78*** --- 
Note. ASI-3 = Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory- 3; RRS- Total = Rumination Response 
Scale- Total Score; IGT- Choice = Number of choices from good decks subtracted from 
number of choices on bad decks on the IGT task; IGT- Sum = Total sum collected on the 
IGT task. 
*** p < .001 
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Rumination by AS. There was no indication of multicollinearity (all tolerance 
values > .80). Multivariate outliers were identified for the interaction between rumination 
and AS for IGT deck choices (n = 3). Analyses were conducted with and without outliers, 
and the outcome did not change; therefore, outliers were included in final analyses. There 
were no points exceeding both leverage and Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized 
residuals against unstandardized predicted values showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro- 
Wilk’s test was significant for IGT deck choice (p = .01) and IGT sum score (p = .01) 
indicating that the studentized residuals were not normally distributed. Visual inspection 
of the histogram showed a slight negative skew for both deck choice and sum scores and 
a leptokurtic distribution of the residuals for IGT deck choice. The residuals for IGT sum 
scores appeared leptokurtic.  
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and rumination for IGT choice1. AS and rumination were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for .8% of the total variance 
in IGT deck choices, R2 = .008, F(2, 126) = .49, p = .61. The interaction between AS and 
rumination was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and 
rumination did not account for additional variance in IGT deck choices, ∆R2 = .002, 
∆F(1, 125) = .20, p = .66. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was also conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and rumination for IGT sum score. AS and rumination were added 
                                                          
1 Deck choices on the IGT are analyzed in a variety of different ways across studies. Many studies analyze 
deck selections across blocks of trials (e.g., Mueller et al., 2010). Specifically, data is typically grouped into 
five blocks of 20 trials for the 100 total trials.  Data in the current study was examined across blocks and 
this did not change the outcome as neither AS, rumination nor the interaction between AS and rumination 
was associated with disadvantageous or advantageous deck choices across any of block. These results are 
therefore not presented. 
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simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for .3% of the total variance 
in IGT sum score, R2 = .003, F(2, 126) = .20, p = .82. The interaction between AS and 
rumination was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and 
rumination did not account for additional variance explained in IGT sum score, ∆R2 = 
.004, ∆F(1, 125) = .46, p = .50.  
In contrast to predictions, neither AS nor the interaction between AS and 
rumination explained risk taking on the IGT.  Heightened anxiety did not impair 
performance. In addition, highly anxious, highly ruminative individuals did not tend to 
perform worse on the IGT as expected.  
Hypothesis One- C. ASI scores were hypothesized to be positively related to 
omission errors and negatively related to commission errors on the passive avoidance 
(PA) task. In addition, it was predicted that motivation would moderate the relations 
between AS and outcome measures on the passive avoidance task. Specifically, it was 
predicted that participants with higher levels of AS and higher BIS levels would commit 
more omission errors than their counterparts.  
Bivariate correlation analyses were conducted to assess the relations between ASI 
scores and PA outcome measures, including PA omission errors, PA commission errors 
and PA sum score. Table 9 presents correlations between AS, motivation and PA 
outcome measures. Correlations between motivation and AS were previously discussed 
(see Hypothesis One- A for a summary of results). Contrary to the predictions, AS was 
not correlated with any of the PA outcome measures. BAS fun seeking was significantly, 
but weakly, correlated with PA commission errors. No other measures of approach or 
avoidance motivation were correlated with the PA outcome measures.  
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Table 9. Correlations between AS, Motivation and PA Outcome Measures  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. ASI-3 --         
2. BAS Drive -.03 ---        
3. BAS- Reward 
Resp 
.05 .41*** ---       
4. BAS- Fun 
Seek 
-.18* .47*** .36*** ---      
5. BAS Total -.08 .79*** .74*** .78*** ---     
6. BIS .40*** -.08 .25*** -
.23*** 
-.23 ---    
7. PA- Om. Err. -.09 -.12 -.12 -.03 -.11 -.05 ---   
8. PA- Com. Err. -.12 .12 .01 .17** .12 -.05 -
.43*** 
---  
9. PA- Sum .14 -.07 .01 -.15 -.10 .06 -.08 -.75** --- 
Note. ASI-3 = Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory- 3; BAS- Drive = Behavioral Activation Scale, 
Drive; BAS- Reward Resp = Behavioral Activation, Reward Responsiveness; BAS- Fun Seek = 
Behavioral Activation Scale, Fun Seeking; BAS Total = Behavioral Activation, Total Score; BIS 
= Behavioral Inhibition Scale; PA- Om. Err. = Errors of omission on the Passive Avoidance Task; 
PA- Com. Err. = Errors of commission on the Passive Avoidance Task; PA- sum = Total sum 
collected on the Passive Avoidance Task. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Interaction between AS and Approach Motivation. 
BAS Drive by AS. There was no indication of multicollinearity (all tolerance 
values > .98). A multivariate outlier was identified for the interaction between BAS drive 
and AS for PA omission errors (n = 1) 2, which was included in final analyses. There 
were no points exceeding both leverage and Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized 
residuals against unstandardized predicted values showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro- 
Wilk’s test was significant for PA omission error (p < .01), indicating that the studentized 
residuals were not normally distributed. Shapiro- Wilk’s test was also significant for PA 
commission (p  = .03), indicating that the studentized residuals were not normally 
                                                          
2 When this outlier was removed, there was a trend for a significant effect (p = .055) of the first step of the 
model; however, removing this outlier did not change the significance of the interaction.  
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distributed. Visual inspection of the histogram showed that the residuals of PA omission 
errors had a platykurtic shape and the residuals of PA commission errors were positively 
skewed. Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated that the studentized residuals for PA sum score 
were normally distributed.  
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BAS drive for PA omission errors. AS and BAS drive were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 2.4% of the total variance 
in PA omission errors, R2 = .024, F(2, 136) = 1.64, p = .20. The interaction between AS 
and BAS drive was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and 
BAS drive did not account for additional variance in PA omission errors, ∆R2 = .008, 
∆F(1, 135) = 1.12, p = .29. 
A hierarchical multiple regression examining the interaction between AS and 
BAS drive for PA commission errors was run. Impulsivity was related to AS, BAS drive 
and PA commission errors; thus, impulsivity was added as a covariate to the model. 
Impulsivity was entered into step one of the model, which accounted for 3.9% of the total 
variance in commission errors, R2 = .039, F(2, 127) = 5.13, p = .03. Higher impulsivity 
was related to significantly more commission errors (t(127) = 2.27, β = .20, t= p  = .03). 
AS and BAS drive were added simultaneously into step two of the model and the amount 
of additional variance explained in PA commission errors approached significance, ∆R2 = 
.042, ∆F(2, 125) = 2.86, p = .06. The interaction between AS and BAS drive was entered 
into step three of the model. The interaction between AS and BAS drive did not account 
for additional variance in PA commission errors, ∆R2 = .009, ∆F(1, 124) = 1.29, p = .26. 
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A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BAS drive for PA sum score. AS and BAS drive were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 2.7% of the total variance 
in PA sum score, R2 = .027, F(2, 136) = 1.90, p = .15. The interaction between AS and 
BAS drive was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and BAS 
drive did not account for additional variance in PA sum score, ∆R2 = .004, ∆F(1, 135) = 
.58, p = .45. 
Reward Responsiveness by AS. There was no indication of multicollinearity (all 
tolerance values > .93). A multivariate outlier was identified for the interaction between 
reward responsiveness and AS for PA omission errors (n = 1). Analyses were conducted 
with and without this outlier, and the outcome did not change; therefore, the outlier was 
included in final analyses. There were no points exceeding both leverage and Cook’s 
distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized residuals against unstandardized predicted values 
showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro-Wilk’s test was significant PA omission errors (p < 
.01), indicating that the studentized residuals were not normally distributed. Visual 
inspection of the histogram showed that PA omission error residuals had a negative skew. 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test was also significant for PA commission errors (p < .01), indicating 
that the studentized residuals were not normally distributed. Visual inspection of the 
histogram showed that the residuals of PA commission errors were positively skewed. 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test result suggested that the studentized residuals for PA sum score were 
normally distributed.  
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and reward responsiveness for PA omission errors. AS and reward 
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responsiveness were added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted 
for 2.6% of the total variance in PA omission errors, R2 = .026, F(2, 136) = 1.84, p = .16. 
The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness was entered into step two of the 
model. The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness did not account for 
additional variance in PA omission errors, ∆R2 = .00, ∆F(1, 135) = .43, p = .84. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was also conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and reward responsiveness for PA commission errors. As stated previously, 
impulsivity was significantly associated with both AS and PA commission errors and, 
therefore, was controlled for. Impulsivity was entered into step one of the model, which 
accounted for 3.9% of the total variance in commission errors, R2 = .039, F(2, 127) = 
5.13, p = .03. As reported above, impulsivity was associated with a higher rate of 
commission errors (t(127) = 2.27, ᵦ = .20, p = .03). AS and reward responsiveness were 
added simultaneously into step two of the model, and the amount of additional variance 
in PA commission errors accounted for by these variables approached significance, ∆R2 = 
.040, ∆F(2, 125) = 2.70, p = .07. The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness 
was entered into step three of the model. The interaction between AS and reward 
responsiveness did not account for additional variance in PA commission errors, ∆R2 = 
.009, ∆F(1, 124) = 1.18, p = .28. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and reward responsiveness for PA sum score. AS and reward responsiveness 
were added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 2.0% of 
additional variance in PA sum score, ∆R2 = .020, ∆F(2, 136) = 1.38, p = .26. The 
interaction between AS and reward responsiveness was entered into step two of the 
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model. The interaction between AS and reward responsiveness did not account for 
additional variance in PA sum score, ∆R2 = .005, ∆F(1, 135) = .69, p = .41. 
BAS Total by AS. Assumptions for moderated regression were assessed in a 
similar manner as described for Hypothesis One- A. There was no indication of 
multicollinearity (all tolerance values > .95). A multivariate outliers were identified for 
PA omission errors (n = 1).  Analyses were conducted with and without this outlier, and 
the outcome did not change; therefore, the outlier was included in final analyses. There 
were no points exceeding both leverage and Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized 
residuals against unstandardized predicted values showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro-
Wilk’s test was significant for PA omission errors (p = .04) and commission errors (p < 
.01), indicating that studentized residuals were not normally distributed. Visual 
inspection of the histograms showed that the residuals of PA omission errors had a 
platykurtic shape and the residuals of PA commission errors were positively skewed. The 
studentized residuals for PA sum score were normally distributed, as assessed by 
Shapiro-Wilk’s test. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BAS total score for PA omission errors. AS and BAS total score were 
added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 2.2% of the total 
variance in PA omission errors, R2 = .022, F(2, 134) = 1.53, p = .22. The interaction 
between AS and BAS total score was entered into step two of the model. The interaction 
between AS and BAS total score did not account for additional variance in PA omission 
errors, ∆R2 = .002, ∆F(1, 133) = .21, p = .65. 
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A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BAS total score for PA commission errors. As stated previously, 
impulsivity was significantly associated with both AS and PA commission errors and, 
therefore, was controlled for. Impulsivity was entered into step one of the model, which 
accounted for 3.8% of the total variance in commission errors, R2 = .038, F(2, 126) = 
5.03, p = .03. As reported above, impulsivity was associated with a higher rate of 
commission errors (t(126) = 2.24, ᵦ = .20, p = .03). AS and BAS total score were added 
simultaneously into step two of the model which accounted for 2.4% of the change in 
variance in PA commission errors, ∆R2 = .043, ∆F(2, 124) = 2.87, p = .06. The 
interaction between AS and BAS total score was entered into step two of the model. The 
interaction between AS and BAS total score did not account for additional variance in PA 
commission errors, ∆R2 = .008, ∆F(1, 123) = 1.04, p = .31. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BAS total score for PA sum score. AS and BAS total score were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 3.1% of the total variance 
in PA sum score, R2 = .031, F(2, 134) = 2.15, p = .12. The interaction between AS and 
BAS total score was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and 
BAS total score did not account for additional variance in PA sum score, ∆R2 = .007, 
∆F(1, 133) = .98, p = .33. 
Interaction between AS and Avoidance Motivation. Assumptions for moderated 
regression were assessed in a similar manner as described for Hypothesis One- A. There 
was no indication of multicollinearity (all tolerance values > .81). No multivariate 
outliers were identified. There were no points exceeding both leverage and Cook’s 
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distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized residuals against unstandardized predicted values 
showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro-Wilk’s test was significant for PA commission errors 
(p < .01), indicating that studentized residuals were not normally distributed. Visual 
inspection of the histogram showed that PA commission error residuals had a positive 
skew. The studentized residuals for PA omission errors and PA sum score were normally 
distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BIS score for PA omission errors. AS and BIS score were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 1.2% of the total variance 
in PA omission errors, R2 = .012, F(2, 137) = .82, p = .42. The interaction between AS 
and BIS score was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and 
BIS score did not account for additional variance in PA omission errors, ∆R2 = .005, 
∆F(1, 136) = .64, p = .43. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was also conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BIS score for PA commission errors. As stated previously, impulsivity 
was significantly associated with both ASI and PA commission errors and, therefore, was 
controlled for. Impulsivity was entered into step one of the model, which accounted for 
3.9% of the total variance in commission errors, R2 = .039, F(2, 127) = 5.13, p = .03. 
Higher levels of impulsivity were associated with a higher rate of commission errors 
(t(127), ᵦ = .20, p = .03). AS and BIS score were added simultaneously into step two of 
the model which accounted for 3.9% of additional variance in PA commission errors, ∆R2 
= .039, ∆F(2, 125) = 2.64, p = .08. The interaction between AS and BIS score was 
entered into step three of the model. The interaction between AS and BIS score d did not 
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account for additional variance in PA commission errors, ∆R2 = .004, ∆F(1, 124) = .55, p 
= .46. 
A hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to examine the interaction 
between AS and BIS score for PA sum score. AS and BIS score were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 2.0% of the total variance 
in PA sum score, R2 = .020, F(2, 137) = 1.41, p = .25. The interaction between AS and 
BIS score was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and BIS 
score did not account for additional variance in PA sum score, ∆R2 = .001, ∆F(1, 136) = 
.13, p = .72. 
Contrary to the hypotheses, the interaction between motivation and AS did not 
significantly account for the variance explained in PA outcome measures. Specifically, 
the interaction between approach motivation (i.e., BAS subscales and total score) and AS 
did not account for further variance in any of the PA outcome measures. In addition, the 
interaction between avoidance motivation (i.e., BIS score) and AS did not account for 
further variance in any of the PA outcome measures. In sum, AS and motivation were not 
associated with outcome measures on the PA task. However, impulsivity was 
significantly associated with the amount of commission errors made, which is consistent 
with prior literature (Trommer, Hoeppner, Lorber, & Armstrong, 1988).  
Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis two concerned the daily decision diary portion of the study.  
Hypothesis Two- A. It was hypothesized that ASI scores would be negatively 
related to positive risk taking in the real world. In addition, it was predicted that higher 
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levels of AS would be associated with more negative expectancies of engaging in 
positive risk taking.  
Correlations between AS and positive risk taking were examined (Table 10). 
Contrary to the predictions, AS was not significantly associated with any positive risk 
taking dimensions. Positive risk taking dimensions were moderately to strongly 
correlated with one another. Correlations between AS and negative expectancies of 
positive risk taking were also examined (Table 11). Findings were not in line with the 
predictions: AS was not significantly correlated with negative expectancies within any of 
the positive risk taking domains. Negative expectancies of each positive risk taking 
domain were moderately to strongly correlated with one another. Correlations between 
AS and positive expectancies were also examined (Table 12). AS was not associated with 
positive expectancies of any positive risk taking dimension.  
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Table 10. Correlations between AS and Positive Risk Taking Behavior 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. ASI-3 --       
2. Positive Risk .10 ---      
3. Nat. Assert. .10 .85*** ---     
4. Non-avoidance .14 .93*** .69*** ---    
5. Openness .10 .86*** .61*** .77*** ---   
6. Sport Risk -.09 .49*** .15 .38*** .43*** ---  
7. Social Risk .08 .92*** .94*** .84*** .70*** .25*** --- 
Note. ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory- 3; Positive Risk = Positive Risk Taking Composite; 
Nat. Assert. = Assertiveness Subscale of Positive Risk Taking Scale; Non-avoidance = Non-
avoidance of Negative Emotions Subscale of Positive Risk Taking Scale; Openness = Openness 
to New Activities Subscale of Positive Risk Taking Scale; Sport Risk = High Risk Sport Subscale 
of Positive Risk Taking Scale; Social Risk = Social Risk Taking Subscale of Positive Risk Taking 
Scale.  
*** p < .001 
 
Table 11. Correlations between AS and Negative Expectancies of Positive Risk Taking 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. ASI-3 ---       
2. Risk- Pos 
Risk 
.09 ---      
3. Risk- 
Assertiveness 
.12 .92*** ---     
4. Risk- Non-
avoidance 
.06 .95*** .88*** ---    
5. Risk -
Openness 
.12 .87*** .83*** .76*** ---   
6. Risk- Sport 
risk 
.06 .80*** .57*** .66*** .65*** ---  
7. Risk -Social 
risk 
.12 .94*** .98*** .94*** .82*** .59*** --- 
Note. ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory- 3; Risk- Pos Risk = Negative Expectancies of Positive 
Risk Taking; Risk- Assertiveness = Negative Expectancies of Assertiveness; Risk- Non-
avoidance = Negative Expectancies of Non-avoidance of Negative Emotions; Risk- Openness = 
Negative Expectancies of Positive Risk Taking Openness to New Activities; Risk- Sport Risk = 
Negative Expectancies of High Risk Sports; Risk- Social Risk = Negative Expectancies of Social 
Risk Taking.  
*** p < .001 
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Table 12. Correlations between AS and Positive Expectancies of Positive Risk Taking 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. ASI-3 ---       
2. Ben- Pos Risk .02 ---      
3. Ben- 
Assertiveness 
.01 .93*** ---     
4. Ben- Non-
avoidance 
.03 .93*** .86*** ---    
5. Ben -
Openness 
.01 .85*** .77*** .69*** ---   
6. Ben- Sport 
risk 
.00 .75*** .56*** .54*** .66*** ---  
7. Ben -Social 
risk 
.01 .95*** .97*** .93*** .77*** .54*** --- 
Note. ASI-3 = Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory- 3; Ben- Pos Risk = Positive Expectancies of 
Positive Risk Taking; Ben- Assertiveness = Positive Expectancies of Assertiveness; Ben- Non-
avoidance = Positive Expectancies of Non-avoidance of Negative Emotions; Ben- Openness = 
Positive Expectancies of Positive Risk Taking Openness to New Activities; Ben- Sport Risk = 
Positive Expectancies of High Risk Sports; Ben- Social Risk = Positive Expectancies of Social 
Risk Taking.  
*** p < .001 
 
Hypothesis Two- B. In terms of negative risk taking, it was predicted that several 
variables including positive expectancies, expressive suppression, and impulsivity would 
moderate the relationship between negative risk taking and AS. Specifically, higher AS 
individuals who had more positive expectancies, were higher in expressive suppression, 
and/or who had higher impulsivity would take more negative risks than their 
counterparts.  
Correlations were first assessed between variables. Table 13 presents correlations 
between negative risk taking behavior and variables predicted to be associated with 
negative risk taking behavior. Positive expectancies of negative risk taking and 
impulsivity were moderately, positively correlated with negative risk taking behavior.  
AS and expressive suppression were not significantly associated with negative risk taking 
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behavior or positive expectancies of negative risk taking. AS and expressive suppression 
were weakly, positively correlated with one another. Impulsivity (i.e., BIS-11-Total) was 
weakly, positively correlated with positive expectancies of negative risk taking and AS.  
 
Table 13. Correlations between Negative Risk Taking, Positive Expectancies of Negative 
Risk Taking, AS, Expressive Suppression and Impulsivity  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Negative Risk --     
2. Benefit- Neg 
Risk 
.47*** ---    
3. ASI-3 .13 .15 ---   
4.ERQ-
Suppression 
.10 .04 .23** ---  
5. BIS-11- Total .35*** .23* .27*** .13 --- 
Note. Negative Risk = Negative Risk Taking Composite; Benefit- Neg Risk = Positive 
Expectancies of Negative Risk Taking; ASI-3 = Anxiety Sensitivity Index- 3; ERQ- Suppression 
= Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, Suppression Scale; BIS-11-Total; Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale -11- Total Score. 
* p < .05; **p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
Assumptions for moderated regression were assessed in a similar manner as 
described for Hypothesis One. There was no indication of multicollinearity (no tolerance 
values > .91). Multivariate outliers were found for the interaction between AS and 
positive expectancies (n = 1), AS and expressive suppression (n = 3), and AS and 
impulsivity (n = 4). Analyses were conducted with and without outliers, and the 
outcomes were unchanged; therefore, outliers were left in final analyses3.  There were no 
points exceeding both leverage and Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized 
residuals against unstandardized predicted values showed homoscedasticity for AS and 
positive expectancies and AS and impulsivity. The plot of studentized residuals against 
                                                          
3 The interaction between AS and impulsivity predicting negative risk taking behavior was marginally 
significant (p = .08) when outliers were removed.   
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unstandardized predicted values for AS and expressive suppression showed 
heteroscedasticity, with the residual plot showing a decreasing funnel shape. Shapiro- 
Wilk’s test was significant for AS and positive expectancies, and AS and expressive 
suppression (p < .01), indicating that studentized residuals were not normally distributed. 
Visual inspection of the histogram showed that the residuals for AS and positive 
expectancies had a positive skew and were playtokurtotic. The residuals for AS and 
expressive suppression and AS and impulsivity were both positively skewed.  
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine the 
interaction between AS and positive expectancies of negative risk taking. AS and positive 
expectancies were added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 
20.1% of the total variance in negative risk taking, R2 = .201, F(2, 129) = 16.21, p < .01. 
Higher positive expectancies of negative risk taking were associated with more negative 
risk taking behavior (t(129)=33, β = .44, p < .01). AS was not associated with negative 
risk taking behavior (t(129)=33, β = .06, p = .44). The interaction between AS and 
positive expectancies was entered into step two of the model. The interaction between AS 
and positive expectancies did not account for significant change in the variance explained 
in negative risk taking, ∆R2 = .004, ∆F(1, 128) = .65, p = .42. 
A hierarchical multiple regression examining the interaction between AS and 
expressive suppression for negative risk taking was run. AS and expressive suppression 
were added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 2.1% of the 
total variance in negative risk taking, R2 = .021, F(2, 128) = 1.34, p = .27. The interaction 
between AS and expressive suppression was entered into step two of the model. The 
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interaction between AS and expressive suppression did not account for significant change 
in the variance explained in negative risk taking, ∆R2 = .004, ∆F(1, 127) = .54, p = .47. 
A hierarchical multiple regression examining the interaction between AS and 
impulsivity for negative risk taking was also run. AS and BIS total score were added 
simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for 12.3% of the total 
variance in negative risk taking, R2 = .123, F(2, 118) = 8.31, p < .001. Higher levels of 
impulsivity were associated with greater negative risk taking behavior (t(118)=33, β = 
.32, p < .01), but AS was not significantly associated with negative risk taking behavior 
(t(118) =33, β = .07, p = .43). The interaction between AS and impulsivity was entered 
into step two of the model. The interaction between AS and impulsivity did not account 
for significant change in the variance explained in negative risk taking, ∆R2 = .013, ∆F(1, 
117) = 1.78, p = .19. 
Hypothesis Three 
 Hypothesis Three examined the relations between laboratory decision making and 
naturalistic decision making.  
 Hypothesis Three- A. It was predicted that there would be positive correlations 
between BART outcome measures, BART adjusted pumps in particular, and positive risk 
taking in the real world. These findings could corroborate the notion that risk taking on 
the BART is advantageous, and therefore, can be considered a form of positive risk 
taking. In contrast to predictions, none of the BART outcome measures were significantly 
correlated with any of the naturalistic positive risk taking domains (Table 14).  
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Table 14. Correlations between BART Performance and Positive Risk Taking 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. BART- Adj --     
2. BART- Bursts .55*** ---    
3. Positive Risk -.03 .00 ---   
4. Social Risk -.02 -.03  ---  
5. Non-avoidance -.04 .03 .92*** .93*** --- 
Note. Bart- Adj = Average balloon pumps on the BART adjusted for balloon bursts; Bart- Bursts 
= Total sum of balloon bursts on the BART; Positive Risk = Positive Risk Taking Composite; 
Social Risk = Social Risk Taking Subscale of Positive Risk Taking Scale; Non-avoidance = Non-
avoidance of Negative Emotions Subscale of Positive Risk Taking Scale.  
*** p < .001 
 
Hypothesis Three- B. It was predicted that the relations between risk taking on the 
BART and positive risk taking in the real-world would be moderated by AS. 
Assumptions for moderated regression were assessed in a similar manner as described for 
Hypotheses One and Two. There was no indication of multicollinearity (tolerance values 
> .98). No multivariate outliers were identified. There were no points exceeding both 
leverage and Cook’s distance cut-offs. Plots of studentized residuals against 
unstandardized predicted values showed homoscedasticity. Shapiro-Wilk’s test indicated 
that the studentized residuals were normally distributed. 
A hierarchical multiple regression examining the interaction between AS and 
positive risk taking for BART adjusted pumps was run. AS and positive risk taking were 
added simultaneously into step one of the model which accounted for .2% of the total 
variance in BART adjusted pumps, R2 = .002, F(2, 124) = .15, p = .86. The interaction 
between AS and positive risk taking was entered into step two of the model. The 
interaction between AS and positive risk taking did not account for significant change in 
the variance explained in BART adjusted pumps, ∆R2 = .002, ∆F(1, 123) = .22, p = .64. 
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Contrary to predictions, AS did not interact with naturalistic positive risk taking to 
predict laboratory risk taking behavior on the BART task.  
Hypothesis Three- C. Specific predictions between negative risk taking in 
naturalistic settings and laboratory behavior were not made. Correlations between 
negative risk taking behavior and participants’ performance on each laboratory task were 
assessed to explore the relations between negative risk taking in naturalistic and 
laboratory settings (Table 15-17). Negative risk taking behavior in the real-world was not 
significantly correlated with risk taking behavior on any of the laboratory tasks.  
 
Table 15. Correlations between BART Outcome Measures and Negative Risk Taking 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. BART- Adj ----    
2. BART- Bursts .55*** ----   
3. Negative Risk  -.01 -.03 ----  
4. Work Risk .04 -.03 .86*** ---- 
Note. BART- Adj = Average balloon pumps on the BART adjusted for balloon bursts; Bart- 
Bursts = Total sum of balloon bursts on the BART; Negative Risk = Negative Risk Taking 
Composite; Work Risk = Work/School-Related Risk Taking Subscale of Negative Risk Taking 
Scale.  
*** p < .001 
 
Table 16. Correlations between IGT Outcome Measures and Negative Risk Taking 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. IGT- choice ----    
2. IGT- sum -.78*** ----   
3. Negative Risk  .12 -.13 ----  
4. Work Risk .12 -.10 .86*** ---- 
Note. IGT- choice = Number of choices from good decks subtracted from number of choices on 
bad decks on the IGT task; IGT- Sum = Total sum collected on the IGT task; Negative Risk = 
Negative Risk Taking Composite; Work Risk = Work/School-Related Risk Taking Subscale of 
Negative Risk Taking Scale. 
*** p < .001 
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Table 17. Correlations between PA Outcome Measures and Negative Risk Taking 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. PA- Om. Err. ----     
2. PA- Com. Err. -.43*** ----    
3. PA- sum -.08 -.75*** ----   
4. Negative Risk  .04 .04 -.04 ----  
5. Work Risk -.11 .07 -.06 .86*** --- 
Note. PA- Om. Err. = Errors of omission on the Passive Avoidance Task; PA- Com. Err. = Errors 
of commission on the Passive Avoidance Task; PA- sum = Total sum collected on the Passive 
Avoidance Task; Negative Risk = Negative Risk Taking Composite; Work Risk = Work/School-
Related Risk Taking Subscale of Negative Risk Taking Scale. 
*** p < .001 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
 Most previous research on anxiety and decision making using laboratory 
computer tasks did not connect findings to behavior in the real-world, leaving a large gap 
in our knowledge of how laboratory findings translate to real-life behavior. The current 
study filled this gap by assessing decision making in the laboratory with computer tasks 
and in real-world settings with the use of a daily diary. To this end, the current study 
addressed three aims. 
 A first aim of this study was to assess the relations between AS and naturalistic 
and laboratory risk taking behavior. In contrast to predictions, AS was not associated 
with risk taking on laboratory tasks or in naturalistic settings. In addition, predicted 
moderators did not interact with AS to explain significant variance in laboratory or 
naturalistic risk taking. These results suggest that, at least in the current sample of college 
students, other variables (e.g., impulsivity) may play a larger role in risk taking than 
anxiety sensitivity. 
 A second aim was to establish a measure assessing real-world positive risk taking. 
The currently available measure that assesses naturalistic risk taking (i.e., the CARE 
questionnaire) is largely made up of negative risk taking behaviors. Inclusion of positive 
risk taking behaviors can be beneficial as assessment of different types of risk taking 
could aid in understanding whether certain factors are involved in the propensity to take 
risks in general or only in taking particular types of risks.  
A final aim of this study was to examine the relations between risk taking in the 
laboratory and naturalistic settings. Overall, risk taking in the laboratory was not 
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associated with real-world risk taking. These findings suggest that findings using 
laboratory risk taking paradigms may not be generalized to real-world behavior. On the 
other hand, these results may imply that the current laboratory tasks assessed a particular 
type of risk taking that was not captured by the daily decision dairy.   
AS and Risk Taking on Laboratory Tasks  
According to the original hypotheses, performance on the BART would be 
predicted by approach and avoidance motivation as measured by the promotion and 
prevention scales, respectively, of the RFQ.  However, the promotion scale of the RFQ 
had low internal consistency in the current sample, and, thus, the RFQ scales were not 
used in the analyses. Instead another measure of approach and avoidance motivation, the 
BIS/BAS, was used for all analyses involving motivation. BAS subscales, including BAS 
Drive, Fun Seeking, and Reward Responsiveness, and the BAS total score were used as 
measures of approach motivation. The unitary BIS scale was utilized as a measure of 
avoidance motivation. These measures were all found to have high reliability. Based on 
Gray’s theory of motivation (Gray, 1982), subscales of the BIS/BAS assess approach and 
avoidance motivation. Predictions regarding the interaction between anxiety and 
motivation remained unchanged with the use of the BIS/BAS. Consistent with prior 
research (Pickett, Lodis, Parkhill, & Orcutt, 2012), higher AS levels were associated with 
higher BIS levels. Similarly, prior research has found that the BIS scale is associated with 
higher levels of neuroticism and associated traits such as depression and anxiety 
(Campbell-Sills, Liverant, & Brown, 2004). Higher AS levels were also associated with 
lower levels of BAS- Fun Seeking. AS was not related to any other BAS subscales. The 
current findings are also consistent with previous research which found that an 
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underactive BAS was more characteristic of depression while not being related to anxiety 
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2004).  
Based on findings from prior research, laboratory tasks with different risk/reward 
ratios were selected to assess different types of risk taking. More specifically, risk taking 
is beneficial up until a particular point on the BART (Maner et al., 2007), whereas risk 
taking on the IGT is generally not beneficial (e.g., Upton, Bishara, Ahn, & Stout, 2011). 
Consistent with this notion, risk taking on the BART (as assessed by adjusted balloon 
pumps) was associated with higher sum scores on the IGT and PA tasks, both of which 
are associated with task success. On the IGT, in particular, task success is associated with 
less risk taking. BART risk taking was also associated with more advantageous deck 
selections on the IGT (i.e., advantageous decks offer lower rewards and punishments on 
individual trials) and less commission errors on the PA task. Risky, disadvantageous 
decks selections on the IGT and commission errors on the PA task are both indicators of 
negative risk taking. These results provided evidence that risk taking on the BART 
differed from risk taking on the IGT and PA tasks. Specifically, risk taking on the BART 
was associated with less risk taking on the IGT and PA tasks. These results provide 
further evidence that risk taking on the BART is beneficial, unlike risk taking on the IGT 
and the PA task.  
As expected, advantageous deck selections on the IGT were associated with a 
higher overall sum earned on the IGT, suggesting that less risk taking on the IGT was 
associated with greater task success. Advantageous deck selections on the IGT were also 
associated with less commission errors on the PA task and higher overall earnings on the 
PA task. Commission errors are indicative of negative risk taking, while greater overall 
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earnings on the PA task are indicative of task success. These results suggest that the 
tendency to engage in negative risk taking was consistent across tasks. More omission 
errors on the PA task were also associated with less commission errors on the PA task; 
however, omission errors were not related to overall earnings on the PA task. Therefore, 
while omission errors do not appear to be detrimental or beneficial to overall task 
success, they may be related to heightened avoidance of both negative and positive risk 
taking.  
Overall, results examining the relations between and within laboratory task 
measures are consistent with the idea that the tasks with different risk-reward ratios 
assess different forms of risk taking. Specifically, risk taking on the BART may be 
considered beneficial or positive risk taking, while risk taking on the IGT is not 
considered beneficial. Within the PA task, commission errors were identified as a 
measure of negative risk taking due to their association with other negative risk taking 
behaviors (i.e., IGT “bad deck” selections) and worse PA task success.     
AS and BART Risk Taking. Contrary to predictions, neither AS nor motivation 
was associated with risk taking on the BART. In addition, the interaction between AS and 
motivation was not associated with risk taking on the BART. This is in contrast to prior 
studies demonstrating that BART risk taking is associated with level of anxiety (Maner et 
al., 2007). Previous studies have also shown that factors such as impulsivity and 
inattentiveness, characteristics of ADHD, influence BART risk taking. The current study 
did not find an association between impulsivity and BART risk taking; however, it is 
possible that other similar, unmeasured factors, such as ADHD symptoms, are more 
strongly associated with risk taking on the BART than AS. As discussed in the Methods 
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section, there are three different reward levels in the BART (i.e., 1 cent, 5 cents, and 25 
cents). The current study used a moderate reward (i.e., 5 cents). Prior research has shown 
impulsivity to influence risk taking only at the highest reward level (White et al., 2008). 
Research has also shown that monetary compensation for participation also increases risk 
taking (Ferrey & Mishra, 2014). These findings potentially explains why impulsivity was 
not associated with BART risk taking in the current study.   
Importantly, higher AS levels were significantly associated with greater levels of 
impulsivity in the current study, which was unexpected. According to Gray’s model of 
appetitive and aversive motivational drives (Gray, 1982), anxiety is posited to be 
associated with aversive motivational drives whereas impulsivity is expected to be 
associated with appetitive motivational drives. Appetitive and aversive motivational 
drives are supposed to be orthogonal and are therefore not expected to be associated with 
one another. Furthermore, anxiety and impulsivity would lead to opposite predictions 
regarding risk taking. While it would be predicted that heightened anxiety would be 
associated with avoidance of risk taking, it would be expected that impulsivity would be 
associated with heightened risk taking. It is possible that the significant association 
between anxiety and impulsivity in the current sample suppressed any potential 
association between approach and avoidance motivation on BART risk taking. 
Individuals with higher AS levels in the current study might behave differently than 
higher AS individuals in other studies, who may exhibit lower impulsivity levels. 
Different combinations of traits may have resulted in alterations in behavior through their 
differential impact on factors like motivation.  
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Lastly, levels of risk taking on the BART in the current study were lower than in 
previous studies, which could have contributed to results that are inconsistent with 
predictions. Specifically, both BART sum scores and BART adjusted pumps were lower 
than prior studies (e.g., White et al., 2008). The lower than typical levels of risk taking in 
the current sample may have dampened relations between anxiety and BART 
performance.   
 AS and IGT Risk Taking. Following up on prior research examining anxiety and 
risk taking on the IGT (Miu et al., 2008), it was predicted that AS and rumination would 
interact to influence maladaptive risk taking on the IGT. This hypothesis was not 
supported. Neither AS nor rumination was significantly associated with IGT risk taking. 
The interaction between AS and rumination also did not account for significant variance 
in the degree of risk taking behavior. Similar to risk taking on the BART, it is likely that 
other factors have a greater influence over risk taking on the IGT than AS in the current 
sample.  
 Differences in analytical strategy and sample characteristics might explain why 
current results contrast with prior finding. Many studies using the IGT analyzed 
performance across blocks (i.e., 5 blocks of 20 trials for the 100 total trials). However, 
the only study examining the relations between anxiety and IGT performance examined 
overall performance (Miu et al., 2008). Following Mui and colleagues, I examined 
overall performance on the IGT. The differences in analytical technique could alter the 
sensitivity of the IGT to find differences. However, post-hoc analyses of performance 
across blocks did not change interpretations of the null findings based on overall 
performance (see results section for further information).  While methods and analytical 
111 
 
  
techniques were modeled after Mui and colleagues study (2008), other differences 
existed. Mui and colleagues (2008) used a small sample size (n = 20) with an extreme 
group design (i.e., high and low anxiety groups) as opposed to a continuous sample used 
in the current study.      
 AS and PA Risk Taking. According to the hypotheses, the interaction between 
AS and motivation state would predict risk taking on the PA task. Results did not support 
the hypotheses as neither the interaction between AS and approach motivation nor AS 
and avoidance motivation were associated with PA risk taking. 
 Impulsivity was significantly associated with commission errors. Specifically, 
participants with higher levels of impulsivity made more commission errors. When 
participants make commission errors on the PA task, they are given immediate 
punishment feedback in the form of losing points. Thus, these findings may reflect a 
reduced sensitivity to punishment in impulsive individuals. Indeed, impulsivity has been 
found to be related to reduced sensitivity to punishing stimuli in prior studies (e.g., Potts, 
George, Martin, & Barratt, 2006).   
 Given that impulsivity was associated with AS, impulsivity was controlled for in 
analyses examining relations between AS and PA risk taking. Controlling for impulsivity 
did not change the relation between AS, motivation, and risk taking on the PA task. 
Similar to the IGT, differences in risk taking due to anxiety may be more pronounced 
when using extreme groups rather than assessing anxiety on a continuum. In the current 
study, individuals tended to make more commission errors and less omission errors 
overall.  These findings suggest that this sample of individuals was more likely to take 
risks on the PA task. However, due to a lack of normative data for the PA task, it is not 
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possible to determine if participants in the current sample were particularly risk averse or 
risk taking. Alternatively, results may also be due to participants’ lack of effort or 
attentiveness to the task, which may have suppressed any anxiety related differences in 
risk taking.    
AS and Naturalistic Risk Taking 
 AS and Positive Risk Taking. According to the hypotheses, AS was predicted to 
be associated with lower positive risk taking and higher levels of negative expectancies 
of positive risk taking. Results did not show any significant relations between AS and 
positive risk taking or AS and negative or positive expectancies of positive risk taking.  
As stated above, it is possible that characteristics of the current sample such as a 
lowered propensity to take positive risks and higher levels of impulsivity may have 
contributed to heterogeneity in positive risk taking in individuals with varying levels of 
anxiety. In addition, it is possible that individuals with higher AS levels avoid particular 
types of positive risk (e.g., taking a pay-cut to take a more rewarding job) that were not 
represented in the current study. Many of the naturalistic positive risk items assessed risk 
taking in social settings.  
Interestingly, anxious individuals in the current sample also did not expect more 
negative consequences from engaging in positive risk taking, another factor which likely 
played a role in the lack of differences in risk taking attributable to anxiety. These 
findings highlight the importance of assessing individuals’ perception of risk in 
understanding individuals’ engagement in risk taking behavior.  
 AS and Negative Risk Taking. It was predicted that the relations between AS 
and negative risk taking in naturalistic settings would be moderated by several variables 
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including impulsivity, expressive suppression, and positive expectancies. Prior studies 
have shown that the interaction between anxiety and positive expectancies of negative 
risk taking predicted significantly higher levels of negative risk taking behavior (Kashdan 
et al., 2006). In the current study, AS did not interact with any of the predicted moderator 
variables to account for negative risk taking behavior. However, there were main effects 
of positive expectancies and impulsivity for negative risk taking behavior. In particular, 
higher levels of positive expectancies and higher levels of impulsivity predicted more 
negative risk taking behavior, which is in line with prior research (Kashdan et al., 2006). 
Higher impulsivity levels also correlated with higher positive expectancies of negative 
risk taking. Thus, impulsive individuals may take more risks because they expect more 
benefits from taking negative risks and have a lower sensitivity to the punishments 
associated with negative risk taking. Again, the significant relation between positive 
expectancies of negative risk taking and involvement in negative risk taking behaviors 
suggests a significant role of individuals’ perception of risk in engagement in risky 
behavior.  
Laboratory and Naturalistic Risk Taking 
 Positive Risk Taking. It was predicted that risk taking on the BART would be 
associated with positive risk taking in the real world. It was also predicted that AS would 
moderate the relation between BART risk taking and naturalistic positive risk taking. 
Results did not support this hypothesis: Positive risk taking and BART risk taking were 
not significantly correlated with one another. In addition, the relation between BART risk 
taking and naturalistic positive risk taking was not moderated by AS. Considering 
significant correlations between laboratory tasks, these results suggest that BART risk 
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taking and naturalistic positive risk taking assessed different types of positive risk taking. 
Many of the naturalistic positive risk taking items assessed assertiveness, social risk 
taking, and non-avoidance of negative emotional states. In contrast, the BART captures 
financial or economic risk taking. In addition, environmental context might play an 
important role in influencing positive risk taking behavior. That is, risk taking in a 
laboratory situation may be fundamentally different from risk taking in a real-world 
setting. Regardless, the findings suggest that risk taking as assessed by BART 
performance should not be automatically extrapolated to real world positive risk taking 
behavior and vice-versa.  
 Negative Risk Taking. Specific hypotheses were not made regarding relations 
between risk taking on laboratory tasks and negative risk taking in real world settings. 
Thus, all analyses examining relations between laboratory risk taking behavior and 
naturalistic negative risk taking were exploratory in nature. Correlations were examined 
between laboratory risk taking and naturalistic negative risk taking. In general, laboratory 
risk taking behavior was not significantly associated with negative risk taking behavior in 
the real world. It is possible that, similar to explanations of null findings between BART 
risk taking and naturalistic positive risk taking, the CARE questionnaire did not capture 
the particular form of negative risk taking assessed by the IGT and PA task. 
Alternatively, as stated above, the context of laboratory and naturalistic risk taking may 
be fundamentally different such that behavior is not consistent from one setting to the 
other. 
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Implications  
 In the current sample of undergraduate students, anxiety was not significantly 
associated with any form of risk taking. These results were in contrast to predictions and 
much of the literature examining the association between anxiety and risky decision 
making. Given that impulsivity was significantly associated with AS, higher AS 
individuals in the current sample may represent a particular subtype of high AS 
individuals, exhibiting a pattern of risk taking behavior not represented in other studies. 
Higher levels of impulsivity in the current sample could be due to the sample being made 
up of young, primarily first-year female college students. While most research focuses on 
inhibited, anxious individuals, recent research recognizes that predominately inhibited 
anxiety is just one subtype of anxiety. In a study on naturalistic risk taking, Kashdan and 
colleagues (2008) identified a group of anxious individuals who took more risks than 
non-anxious individuals. Indeed, impulsivity and anxiety may be associated due to the 
involvement of overlapping brain regions. Specifically, studies have shown abnormal 
frontal lobe functioning in individuals with high levels of impulsivity and individuals 
with high levels of anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007; Crews & Boettiger, 2009). 
Consequently, it is advised to, at a minimum, assess and control for impulsivity levels 
when examining relations between anxiety and risk taking.  
 In spite of the potential role of the heightened impulsivity observed in the current 
sample, the fact that AS was not related to any measures of negative or positive risk 
taking in the current study remains puzzling. Prior studies have demonstrated a relatively 
consistent relation between anxiety and risk taking behavior. In addition, most theories 
regarding anxious behavior suggest that anxious individuals most likely will withdraw 
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from risk (e.g., Gray’s biopsychosocial theory of personality). Indeed clinical 
presentations of anxiety disorders often involve a high degree of risk aversion. The use of 
a normative sample rather than a clinical sample may have resulted in the lack of risk 
aversion in the current study. Perhaps risk aversion emerges further into the course of 
anxiety disorders, born out of fear conditioning, persistent avoidant behavior and 
negative interpretations of the consequences of risk taking behavior. The current study 
and Kashdan’s and colleagues (2006) study suggest that a new theory is necessary to 
fully describe how anxiety in normal samples influences risk taking. A new, more 
comprehensive theory may help to understand the conditions in which anxious 
individuals are more prone to take risks. For instance, demographic characteristics such 
as age, sex, and education level may play a role in levels and forms of risk taking 
behavior. Further investigations of co-occurring traits (e.g., impulsivity, which is 
discussed below) that influence risk taking may also clarify the instances in which risk 
taking is most and least likely to occur. Longitudinal studies may also help us understand 
when risk taking is most likely to occur as anxiety symptoms fluctuate over time.  
In the current study, impulsivity was a significant predictor of negative risk taking 
behavior in the real world and in the laboratory. These findings suggest that in a college 
sample, impulsivity is a good predictor of risk taking behavior. In addition, the current 
study only found associations between impulsivity and negative risk taking behavior and 
not positive risk taking behavior. It is not surprising that impulsivity predicts higher 
levels of risk taking; however, few studies examined the associations between impulsivity 
and risk taking in both naturalistic and laboratory settings within the same study. Further, 
the unique association between impulsivity and negative risk taking behavior, both in 
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naturalistic and laboratory settings, helps to further delineate negative and positive risk 
taking as distinct risk taking dimensions. Impulsivity is related to a reduction in 
sensitivity to punishment stimuli (e.g., Potts et al., 2006). In the current study, impulsive 
individuals did not withhold responses to punishing stimuli in the PA task, which might 
be due to their reduced sensitivity to punishment. In addition, the current study 
demonstrated a relation between impulsivity and positive expectancies of negative risk 
taking. Thus, interventions for impulsive individuals may benefit from focusing on 
altering their positive expectations of negative risk to decrease negative risk taking 
behaviors. 
 The current study was successful in differentiating positive and negative risk 
taking in the laboratory. Specifically, risk taking on the BART can be considered positive 
risk taking, whereas risk taking on the IGT can be considered negative risk taking. Clear 
distinctions between positive and negative risk taking in real world decision making were 
not found as many naturalistic positive and negative risk taking behaviors were correlated 
with one another. Perhaps negative and positive risk taking are not divergent in the real-
world for many individuals. A distinction between negative and positive risk taking in the 
laboratory, but not in naturalistic settings, point to the role environmental context may 
play in risk taking behavior. However, clear delineations of negative and positive risk 
taking do not exist in the literature. Providing clear distinctions between positive and 
negative may clarify the nature of avoidance in anxiety disorders and other mental health 
conditions. Avoidance plays such a significant role in the maintenance of anxiety and, 
thus, understanding the types of avoided and approached activities is clinically valuable. 
For example, knowing which activities are avoided could aid in informing assessment 
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and cognitive-behavioral interventions for anxiety disorders. Additionally, understanding 
the impact of interventions for anxiety on risk taking behavior could have great clinical 
relevance for emotional and physical health. Distinguishing between positive and 
negative risk taking while also highlighting the role of environmental context may also 
offer important information to inform further research in understanding how trait 
characteristics influence different types of risk taking.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
There were several limitations to the current research. First, the sample used in 
the current study consisted entirely of undergraduate students. The age of the sample may 
have contributed to the association between  anxiety and impulsivity in the current study, 
considering that frontal lobe development is not complete until the late 20s or even 30s 
(Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 1999). In addition, using a clinical 
sample could clarify the role of pathological anxiety in laboratory and naturalistic risk-
taking behavior given that risk aversion may not be manifested until an individual has 
developed or begins to develop an anxiety disorder. 
 Participants’ AS levels were assessed solely by a self-report measure. However, 
self-evaluation of various traits tends to have low validity and high variability (Mabe & 
West, 1982). Physiological measures of anxiety, such as galvanic skin conduction could 
be used in conjunction with self-report measures to increase validity of trait 
characterization of anxiety. Although better characterization of anxiety may be beneficial, 
reliability of AS in the current study was high and related to other relevant measures of 
anxiety (i.e., trait anxiety scale, social anxiety scale). Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that measurement of anxiety was adequate in the current study. 
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 Self-report was also utilized to assess all other trait characteristics and behavior in 
real world settings, which could introduce reporting biases. Regarding the assessment of 
risk taking behavior in real world settings, there was an additional limitation. Prompts to 
complete risk taking questionnaires were sent at a specified time point (i.e., 4 pm each 
day) over the course of a seven-day time period. That is, risk taking behavior was not 
assessed as it occurred but was reported retrospectively. Unfortunately retrospective 
reports of behavior may be inaccurate and subject to attention and memory biases. 
Obtaining reports of behavior at a specified time point could result in missed 
opportunities to observe behavior in real-time. Assessing behavior more frequently, such 
as through ecological momentary analyses or over a longer period of time (e.g., 30 days), 
may provide a more accurate and detailed representation of naturalistic behavior. At the 
same time, however, having a standardized time point of collecting data and a relatively 
short monitoring period might have increased compliance in collecting diary data.    
 Another limitation of this study was the use of computer-based decision making 
paradigms that concerned mainly economic/financial decision making. Both the BART 
and the IGT involved gaining and losing money, while the passive avoidance task 
involved gaining and losing points. Although computer tasks were economical in nature, 
prior research has provided evidence that these tasks are appropriate proxies of real world 
risk taking behavior in a variety of domains (e.g.,  Lejuez et al., 2002; Xu, Korczykowski, 
Zhu, & Rao, 2013). Specifically, Lejuez and colleagues (2002) found that self-reported 
engagement in addictive behaviors (e.g., smoking status, alcohol consumption) and 
general risk taking behaviors (e.g., amount of times stealing) was positively correlated 
with performance on the BART. Even so, many of the items used in the decision making 
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diary in the current study, especially positive risk items, were social and emotional in 
nature. Thus, a future avenue for assessing risk taking in anxiety would be to incorporate 
computer tasks with more social-based risk taking and/or to include more economic or 
financial risk taking items to real-world risk taking measures. 
Another limitation of the computer-based decision making paradigms was that 
participants did not earn actual monetary compensation from the points earned on the 
tasks. Thus, the points earned may not have provided salient enough incentive to 
influence effort on the tasks. To address this limitation and to ensure adequate level of 
motivation, I informed participants that individuals who performed better than average 
would be entered into a lottery to win a gift card. In reality, all participants were entered 
into this drawing).  
Understanding the role of anxiety in risk taking behavior is highly important in 
better understanding the clinical presentation of anxiety and its treatment. Avoidance 
plays a critical role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders; however, 
avoidance is not always straightforward, such as in simple phobias. This was 
demonstrated in the current study. Contrary to prior findings, anxiety-related alterations 
in risk taking behavior were not found in either laboratory or naturalistic settings. While 
results did not support hypotheses, valuable information was obtained that demonstrated 
circumstances in which anxiety may not be associated with risk taking. The findings from 
the current study also provided support for the distinction between negative and positive 
risk taking which can be utilized to inform future research on risk taking. Lastly, the 
current findings suggest that impulsivity plays an important role in risk taking with long-
term negative consequences demonstrating insensitivity to punishing ramifications in 
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favor of short-term benefits. Clearly, more research is needed to better understand the 
effects of anxiety on negative and positive risk taking while considering levels of 
impulsivity. 
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                APPENDIX A: CONSENT FORM 
Laboratory-Based and Naturalistic Decision Making 
Informed Consent Form 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Amanda Kutz, a 
graduate student in the Department of Psychology at the University of Maine (Faculty Sponsor: 
Dr. Lira Yoon). The purpose of the research is to investigate the decision making in different 
settings. You must be at least 18 years of age to participate without parental permission. 
What Will You Be Asked to Do? 
 If you decide to participate, you will be asked to complete a laboratory session and a 
daily diary involving logging emotions and engagement in certain activities for 7 days.  
 Laboratory Session 
o For this session, you will complete computer tasks and questionnaires (e.g., 
“Indicate how often you feel lonely,” “It scares me when my heart beats 
rapidly,”) in a laboratory in Little Hall. Computer tasks involve making decisions 
based on task goals. Each computer task will take between 10-15 minutes to 
complete. Following the computer tasks, you will be asked to complete 
questionnaires on a computer. The laboratory session will last approximately one 
hour.  
 Daily Diary Monitoring 
o Following the laboratory session, you will be asked to complete questionnaires 
assessing emotions (e.g., “Distressed,” Upset”) and daily activities including 
substance use (e.g. “Tried drugs other than alcohol or marijuana”) and 
participation in certain activities (e.g., “Played non-contact team sports”). You 
will be asked to complete these questionnaires each day for 7 days beginning on 
the nearest Monday. You will receive emails each day at 4pm with a link to 
complete the daily survey. Questionnaires will take approximately 10-15 minutes 
each day to complete.   
Risks 
 There is the possibility that you may become uncomfortable answering some of 
the questions. You have the right to skip questions you do not want to answer. 
Benefits 
 While there are no direct benefits to you from participating, we hope this study 
will help us to better understand the ways individuals make decisions. 
 
Compensation 
 You will receive 2 hours of research credit for participating in this study 
(Laboratory session =1 credit, Daily Diary Monitoring = 1 credit). In addition, if 
you complete all 7 days of the daily diary monitoring by 11:59pm each day, you 
will receive $5 cash.  
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Confidentiality 
Your name will not be on any of the documents. Your name and email address will be needed if 
you wish to participate in daily diary monitoring portion of the study so that the experimenter 
(i.e., Amanda Kutz) can contact you with survey links each day of the study. This information 
will not be shared with anyone other than the individuals named above. A code number will be 
used on all study files to protect your identity. Study files will be labeled with an ID number in 
place of a name and will be maintained in a locked office. All electronic files will be maintained 
with password protection. Your name or other identifying information will not be reported in any 
publications. The key linking your name to the data will be destroyed after data analysis is 
complete (approximately in one year), but the investigator will keep the data, which only contains 
an ID number instead of your name, indefinitely. The key and the data files will be stored on 
separate computers. In addition, the file containing the key will be stored using software that 
provides additional protection.  
 
Voluntary 
Participation is entirely voluntary. You are free to refuse to participate in the study or 
withdraw your consent at any time during the study without giving reason. You may skip any 
questions you do not wish to answer. If you decide to withdraw, your credit compensation will be 
prorated. 
Contact information: 
If you have questions about this screening, please contact Amanda Kutz (email: 
Amanda.Kutz@umit.maine.edu). You may also reach the faculty advisor on this study, Dr. Lira 
Yoon at lira.k.yoon@umit.maine.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact Gayle Jones, Assistant to the University of Maine’s Protection of 
Human Subjects Review Board at 581-1498 (or e-mail: gayle.jones@umit.maine.edu). 
 
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understand the above information 
and agree to participate. You will receive a copy of this form. 
 
 
_______________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
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APPENDIX B: LABORATORY QUESTIONNAIRES 
ASI-3 
Enter the number from the scale below that best describes how typical or characteristic 
each of the 16 items is of you, putting the number next to the item. You should make 
your ratings in terms of how much you agree or disagree with the statement as a general 
description of yourself.   
 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 very little  a little  some  much  very much 
 
1. It is important for me not to appear nervous. 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that I might be going crazy. 
3. It scares me when my heart beats rapidly. 
4. When my stomach is upset, I worry that I might be seriously ill. 
5. It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task.  
6. When I tremble in the presence of others, I fear what people might think of me.  
7. When my chest feels tight, I get scared that I won’t be able to breathe properly. 
8. When I feel pain in my chest, I worry that I’m going to have a heart attack.  
9. I worry that other people will notice my anxiety.  
10. When I feel “spacey” or spaced out I worry that I may be mentally ill.  
11. It scares me when I blush in front of people. 
12. When I notice my heart skipping a beat, I worry that there is something seriously 
wrong with me. 
13.  When I begin to sweat in a social situation, I fear people will think negatively of 
me. 
14. When my thoughts seem to speed up, I worry that I might be going crazy. 
15. When my throat feels tight, I worry that I could choke to death. 
16.  When I have trouble thinking clearly, I worry that there is something wrong with 
me. 
17. I think it would be horrible for me to faint in public.  
18. When my mind goes blank, I worry there is something terribly wrong with me. 
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STAI 
Directions 
A number if statements which people have 
used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then 
blacken in the appropriate circle to the 
right of the statement to indicate you 
generally feel. 
 
 
Almost 
Never 
 
Sometimes Often 
Almost 
Always 
 
1. I feel pleasant 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
2.  I feel nervous and restless. 1 2 3 4 
3.  I feel satisfied with myself. 1 2 3 4 
4.  I wish I could be as happy as other 
seem to be. 
1 2 3 4 
5.  I feel like a failure. 1 2 3 4 
6.  I feel rested. 1 2 3 4 
7.  I am “calm, cool, and collected”. 1 2 3 4 
8.  I feel that difficulties are piling up 
so that I cannot  overcome them. 
1 2 3 4 
9.  I worry too much over something 
that really doesn’t matter. 
1 2 3 4 
10.  I am unhappy. 1 2 3 4 
11.  I have disturbing thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
12.  I lack self-confidence. 1 2 3 4 
13.  I feel secure. 1 2 3 4 
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14.  I make decisions easily. 1 2 3 4 
15.  I feel inadequate. 1 2 3 4 
16.  I am content. 1 2 3 4 
17.  Some unimportant thought runs 
through my mind and bothers me. 
1 2 3 4 
18.  I take disappointments so keenly 
that I can’t put them out of my 
mind. 
1 2 3 4 
19.  I am a steady person. 1 2 3 4 
20.  I get in a state of tension or 
turmoil as I think over my recent 
concerns and interests. 
1 2 3 4 
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SPS 
 
For each of the following statements, mark the appropriate answer in the space 
next to that statement. Indicate, using the 0 to 4 scale below, the degree to which the 
statement is typical or true of you IN GENERAL. 
 
0-----------------1-----------------2-----------------3------------------4 
 
 
 
 
_____ 1. I became anxious if I have to write in front of other people. 
_____ 2. I become self-conscious when using public toilets. 
_____ 3. I can suddenly become aware of my own voice and of others listening to me. 
_____ 4. I get nervous that people are staring at me as I walk down the street. 
_____ 5. I fear I may blush when I am with others. 
_____ 6. I feel self-conscious if I have to enter a room where others are already seated. 
_____ 7. I worry about shaking or trembling when I’m watched by other people. 
_____ 8. I would get tense if I had to sit facing other people on a bus or a train. 
_____ 9. I get panicky that others might see me faint, sick, or ill. 
_____ 10. I would find it difficult to drink something if in a group of people. 
_____ 11. It would make me feel self-conscious to eat in front a stranger at a restaurant. 
_____ 12. I am worried people will think my behavior odd. 
_____ 13. I worry I’ll lose control of myself in front of other people. 
_____ 14. I worry I might do something to attract the attention of others. 
_____ 15. I would get tense if I had to carry a tray across a crowded cafeteria. 
_____ 16. When in an elevator I am tense if people look at me. 
_____ 17. I can feel conspicuous standing in a line. 
_____ 18. I can get tense when I speak in front of other people. 
_____ 19.  I worry my head will shake or nod in front of others. 
_____ 20. I feel awkward and tense if I know people are watching me. 
  
Not at all typical of 
me 
Extremely typical of 
me 
Very Moderately Slightly 
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BIS/BAS 
 
Read each statement carefully and decide whether it is a “true” or and “untrue” 
description of your usual reaction in that particular situation.  Then decide “how true” or 
“how untrue” the statement is, and use the following scale to indicate how the statement 
describes your reaction: 
 
1 = quite untrue of you 
2 = slightly untrue of you 
3 = slightly true of you 
4 = quite true of you 
 
____ 1. If I think something unpleasant is going to happen I usually get pretty “worked 
up.” 
____ 2. When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized. 
____ 3. When I want something I usually go all-out and get it. 
____ 4. I worry about making mistakes. 
____ 5. When I’m doing well at something, I love to keep at it. 
____ 6. I go out of my way to get things I want. 
____ 7. Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit. 
____ 8. When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly. 
____ 9. If I see a chance to get something I want, I move on it right away. 
____ 10. I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry at me. 
____ 11. It would excite me to win a contest. 
____ 12. When I go after something I use a “no holds barred” approach. 
____ 13. Even if something bad is about to happen to me, I rarely experience fear or 
nervousness. 
____ 14. When I see an opportunity for something I like, I get excited right away. 
____ 15. I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something. 
____ 16. I have very few fears compared to my friends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
 
  
CES-D 
 
Instructions:  Below is a list of ways people sometimes feel or behave.  For each item, 
please think and indicate how often or how consistently you have felt or behaved this 
way during THE PAST TWO MONTHS by circling the appropriate response number. 
During the past two months: 
 0 = RARELY (less than 3 days over the past two months) 
 1 = SOMETIMES (a total of 3- 7 days spread out over the past two months) 
 2 = OFTEN (a total of 1- 4 weeks over the past two months) 
 3 = MOST OF THE TIME (4 weeks or more) 
 
1.  I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.   0     1     2     3 
 2.  I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.     0     1     2     3 
3.  I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my   
family or friends.          
 4.  I felt that I was just as good as other people.     0     1     2     3 
 5.  I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.    0     1     2     3 
 6.  I felt depressed.         0     1     2     3 
 7.  I felt that everything I did was an effort.      0     1     2     3 
 8.  I felt hopeful about the future.       0     1     2     3 
 9.  I thought my life had been a failure.      0     1     2     3 
10. I felt fearful.         0     1     2     3 
11. My sleep was restless.        0     1     2     3 
12.  I was happy.         0     1     2     3 
13.  I talked less than usual.        0     1     2     3 
14.  I felt lonely.         0     1     2     3 
15.  People were unfriendly.        0     1     2     3 
16.  I enjoyed life.         0     1     2     3 
17.  I had crying spells.        0     1     2     3 
18.  I felt sad.          0     1     2     3 
19.  I felt that people dislike me.       0     1     2     3 
20.  I could not get “going”.        0     1     2     3  
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Rumination Scale  
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of 
the items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost 
always think or do each one when you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what 
you generally do, not what you think you should do. 
 
1 almost never  2 sometimes  3 often  4 almost always 
 
 
1. think about how alone you feel  
2. think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this”  
3. think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  
4. think about how hard it is to concentrate  
5. think “What am I doing to deserve this?”  
6. think about how passive and unmotivated you feel.  
7. analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed 8. think about how 
you don’t seem to feel anything anymore  
9. think “Why can’t I get going?”  
10. think “Why do I always react this way?”  
11. go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  
12. write down what you are thinking about and analyze it  
13. think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  
14. think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”  
15. think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  
16. think “Why can’t I handle things better?”  
17. think about how sad you feel.  
18. think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  
19. think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything  
20. analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed  
21.go someplace alone to think about your feelings  
22. think about how angry you are with yourself 
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) 
Instructions and Items  
We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, 
how you control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions 
below involve two distinct aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional 
experience, or what you feel like inside. The other is your emotional expression, or 
how you show your emotions in the way you talk, gesture, or behave. Although 
some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, they differ in 
important ways. For each item, please answer using the following scale: 
1-----------------2------------------3------------------4------------------5------------------6------------------7 
strongly      neutral      strongly 
            disagree           agree 
 
 
1 ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what I’m 
thinking about.  
 
2 ____ I keep my emotions to myself.  
 
3. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m 
thinking about.  
 
4. ____ When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.  
 
5. ____ When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that helps 
me stay calm.  
 
6. ____ I control my emotions by not expressing them.  
 
7. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation.  
 
8. ____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.  
 
9. ____ When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.  
 
10. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
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Regulatory Focus Pride (RFQ) 
 
This set of questions asks you HOW FREQUENTLY specific events actually occur or 
have occurred in your life. Please indicate your answer to each question by circling the 
appropriate number below it. 
 
 
1. Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
                            or seldom 
 
2. Growing up, would you ever “cross the line” by doing things that your parents would not 
tolerate? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
   or seldom 
 
 
3. How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to work even harder? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
   or seldom 
 
4. Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
    or seldom 
 
5. How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
   or seldom 
 
6. Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were objectionable? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
   or seldom 
 
7. Do you often do well at different things that you try? 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
                or seldom 
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8. Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
   or seldom 
 
9. When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t perform as 
well as I ideally would like to. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Never      Sometimes   Very Often 
   or seldom 
 
10. I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Certainly false      Certainly true 
 
11. I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate 
me to put effort into them. 
1  2  3  4  5 
Certainly false      Certainly true 
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Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale – Short Form 
Please indicate the number that best corresponds to how much you agree with each item. 
 
Not at all 
characteristic 
of me 
A little 
characteristic 
of me 
Somewhat 
characteristic 
of me 
Very 
characteristi
c of me 
Entirely 
characteristic 
of  
me 
1. Unforeseen events upset me greatly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. It frustrates me not having all the 
information I need. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Uncertainty keeps me from living a 
full life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. One should always look ahead so as 
to avoid surprises. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. A small unforeseen event can spoil 
everything, even with the best of 
planning. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. When it’s time to act, uncertainty 
paralyses me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. When I am uncertain I can’t function 
very well. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. I always want to know what the 
future has in store for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I can’t stand being taken by surprise. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. The smallest doubt can stop me 
from acting. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I should be able to organize 
everything in advance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I must get away from all uncertain 
situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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BIS-11 
 
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is 
a test  to measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and 
put an X on the appropriate circle on the right side of this page. Do not spend too much 
time on any  statement. Answer quickly and honestly. Answer questions on the following 
scale:  
1= Rarely/Never, 2= Occasionally, 3= Often, 4= Almost Always/Always 
 
1. I plan tasks carefully.  
2. I do things without thinking.  
3. I make-up my mind quickly.  
4. I am happy-go-lucky.  
5. I don’t “pay attention.”  
6.  I have “racing” thoughts.  
7.  I plan trips well ahead of time.  
8. I am self controlled.  
9. I concentrate easily.  
10. I save regularly.  
11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures.  
12. I am a careful thinker.  
13. I plan for job security.  
14. I say things without thinking.  
15. I like to think about complex problems.  
16. I change jobs.  
17. I act “on impulse.”  
18. I get easily bored when solving thought problems.  
19. I act on the spur of the moment.  
20. I am a steady thinker.  
21. I change residences.  
22. I buy things on impulse.  
23. I can only think about one thing at a time.  
24. I change hobbies.  
25. I spend or charge more than I earn.  
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.  
27. I am more interested in the present than the future.  
28. I am restless at the theater or lectures.  
29. I like puzzles.  
30. I am future oriented. 
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The College Self-Expression Scale 
The following inventory is designed to provide information about the way in which you 
express yourself. Please answer the questions by checking the appropriate box from 0-4 
(Almost Always or Always, 0; Usually, 1; Sometimes, 2; Seldom, 3; Never or Rarely, 4) 
on the computer answer sheet. Your answer should reflect how you generally express 
yourself in the situation.  
1. Do you ignore it when someone pushes in front of you in line?  
2. When you decide that you no longer wish to date someone, do you have marked 
difficulty telling the person of your decision?  
3. Would you exchange a purchase you discover to be faulty?  
4. If you decided to change your major to a field which your parents will not 
approve, would you have difficulty telling them?  
5. Are you inclined to be over-apologetic?  
6.  If you were studying and if your roommate were making too much noise, would 
you ask him to stop?  
7. Is it difficult for you to compliment and praise others?  
8. If you are angry at your parents, can you tell them?   
9. Do you insist that your roommate does his fair share of the cleaning?   
10.  If you find yourself becoming fond of someone you are dating, would you have 
difficulty expressing these feelings to that person?  
11. If a friend who has borrowed $5.00 from you seems to have forgotten about it, 
would you remind this person?   
12. Are you overly careful to avoid hurting other people’s feelings?  
13. If you have a close friend whom your parents dislike and constantly criticize, 
would you inform your parents that you disagree with them and tell them of your 
friend’s assets?  
14. Do you find it difficult to ask a friend to do a favor for you? 
15. If food which is not to your satisfaction is served in a restaurant, would you 
complain about it to the waiter?  
16. If your roommate without your permission eats food that he knows you have been 
saving, can you express your displeasure to him?  
17. If a salesman/woman has gone to considerable trouble to show you some 
merchandise which is not quite suitable, do you have difficulty in saying no?  
18. Do you keep your opinions to yourself?  
19. If friends visit when you want to study, do you ask them to return at a more 
convenient time?  
20. Are you able to express love and affection to people for whom you care?  
21. If you were in a small seminar and the professor made a statement that you 
considered untrue, would you question it?  
22. If a person of the opposite sex whom you have been wanting to meet smiles or 
directs attention to you at a party, would you take the initiative in beginning a 
conversation? 
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23. If someone you respect expresses opinions with which you strongly disagree, 
would you venture to state your own point of view?   
24.  Do you go out of your way to avoid trouble with other people?  
25.  If a friend is wearing a new outfit which you like, do you tell that person so?  
26. If after leaving a store you realize that you have been “short-changed,” do you  go 
back and request the correct amount?  
27. If a friend makes what you consider to be an unreasonable request, are you able to 
refuse? 
28.  If a close and respected relative were annoying you, would you hide your 
feelings rather than express your annoyance’?  
29. If your parents want you to come home for a weekend but you have made 
important plans, would you tell them of your preference?   
30. Do you express anger or annoyance toward the opposite sex when it is justified? 
31. If a friend does an errand for you, do you tell that person how much you 
appreciate it?  
32. When a person is blatantly unfair, do you fail to say something about it to him?  
33.  Do you avoid social contacts for fear of doing or saying the wrong thing?  
34.  If a friend betrays your confidence, would you hesitate to express annoyance to 
that person?  
35. When a clerk in a store waits on someone who has come in after you, do you call 
his attention to the matter?  
36. If you are particularly happy about someone’s good fortune, can you express this 
to that person?   
37. Would you be hesitant about asking a good friend to lend you a few dollars?  
38. If a person teases you to the point that it is no longer fun, do you have difficulty 
expressing your displeasure?  
39. If you arrive late for a meeting, would you rather stand than go to a front seat 
which could only be secured with a fair degree of conspicuousness?  
40. If your date calls on Saturday night 15 minutes before you are supposed to meet 
and says that he/she has to study for an important exam and cannot make it, would 
you express your annoyance? 
41. If someone keeps kicking the back of your chair in a movie, would you ask him to 
stop?  
42. If someone interrupts you in the middle of an important conversation, do you 
request that the person wait until you have finished?  
43. Do you freely volunteer information or opinions in class discussions?  
44. Are you reluctant to speak to an attractive acquaintance of the opposite sex?  
45. If you lived in an apartment and the landlord failed to make certain necessary 
repairs after promising to do so, would you insist on it?  
46. If your parents want you home by a certain time which you feel is much too early 
and unreasonable, do you attempt to discuss or negotiate this with them?47. Do 
you find it difficult to stand up for your rights?  
47. If a friend unjustifiably criticizes you, do you express your resentment there and 
then?  
48. Do you express your feelings to others?  
49. Do you avoid asking questions in class for fear of feeling self-conscious. 
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APPENDIX C: DAILY DIARY MONITORING INSTRUCTIONS 
Diary Monitoring Instructions 
Thank you for completing the laboratory portion of the study. You have earned 1 
credit for you participation so far. For the next part of the study, we will ask you to fill 
out questionnaires daily for 7 days at home on your computer. These questionnaires will 
ask you to report on daily activities and current emotions you may be experiencing. 
Questionnaires take approximately 10-15 minutes to complete per day.  
You will begin filling out questionnaires on the nearest Monday. You will receive 
prompts to complete each daily questionnaire via email address you provide to us (thus 
you should provide an email where you can be easily reached). Prompts will be sent at 
4pm daily. If you do not complete the questionnaires by 10pm, another reminder prompt 
will be sent. Questionnaires should be completed by 11:59pm. If you are not able to do 
this, please alert Amanda Kutz on FirstClass (Amanda.Kutz@umit.maine.edu).  
You will earn 1 more credit for completion of the diary portion of the study. Thus, 
you will earn 2 credits for your participation in all study procedures. In addition, you will 
earn $5 in cash if you complete all 7 days of the diary portion of the study. To earn the 
$5, you must complete all 7 days of before 11:59pm each day. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between behavior in the 
laboratory and real-world behavior. Few studies examine these relationships, thus results 
of this study may help fill that gap in knowledge. Your participation is important and 
highly valued.  
If you have any questions about study procedures or run into any difficulties, you 
may contact Amanda Kutz (Amanda.Kutz@umit.maine.edu) at any time. Thank you 
again for your participation!  
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APPENDIX D: DIARY QUESTIONNAIRES 
CARE QUESTIONNAIRE 
EVENTS 
For each of the activities listed below, please indicate if you have participated in this 
activity in the past 24 hours. 
 
                  Indicate Yes/No  
1. Tried/used drugs other than alcohol or marijuana          _____________ 
 
2. Missed class or work              _____________ 
 
3. Grabbed, pushed, or shoved someone           _____________ 
 
4. Left a social event with someone I have just met                     _____________ 
 
5. Drove after drinking alcohol             _____________ 
 
6. Made a scene in public             _____________ 
 
7. Drank more than 5 alcoholic beverages           _____________ 
 
8. Not studied for exam or quiz                        _____________ 
 
9. Drank alcohol too quickly             _____________ 
 
10. Disturbed the peace              _____________ 
 
11. Damaged/destroyed public property            _____________ 
 
12. Sex without protection against pregnancy                _____________ 
 
13. Left tasks or assignments until the last minute          _____________ 
 
14. Hit someone with a weapon or object           _____________ 
 
15. Rock or mountain climbed             _____________ 
 
16. Sex without protection against sexually transmitted disease          _____________ 
 
17. Played non-contact team sports            _____________ 
 
18. Failed to do assignments              _____________ 
 
19. Slapped someone              _____________ 
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20. Not studied or worked hard enough              _____________ 
 
21. Punched or hit someone with fist              _____________ 
 
22. Smoked marijuana                _____________ 
 
23. Snow or water skied                _____________ 
 
24. Mixed drugs and alcohol               _____________ 
 
25. Got into a fight or argument               _____________ 
 
26. Involved in sexual activities without my consent            _____________ 
 
27. Played drinking games               _____________ 
 
28. Sex with someone I have just met or don’t know well                    _____________ 
 
29. Played individual sports                          _____________  
 
30. Volunteered to help someone 4              _____________ 
 
31. Dealt (i.e., did not leave the situation) with a feared individual      _____________ 
 
32. Dealt (i.e., did not leave the situation) with a fear animal           _____________ 
 
33. Endured pain or physical discomfort without the use of medicine   
          (excluding over the counter medications)             _____________ 
34. Stood up to someone                _____________ 
 
35. Performed in public (e.g., public speaking)             _____________ 
 
36. Performed a difficult task                _____________ 
 
37. Expressed love/affection/gratitude to a friend/family member         _____________ 
 
38. Expressed annoyance/frustration with a friend/family member      _____________ 
 
39. Asked/answered a question in class                         _____________ 
 
40. Attempted to clear up a misunderstanding with someone           _____________ 
                                                          
4 Items 30-43 are additional items, which are not in the original CARE questionnaire, included to assess 
positive risk taking.  
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41. Made small talk with a stranger              _____________ 
 
42. Tried a new activity                _____________ 
 
43. Asked someone I liked out on a date              _____________ 
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EXPECTED BENEFITS 
On a scale of 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely), HOW LIKELY IS IT 
THAT YOU WOULD EXPERIENCE SOME POSITIVE CONSEQUENCE (e.g., 
pleasure, win money, feel good about yourself, etc.) if you were to engage in these 
activities? 
                                             ________________Positive Consequences___________ 
             Not at all                          Moderately                     Extremely 
   Likely         Likely                         Likely 
1. Tried/used drugs other than 
alcohol or marijuana 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Missing class or work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Grabbing, pushing, or 
shoving someone 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Leaving a social event with 
someone I have just met 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Driving after drinking 
alcohol 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Making a scene in public 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Drinking more than 5 
alcoholic beverages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Not studying for exam or 
quiz 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. Drinking alcohol too 
quickly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. Disturbing the peace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Damaging/destroying 
public property 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Sex without protection 
against pregnancy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Leaving tasks or 
assignments for the last 
minute 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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14. Hitting someone with a 
weapon or object 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Rock or mountain climbing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Sex without protection 
against sexually 
transmitted diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Playing non-contact team 
sports 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Failing to do assignments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. Slapping someone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. Not studying or working 
hard enough 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Punching or hitting 
someone with fist 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. Smoking marijuana 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Sex with multiple partners 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. Snow or water skiing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
25. Mixing drugs and alcohol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26. Getting into a fight or 
argument 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. Involvement in sexual 
activities without my 
consent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. Playing drinking games 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. Sex with someone I have 
just met or don’t know 
well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. Playing individual sports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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31. Volunteered to help 
someone  
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32.  Dealt (i.e., did not leave 
the situation) with a feared 
individual 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. Dealt (i.e., did not leave 
the situation) with a fear 
animal  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. Endured pain or physical 
discomfort without the use 
of medicine (excluding 
over the counter 
medications) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. Stood up to someone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. Performed in public (e.g., 
public speaking)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37. Performed a difficult task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38. Expressed 
love/affection/gratitude to a 
friend/family member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. Expressed 
annoyance/frustration with 
a friend/family member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40. Asked/answered a question 
in class 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41. Attempted to clear up a 
misunderstanding with 
someone 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42. Made small talk with a 
stranger 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43. Tried  new activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44. Asked someone I liked out 
on a date  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
159 
 
  
EXPECTED RISKS 
On a scale of 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (extremely likely), HOW LIKELY IS IT 
THAT YOU WOULD EXPERIENCE SOME NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCE 
(e.g., become sick, be injured, embarrassed, lose money, suffer legal consequences, 
fail a class, or feel bad about yourself) if you engaged in these activities? 
                                            _______________Negative Consequences___________ 
              Not at all                          Moderately                    Extremely 
  Likely          Likely                        Likely 
45. Tried/used drugs other than 
alcohol or marijuana 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46. Missing class or work 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
47. Grabbing, pushing, or 
shoving someone 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
48. Leaving a social event with 
someone I have just met 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
49. Driving after drinking 
alcohol 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
50. Making a scene in public 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
51. Drinking more than 5 
alcoholic beverages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
52. Not studying for exam or 
quiz 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
53. Drinking alcohol too 
quickly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
54. Disturbing the peace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
55. Damaging/destroying 
public property 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
56. Sex without protection 
against pregnancy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
57. Leaving tasks or 
assignments for the last 
minute 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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58. Hitting someone with a 
weapon or object 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
59. Rock or mountain climbing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
60. Sex without protection 
against sexually 
transmitted diseases 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
61. Playing non-contact team 
sports 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
62. Failing to do assignments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
63. Slapping someone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
64. Not studying or working 
hard enough 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
65. Punching or hitting 
someone with fist 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
66. Smoking marijuana 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
67. Sex with multiple partners 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
68. Snow or water skiing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
69. Mixing drugs and alcohol 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
70. Getting into a fight or 
argument 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
71. Involvement in sexual 
activities without my 
consent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
72. Playing drinking games 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
73. Sex with someone I have 
just met or don’t know 
well 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
74. Playing individual sports 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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75. Volunteered to help 
someone   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
76.  Dealt (i.e., did not leave 
the situation) with a feared 
individual 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
77. Dealt (i.e., did not leave 
the situation) with a fear 
animal  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
78. Endured pain or physical 
discomfort without the use 
of medicine (excluding 
over the counter 
medications) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
79. Stood up to someone 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
80. Performed in public (e.g., 
public speaking)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
81. Performed a difficult task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
82. Expressed 
love/affection/gratitude to a 
friend/family member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
83. Expressed 
annoyance/frustration with 
a friend/family member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
84. Asked/answered a question 
in class 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
85. Attempted to clear up a 
misunderstanding with 
someone 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
86. Made small talk with a 
stranger 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
87. Tried  new activity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
88. Asked someone I liked out 
on a date  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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PANAS Questionnaire 
 This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. 
 
 
 
 
__________ 1. Interested __________ 11. Irritable 
__________ 2. Distressed __________ 12. Alert 
__________ 3. Excited __________ 13. Ashamed 
__________ 4. Upset __________ 14. Inspired 
__________ 5. Strong __________ 15. Nervous 
__________ 6. Guilty __________ 16. Determined 
__________ 7. Scared __________ 17. Attentive 
__________ 8. Hostile __________ 18. Jittery 
__________ 9. Enthusiastic __________ 19. Active 
__________ 10. Proud __________ 20. Afraid 
 
 
 
  
1   2   3   4   5  
    Very Slightly            A Little        Moderately          Quite a Bit    Extremely 
    or Not at All 
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APPENDIX E: DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
In this study, you were told that participants who performed better than average 
on the computer task would be entered into a drawing for one of two $20 gift card to 
Amazon.com. The purpose of this was to increase motivation to perform well on tasks. In 
actuality, all participants will be entered into this drawing regardless of their performance 
on the task. You will be notified via email if you have won the drawing when the study is 
completed.  
 
If you have any further questions about this study, please feel free to contact 
Amanda Kutz on FirstClass (Amanda.Kutz@umit.maine.edu).  
 
Thank you again for your participation!
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